Foundation of Misery :
The Nehruvian Era
PART-I
Kashmir, Tibet, India-China War, Integration of Hyderabad,
Foreign Policy & External Security
by
Rajnikant Puranik
Categories: Non-fiction, History
Copyright © 2020 Rajnikant Puranik
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Preface
Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
—George Santayana
It has been said that the road to hell is often paved with best intentions,
and despite the probable best intentions, ‘The Nehruvian Era, 1947–64’
unfortunately laid the firm foundations of India’s misery. The same are
detailed in this two-part book. This part deals with the major foreign policy
and external security issues.
Chapter-1 gives an overview of the history of J&K, and details
chronologically how Nehru, by arrogantly ignoring wise councils and
making one blunder after another, single-handedly created the Kashmir
problem that bedevils India till today.
Chapter-2 details how creation of Pakistan-II was frustrated by Sardar
Patel by a firm policy on the integration of the Hyderabad Princely State,
despite Nehru’s muddle-headedness.
Chapter-3 is a sad story on how India under Nehru pusillanimously and
irresponsibly created a permanent severe external security threat for India
by allowing our peaceful neighbour Tibet to be erased as a nation, without
even registering a protest in the international fora.
Chapter-4 is the shocking story of how India drifted into an unnecessary
war with China in 1962 by failing to settle the borders peacefully, despite
an overlong time of a decade and a half to settle it, willingness of China to
do so, and the multiple opportunities that presented themselves; and how
with irresponsibly no preparation, Nehru&Co shamed India before the
world in that war.
Chapter-5 summarises the many foreign policy and external security
failures of the Nehruvian era.
— Rajnikant Puranik
To the fond memory of my late parents
Shrimati Shakuntala and Shri Laxminarayan Puranik
Thanks to
Devbala, Manasi, and Manini
A Note on Citations & Bibliography
Citations are given as super-scripts in the text, such as {Azad/128}.
Citation Syntax & Examples
{Source-Abbreviation/Page-Number}
e.g. {Azad/128} = Azad, Page 128
{Source-Abbreviation/Volume-Number/Page-Number}
e.g. {CWMG/V-58/221} = CWMG, Volume-58, Page 221
{Source-Abbreviation} … for URLs (articles on the web), and for digital
books (including Kindle-Books), that are searchable, where location or
page-number may not be given.
e.g. {VPM2}, {URL15}
{Source-Abbreviation/Location-Number}… for Kindle Books
e.g. {VPM2}, {VPM2/L-2901}
Example from Bibliography Table at the end of this Book
Azad B Maulana Abul Kalam Azad—India Wins Freedom.
Orient Longman. New Delhi. 2004
CWMG D,
W
Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 1 to 98.
http://gandhiserve.org/e/cwmg/cwmg.htm
URL15 U Article ‘Nehru vs Patel: Ideological Rift, Hardly a
Trivial One. Rakesh Sinha, Sunday Express. 10-Nov-
2013.
www.pressreader.com/india/sunday-
express8291/20131110/282033324959792
VPM2 K,
D
V.P. Menon—The Transfer of Power in India. Orient
Longman. Chennai. (1957) 1997.
books.google.co.in/books?id=FY5gI7SGU20C
The second column above gives the nature of the source: B=paper Book,
D=Digital Book/eBook other than Kindle, K=Kindle eBook, U=URL of
Document/Article on Web, W=Website, Y=YouTube.
Detailed Table of Contents
{ 1 } Nehru’s Kashmir Botch-up
J&K’s Geography
Outline of Kashmir’s History
Kashmir, Maharaja Ranjit Singh & Dogras
Kashmir, Nehru’s Hubris & Patel’s Resignation
J&K Timelines, British Games & Nehru’s Blunders
Article-370, thanks to Nehru
Sardar’s 547 Successes & Nehru’s Kashmir Failure
Sardar, VP Menon & Kashmir
{ 2 } Preventing Pakistan-II : Sardar vs. Nehru
Historical Background
Status at Independence
Razakars and Nizam
Nizam–British–Mountbatten–Nehru vs. Sardar Patel
Operation Polo, thanks to Sardar, and Despite Nehru
Resistance by Nehru & the British to Any Action
Sardar’s Decision for Action & Attempt to Abort it
The Actual Operations
Hailing Hyderabad’s Liberation
Sardar Patel, Post Liberation
{ 3 } Tibet : Erasing a Nation
The Historical Background
Shimla Convention, 1913-14: Outer/Inner Tibet & McMahon
Line
1914-1950 : Tibet de-facto Independent
Tibet’s Importance and its Water Resources
Erasure of Tibet as a Nation
Chronology
Could China have been prevented?
Sardar Patel’s Approach
Nehru’s Meek, Delusional Note of 1950
Nehru’s Other Delusional Notes
Independent India: Less Concerned about itself than the
British!
Independent India’s Indifferent Approach
India Promoting China in the UN!
India’s Indifference to Tibet in the UN!
The Blunder called Panchsheel
Why the Untenable Approach?
Strange and Baffling Rationalisation
Further Examples of Nehru’s Non-Policy on Tibet
{ 4 } Himalayan Misadventure
Border History till Independence
India-Tibet Border Segments
Ladakh-Tibet Border & Aksai Chin
The McMahon Line
Mid-Segment
Sikkim-Tibet Border
Post-Independence Scenario
What should have been done post-Independence
China’s Stand
India’s Stand
India Unilaterally Changed Maps, July-1954
Onwards to Disaster: 1950–61
Towards Disaster: Dec-1961 Onwards
Stand of Other Countries: Failure of Nehru’s Foreign Policy
China’s Strategy, Attitude & Response
Analysis of & Accountability for the Disaster
The Guilty Men
Ill-Treating Thimayya & Others, Promoting ‘Yes-Men’
India’s Faulty Approach
Why Fix the Borders Unilaterally?
Why the Intransigence?
India’s Military “Preparation”
No Planning and No Intelligence
Sweep Under the Carpet
Neglecting to Use Air-Force
Israel’s Example
Not Taking Responsibility
Reactions of the Media and the Public
Summarising Himalayan Blunders
Nehru’s Insufferably Arrogant Protégé
The Current Status
{ 5 } Foreign Policy & External Security
Innocent on British Intentions
J&K : A Foreign Policy Failure
Letting Go of Gwadar
Giving Away of Indian Territory.
Nehru–Liaquat Pact 1950
No to India's UNSC Membership
Advocating UN/UNSC seat for China
No Initiative on Sri Lankan Tamil Problem
Delayed Liberation of Goa
Nehru’s NO to Nuclear Arms
No Settlement with Pakistan
Indus Water Treaty (IWT): Nehru’s Second Himalayan Blunder
Nehru & Israel
International Record in Insecure Borders
Neglecting Southeast Asia
India vs. the US, UK & the West
‘Non-Alignment’: Not Aligned with National Interests
Criminal Neglect of Defence & External Security
Foreign to Foreign Policy
{ 6 } Bibliography
{ 1 }
NEHRU’S KASHMIR BOTCH-UP
J&K’S GEOGRAPHY
Geographically, J&K was the biggest of the princely States with a
population of about 40 lacs. Its location was strategic. Its northern
boundaries touch Afghanistan, USSR and China, with Pakistan to its west,
and India to the south. Control-wise, J&K comprises three parts, otherwise
seven parts.
(A) Area under the control of India:
(1) Jammu in the south, which is largely Hindu.
(2) Ladakh in the east, which is Buddhist.
(3)Kashmir Valley: An oval-shaped valley in the middle—between PoK
to the north and west, Jammu to the south, and Ladakh to the east—often
referred to as just Kashmir, which is predominantly Muslim.
(B) Area under the control of China:
(4) Aksai Chin in the north-east, under the control of China.
(5) Shaksgam Valley in the north, illegally ceded by Pakistan to China.
(C) Area under the control of Pakistan:
(6) Gilgit-Baltistan in the north.
(7) Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad divisions in the north-west
referred to as PoK or Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir.
The length of the Kashmir valley, including the inner slopes of its
surrounding hills, is about 120 miles from north-west to south-east, the
greatest width being 75 miles, and the total area about 6000 square miles.
The basin is about 84 miles long and 20 to 24 miles wide. Its mean height is
6000 feet above the sea level.
To the north of the valley are the main ranges of Himalayas. To the east
is Ladakh separated by the Himalayas. Pir Panjal range encloses the valley
from the west and the south, separating it from the Great Plains of northern
India.
Srinagar, its capital, is located in the heart of the Kashmir valley at an
altitude of 1,730 metres, that is, 5674 feet above sea level, and is spread on
both sides of the river Jhelum. Its two lakes—Dal and Nagin—enhance its
picturesque setting. The Indus, Jhelum, Tawi, Ravi and Chenab are the five
major rivers that flow through the state.
67% of the population of J&K under the Indian control is Muslim.
However, Kashmir valley is about 97% Muslim.
Area of Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir Valley divisions are respectively
59000, 26000 and 16000 sq km out of the total of 1,01,000 sq km, forming
respectively 58%, 26% and 16% of the total area of J&K within India’s
control.
However, the total area of J&K is 2,22,000 sq km. Therefore, 1,21,000
sq km amounting to 54% of the total, that is, more than half, is illegally
occupied by Pakistan and China: 78,000 sq km amounting to 35% of the
total area of J&K by Pakistan; 38,000 sq km amounting to 17% of the total
by China; and 5,000 sq km, that is, 2% of the total that was illegally handed
over by Pakistan to China.
OUTLINE OF KASHMIR’S HISTORY
How Kashmir Got its Name
Kashmir got its name from Kashyap, the sage who founded it. Kashyap-
mir aka Kashyapmir aka Kashmir means the land of Kashyap Rishi.
Kashmir was then a home of rishis and scholars. The land of Kashmir
nourished Shaivism, Vaishnavism and Buddhism, and spread them for the
benefit of mankind.
Legend has it that Shiva, at the instance of Kashyap, struck the earth
with his trident, and a river flowed from the spot. The river was named
Vitasta, now called Jhelum. As per a popular belief, many generations of
Pandavas ruled over Kashmir, and that the temple atop the hill of
Shankaracharya in Srinagar dates from the Pandava era.
Rajatarangini—meaning the ‘River of Kings’—is a historical chronicle
of Kashmir from the earliest times, written in Sanskrit in the twelfth century
by Kalhana, a Kashmiri Brahmin.
BCE: Buddha, Ashok & Srinagar
Regarding the environment of Kashmir as ideal for meditation and
religious life, Buddha had desired it to be the focal point for the spread of
his message.
Ashoka annexed Kashmir in the Mauryan empire, founded the ancient
capital, Srinagari, about 5 kilometres away from the current capital in
3rd Century BCE, and constructed a number of temples, Buddha Vihars and
Stupas. Ashoka's son, Jaluka, said to have been born after Ashoka's prayers
at the famous Shiv temple at Harmuktaganga in Kashmir, remained a
Hindu, and ruled Kashmir. The present Srinagar was founded by
Pravarasena-II.
1st Century CE: Kushans
Kushans of Turkish nationality established their foothold in Kashmir, its
famous rulers being Hushak, Jushak and Kanishka. Kanishka adopted
Buddhism and declared Buddhism as the State religion. He made Kashmir a
powerful centre for propagating Buddhism, and it spread to many countries
during his time: Ladakh, Tibet, Central Asia, China, Korea and Japan, and
even to Afghanistan and Turkey.
Hu Shih, a former Chinese Ambassador to USA, had commented:
“India conquered and dominated China culturally for 20 centuries without
ever having to send a single soldier across her border.”
The sacred tooth-relic of Buddha was also with the King of Kashmir. It
was taken away by Emperor Harshavardhana, whose capital was Kanauj.
Harshavardhana exercised a weak suzerainty over Kashmir. Incidentally, the
tooth-relic was later taken to Sri Lanka: it is enshrined at Sri Dalada
Maligawa Temple or The Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy in Sri
Lanka.
6th–7th Century CE
Mihirakula, a Hun, took refuge in Kashmir, upon being defeated in
northern India. He was cruel. During one of his armed campaigns his
elephant slipped from the Pir Panjal mountain. The animal’s terrible and
painful cry excited and delighted Mihirakula so much that he ordered
pushing down 100 elephants at a time from the mountain!
Kashmiris, particularly Shaiva Pandits, ultimately managed to make him
change his ways. He adopted Shaivism, took up its cause, and displaced
Buddhism in the process.
After the death of Mihirakula, Kashmir remained under local rulers, and
then under Pratapaditya, a very able minister of King Vikrmaditya of
Ujjain, sent there as the head of the state.
He was followed by King Meghwahan, a very able leader, born in the
Afghan city of Gandhar—now Kandahar—an important centre of
Buddhism. His wife, Amritprabha, was the daughter of the king of Assam,
then under the influence of Vaishnavism. That’s how Vaishnavism arrived
in Kashmir. She built a Buddhist monastery, the flagstaff of which came
from the king of Sri Lanka—such was the unity of India from up north to
the far south.
Incidentally, Hiuen-Tsang aka Yuan Chwang aka Xuanzang, a Chinese
pilgrim, visited India during the reign of Harsha and stayed in India for
almost 15 years—630 to 645 CE. His experiences are recorded in his book
Si-Yu-ki. As per Hiuen-Tsang, Kashmir then was a great centre of
Buddhism. He spent two years in Kashmir studying Sutras and Shastras.
7th Century CE: Lalitaditya, the Great Ruler
Kashmiri power was at its zenith during the reign of Lalitaditya in the
seventh century CE, when it spread to Tibet in the east, and to Punjab and
Kanauj in the south. One of the main reasons of his success was religious
tolerance: Hindus and Buddhists living together in harmony.
Lalitaditya was a great administrator, and introduced a number of
innovative methods for efficient and just administration. He was also a great
builder. He built a number of towns, temples, viharas and stupas. The grand
Temple of Martanda, in honour of sun-god, was built by him, at a place now
called Matan. About the temple, Younghusband, the explorer, had
commented: “The temple is built on the most sublime site occupied by any
building in the world...”
Lalitaditya respected all religions, and even though a Hindu—a Vishnu
worshipper—he established a number of Buddhist monasteries and temples.
His army chief was a Buddhist and his officers belonged to various sects.
9th–10th Century CE. Avantivarman, Abhinavagupta
9th Century CE . Avantivarman ruled Kashmir for 28 years (855–883
CE), bringing to it unprecedented prosperity. Avantivarman focussed all his
energies on development and welfare, shunning wars. He implemented
many schemes to develop agriculture, including irrigation and drainage.
He prohibited killing of any living creature. In Kalhana’s words: “At
that time, the shad fish left the cold water without fear, and coming to the
river banks sunned their backs in the autumn sun.”
He founded the town of Avantipur and built two magnificent temples
there—Avamtiswamin and Avantiswara—whose ruins even are a great
tourist attraction. Sopore, then called Suyyapur, was also built during his
time—Suyya was a genius whose services Avantivarman had utilised to the
hilt.
Adi Shankara from South India visited Sharada Peeth in Kashmir in the
ninth century CE.
10th Century CE . Abhinavagupta (950–1020 CE), born in the Valley of
Kashmir, was one of India's greatest philosophers and mystics, besides
being a polymath, a musician, a poet, a dramatist, a theologian, and a
logician; and wrote 35 works, the largest and the most famous of which is
Tantraloka, an encyclopaedic treatise on Trika and Kaula—Kashmiri
Shaivism. He also wrote Abhinavabharati, a commentary on Natyashstra of
Bharat Muni.
Controversial queen Didda ruled Kashmir during 958–1003 CE, first as
a Regent for her son and various grandsons, and 980 CE onwards as sole
ruler and monarch.
11th Century CE: Mahmud Ghazni Bites Dust
Mahmud of Ghaznavi, who had wreaked havoc in Somnath, Mathura
and elsewhere in India, was forced to lick dust by the king of Kashmir,
Sangramraj, not once, but twice—in 1015 CE and then in 1021 CE, after
which he did not dare to again attack Kashmir.
12th Century CE: Jaya Simha
Jaya Simha ruled Kashmir for about 27 years during 1128–55 CE. He
was a great king in the tradition of Lalitaditya and Avantivarman; and
devoted himself to development and public welfare. He constructed a
number of temples and ‘maths’.
1320 CE: Destroyer Dulacha, the Mongol
Dulacha, a Mongol from Turkistan, attacked Kashmir in early fourteenth
century CE during summer, vandalized it for several months, and totally
ruined it—they looted and burnt cities and villages. While men were put to
sword, women and children were taken away as slaves. While returning, his
army was trapped at the Banihal Pass by a fierce blizzard, and none
survived. That was the revenge Kashmir took on Dulacha and his
marauders.
1320 CE: Rinchin & How KPs Scored a Self-Goal
At the time of the attack by Dulacha the king of Kashmir was one
Sahadev, who had fled. A young warrior from Ladakh, Rinchin, assisted by
one Shah Mir and several others, had tried to resist the marauders and save
people to the extent possible.
Post Dulacha, although Sahadev tried to make a comeback, the position
of the king was wrested in 1320 CE by Rinchin, also called Rinchana.
Rinchin was a Buddhist, and by that time Buddhism had almost disappeared
from the Valley, and Hinduism was the dominant religion, Shaivism having
made a comeback. Islam was on the fringe, and was at the time being
propagated by Saiyyid Bilal Shah, popular as Bulbul Shah. The first
mosque, now called Bulbul Langar, was constructed by him.
It is worth highlighting an interesting episode. After Sahadev fled and
Dulacha left, Sahadev’s Army Chief, Ramchandra, occupied the throne.
But Rinchin, who had a key post in Sahadev’s administration, plotted and
eliminated Ramchandra, and sat in his place. To pacify the public provoked
by the misdeed, he married Kotarani, daughter of Ramchandra.
At Kotarani’s behest, discarding Buddhism, Rinchin adopted Shaivism to
become acceptable to the public. But the Kashmiri Pandits refused to
accept him in their fold, saying that his conversion was not feasible—a
legend says they couldn’t decide which caste to put him in. As a reaction to
the rebuff, and at the instance of Shah Mir, Rinchin then approached Bulbul
Shah, who converted him to Islam, and gave him the name Sultan Malik
Sadruddin.
Rinchin later built a mosque called the Bodro Masjid, venerated both by
the Ladakh Buddhists and the Kashmiri Muslims. With the king converted
to Islam, many others followed. And thus Islam spread in the Kashmir
Valley.
This is how Pandits scored a self-goal. So, in a way, the Kashmiri
Pandits have themselves to blame for inadvertently giving a push to the
Islamisation of the Valley, though it was the later state-backed campaign—
through preaching, patronage, incentives and forced conversions—that
reduced the Pandits from an overwhelming majority to a minority.
1339 CE: Shah Mir & Islamisation
After the pre-mature death of Rinchin, Shah Mir, who had helped
Rinchin earlier, took over after defeating an attempt at takeover by the
associates of Sahadev. Incidentally, Shah Mir was a young man from the
valley of Swat—a stunningly beautiful valley now in NWFP in Pakistan,
adjoining Afghanistan. It is said that Shah Mir had a dream one night in
which a holy man told him to go to Kashmir where he would become a
king, and believing the same, he had come to Kashmir. Shah Mir and his
dynasty ruled Kashmir for over 220 years starting 1339 CE. He called
himself Sultan Shamsuddin.
With Shah Mir at the helm, the gradual process of Islamisation of
Kashmir commenced. It was done tactfully. He gradually brought in
Muslim scholars, religious preachers and Syeds from Khurasaan/Persia,
Turkey and other regions, and provided them all amenities. With the state
patronage, they established many preaching centres where people were also
given free food, and influenced them into conversion. Gradually, a powerful
Converted–Brahmin–Muslim–Class promoted by the Syeds and the state
emerged, which helped further conversions. The initial tact and liberalism
later gave way to forcible conversions.
1389-1413 CE: Sultan Sikandar & Islamisation
Sultan Sikandar, a descendent of Shah Mir, ruled Kahmir during 1389–
1413 CE. In order to raise ransom money to pacify Taimur, who was likely
to attack, seized wealth of Hindu temples and imposed Jiziya tax, and at the
instance of Mullahs and fanatics and such hordes, and assisted by them,
broke idols, engaged in forcible conversions, and enforced ban on music.
He came to be known as ‘but-shikan’—destroyer of idols. This heralded the
Islamic communalism and terror in Kashmir. During Sikandar’s reign,
thousands of Syeds from West and Central Asia came to Kashmir, and
started their bloody campaigns of conversion. Sikandar decreed, “Either
adopt Islam, or accept death or banishment.” Out of fear, many Hindus
converted, many migrated, and many committed suicide. A few who
remained were forced to pay crushing taxes—jiziya—and had to live with
terrible difficulties and ignominies.
Sikandar destroyed and set ablaze the famous Martanda Temple.
Vijeshwar, another famous temple at Bijbehara, and scores of other temples
around it were also demolished, and a mosque was built from their stones.
Pushed by the Syeds, Sikandar set on fire all the books: mostly religious
and cultural texts, history and literature in Sanskrit—Sanskrit was the
Kashmiri language then. It is often said that Hindus did not have a tradition
of maintaining written records and history, and that’s why so much is not
known. Those who say this forget how books were burnt wholesale all
across India by the bigoted Muslim hordes from the northwest. Nalanda
library reportedly burned for six months after it was set ablaze by the
Turkic Muslim invaders under Bakhtiyar Khilji in 1193. The invaders
destroyed India’s inheritance and books. A few books that remained were
what individuals could preserve with them.
It is said that after several decades of repression, only 11 Pandit
families were left in the Valley. They came to be called Malamasis, and
thereafter belonged to that new sub-caste. Those who had deserted and had
left the Valley even temporarily came to be classified under the slightly
inferior sub-caste, Banamasis.
It was the reign of Sultan Sikandar that led to predominance of Muslims
in the population of Kashmir.
1420–70 CE: Bud Shah, the Great King
Shah Khan, also known as Sultan Zainul Abidin or Zain-ul-Abidin, who
later became famous as Bud Shah—the Great King—ascended the throne at
the age of 19 in 1420 and ruled for 50 years. He ensured justice for all,
banned state-sponsored conversion, abolished jiziya, gave religious
freedom, and promoted education. Architecture, arts, crafts and music
flourished during his time, and there was peace and prosperity.
There is an interesting story about one Vaidraj Pandit Shri Bhat. A mere
two years after his ascension, the Sultan was afflicted with a severe ailment.
Nobody was able to treat him. Finally, Vaidraj came on the scene and cured
him. In gratitude, Sultan offered him immense wealth of gold, diamonds
and jewels. Vaidraj politely turned down the offer and instead requested for
a few things for the people. His request included stoppage of atrocities on
Hindus; rebuilding of damaged or destroyed temples; allowing reconversion
of forcibly converted Hindus; inviting back the Hindus who had fled the
terror of Sikandar; re-opening of Sanskrit schools; abolition of jiziya; and
repairs to libraries. Impressed by the selflessness of Vaidraj Bhat, the Sultan
readily agreed to all his requests.
Something unique about Bud Shah was appointment of an official to
oversee expansion of Hinduism, persuading the Hindus who had left the
Valley to return, and state-supported reconversion!
Pandits were also inducted into bureaucracy. He recommenced the nine-
day celebration of the Festival of Flowers—unique to Kashmir—earlier
banned by zealots. He became a very popular king.
1470 CE: The Bigots Hyder Shah & Descendents
Bud Shah’s son, Hyder Shah, who came on the scene in the 1470s, and
his descendents, however, returned to the ways of Sikandar. During the
Islamic rule in India, kings being fair and reasonable were rare exceptions,
like say Bud Shah or Akbar. Prodded mainly by the foreign preachers and
Syeds, they went about setting up “Darul Islam” in the Valley, unleashing
conversions, destroying temples and torturing Hindus.
1586–1658 CE: Akbar & Descendants
1586 CE . Kashmir came under Akbar in 1586. He abolished jiziya,
which had been re-imposed, and restored equality of all faiths. It was Akbar
who introduced the idea of having houseboats for residential purposes on
the Dal Lake. His reign is remembered for peace and stability it brought
about, and in effectively fighting one of the worst famines of Kashmir by
providing employment to people through massive public works that were
started in Kashmir, and importing massive quantities of grains from Punjab.
Peace and stability continued in Kashmir under Akbar's descendents.
1605–1628 CE . Jahangir aka Nur-ud-din aka Salim ruled Kashmir. He
got the famous Shalimar Gardens, also called the Mughal Gardens, built in
Srinagar for his wife Nur Jahan in 1616.
1628–1658 CE . Shah Jahan ruled Kashmir. Nishat, Achabal, Chasme
Shahi and Pari-Mahal were built during the times of Jahangir and Shah
Jahan.
1658–1707 CE: The Despicably Diabolic Bigot Aurangzeb
With Aurangzeb (1658–1707 CE), given his intolerance to other faiths,
including Shias, things began to decline in the rest of India and also in
Kashmir.
Aurangzeb built a record of sorts for intolerance and cruelty. As per
many historians, the number of temples destroyed by him can be counted in
four figures! He ordered destruction of Kashi Vishwanath temple, Keshav
Dev temple—Krishna's birth place—in Mathura, the rebuilt Somnath
temple on the coast of Gujarat and so on—it is a long list. As per certain
descriptions, the work of destruction was often accompanied by wanton
desecration, such as the slaughtering of cows in the sanctuary and causing
the idols to be trodden down. At many places he had the temples replaced
by mosques. Aurangzeb’s contemporaries and his own noblemen of the
court have written approvingly about these acts.
1675 CE: Sacrifice of Shri Guru Teg Bahadur
Aurangzeb, during his 49-year rule, deputed Subedars to Kashmir for
Islamisation. Subedars Iftihar Khan was the cruellest, who during 1671-75
forced many to adopt Islam. A delegation of Kashmiri Pandits under the
leadership of Pandit Kripa Ram met Shri Guru Teg Bahadur, and narrated
their pitiable condition and requested him to intervene. The compassionate
and brave Shri Guru Teg Bahadur took up their cause and challenging
Aurangzeb that “if Aurangzeb could convert him to Islam, every Hindu
would also become a Muslim”, proceeded to Delhi. Shri Guru Teg
Bahadur's group was arrested when they reached Delhi.
Aurangzeb gave the Guru two options: death or conversion to Islam.
The Guru opted for sacrificing his life. First Bhai Dayal, an associate of the
Guru, was thrown in a boiling pot and killed, as per the fatwa of the royal
Qazi. Bhai Sati Das, another associate, was packed in a bale of cotton and
was set ablaze. Bhai Mati Das, the third one, was cruelly sawed to death!
Finally, the Guru was beheaded.
Sikh Guru sacrificed for the Hindus. And, recall, what the Congress-led
mob did to Sikhs during the anti-Sikh attacks in 1984. Uncivilised don’t
read history, or may be, they read a doctored Nehruvian-Marxist-Leftist
version, with all such references removed.
Incidentally, Gurdwara Sis Ganj Sahib is built at the site in Chandni
Chowk in Old Delhi, where that brave ninth Sikh Guru, Shri Guru Teg
Bahadur, was beheaded: on Wednesday, November 24, 1675, to be exact. It
is the site of the Guru’s martyrdom in the cause of the Hindus. And, most
regretfully one has to say that the Congress-led mob of 1984 had also
targeted that Gurdwara! What could be worse!!
Renaming of Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi.
The British had named a road in New Delhi after Aurangzeb.
Incidentally, Sardar Patel residence after independence was 1, Aurangzeb
Road. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee had petitioned the
Prime Minister in November 2014 to change the name of Aurangzeb Road
to Guru Tegh Bahadur Road after the name of the ninth Sikh guru who was
executed in Delhi on the orders of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzebas, as a
tribute to him on his martyrdom anniversary observed on 24 November.
East Delhi BJP MP Maheish Girri wrote to the PM on 31 July 2015 with a
request to “correct the mistakes made in our history”, and to rename the
road as Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Road in honour of the late President. The
New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC), under whose jurisdiction the
matter fell, took the decision to rename the road as Dr APJ Adbul Kalam
Road on 28 August 2015; although the suggestion of Tarek Fatah, the
Canadian writer and activist of Pakistani origin, to rename it as Dara Shikoh
(enlightened secular brother of Aurangzeb) Road, was perhaps more
appropriate (some other prominent road could have been named after Dr
Kalam).
As expected, the leftists, communists, socialists, history-distortionists,
fake-seculars and fake-liberals objected to the renaming: also, the
politicians from all political parties (Congress, NCP, JDU, BSP, and so on)
who saw in there an opportunity to buttress their Muslim vote-bank—the
intriguing point being when both Aurangzeb and Kalam were Muslims,
why preference for the cruel option!
1750 CE: Barbarian Afghan Abdali
After Aurangzeb, there was further deterioration in the quality of rule
from Delhi. Kashmir was captured by the Afghans under Ahmad Shah
Abdali around 1750, and it saw its worst time in history for many years. As
per one description, the bigoted Afghans went to the insane extent of
crushing all flowers in the great gardens of Kashmir, except for the green
“Islami” flowers!
KASHMIR, MAHARAJA RANJIT SINGH & DOGRAS
To Maharaja Ranjit Singh goes the credit of subduing Abdali. He
brought Kashmir under his control in 1819. Maharana Ranjit Singh was a
highly tolerant and capable king. He died in 1839.
Dogras
Maharaja Hari Singh was a Dogra king from Jammu who ruled over
J&K at the time of partition of India.
The name Dogra comes from the Sanskrit word Dogirath, which means
two lakes. The two lakes are Mansar and Siroinsar around which the Dogras
are settled. These lakes are in the Jammu region to the north of Punjab.
Dogras are Rajputs, who came from Delhi and Awadh to defend India
against Alexander, the Greek invader.
Dogras preserved their kingdom, but remained a dependency, by paying
an annual tribute to the Sikhs, when they became powerful in the late
eighteenth century.
Later (1830 CE), the Dogras entered the service of Maharaja Ranjit
Singh.
Dogra Gulab Singh
Dogra Gulab Singh joined Ranjit Singh's army as a commander, and
rose quickly on account of his distinguished services. Impressed, Ranjit
Singh ultimately rewarded him by making him Raja of his traditional family
possession, Jammu, of course, under Ranjit's control.
As Raja of Jammu, he extended his territory and annexed Bhimber,
Rajouri, Bhadarwah and Kishtwar, and later Baltistan and Ladakh. All this
was made possible by his brave Wazir, Zorawar Singh.
Ladakh, thanks to Zorawar Singh, the Great General
Writes KM Pannikar: “Before Zorawar Singh, no army from Hindustan
had attacked Tibet. No Indian ruler had thought of conquering it and no
Indian general accustomed to the heat of the plains had ever dared to face
the hostility of the Tibetan climate.”{Jag/69}
In 1841, Zorawar Singh took on Tibet, and aimed to capture Lhasa.
However, the bad weather did him in. Tibetan army then attacked Ladakh,
but was thrown out by a new army sent by Gulab Singh. A peace treaty was
signed in 1842 between the representatives of Gulab Singh and Dalai Lama,
by which the boundaries between Tibet and Ladakh were accepted.
However, the boundaries were not well-demarcated. The area around
Minsar near Mansarover lake, held by the Rajas of Ladakh since the last
three centuries, was retained by the Jammu government. The revenue from
Minsar which lies hundreds of miles inside Tibet was being received by the
J&K Government regularly till 1948.
It is thanks to Zorawar Singh that Ladakh is part of India; else China
would have claimed it as part of Tibet. Writes KM Pannikar:
“To have marched an army not once or twice, but six times, over the
snow-clad ranges of Ladakh and Baltistan, 15000 feet above the
sea-level, where air is so rarefied that people from the plains can
hardly live with comfort, is a wonderful achievement. To have
conquered that country after successive campaigns and reduced it to
a peaceful province is an exploit for which there is no parallel in
Indian history.”{KMP/82}
After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839, the Sikh rule became weak. In
their first battle against the Afghans in 1841, when the British garrison of
Jalalabad was under siege, Sikh's Lahore Darbar had come to the rescue of
the British by sending them help under the command of Gulab Singh.
Maharaja Gulab Singh & Kashmir
In the battle between the Sikhs and the British in 1846, Gulab Singh
remained neutral—after the brutal murders of his brothers and a nephew at
Lahore by the Khalsa army that had gone on rampage—while several Sikh
nobles at the time indirectly supported the British. Defeated, the Lahore
Darbar, that is, the Sikhs, were asked by the British—actually, the East
India Co—to pay an indemnity of rupees one crore, in addition to forfeiture
of a large territory. As it was not within the means of the Sikhs to pay the
money, they ceded all their hill territories between Beas and Indus,
including J&K.
Although Jammu was a dependency of the Lahore Darbar, it was ruled
by Maharaja Gulab Singh, who commanded a strong, independent army.
Ceding of Jammu to British by the Sikhs meant little loss to Sikhs in
practical terms as the area was actually controlled by Maharaja Gulab Singh
—for whom it was the real loss. While Jammu was anyway under the
possession of the Maharaja, he had won Bhimber, Rajouri, Bhadarwah and
Kishtwar, and later Baltistan and Ladakh, through his own resources and
efforts. He did not wish to lose them; and had English forced the matter, he
would have given them a tough fight, for he commanded a strong army.
Fortunately for Gulab Singh, Lord Hardinge, the then Governor
General, was not interested in controlling all those territories directly, as it
would have meant much extended border requiring substantial additional
expenditure to deploy additional forces to ensure their protection, when the
concerned territories were mostly unproductive, and could not have
generated sufficient revenues to warrant the trouble. As Gulab Singh did not
wish to lose his territory, he offered to pay the amount of rupees one crore
to the British, which they had demanded from the Sikhs. The offer of Gulab
Singh suited the British, and the Sikhs.
A treaty—known as the Treaty of Amritsar—was then signed between
Gulab Singh and the British in 1846, in terms of which Gulab Singh
acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government, agreed to pay a
sum of rupees one crore, and an annual token presentation to British
comprising two Kashmir shawls and three handkerchiefs; and in return, he
became the ruler: the Maharaja of J&K. Jammu and Kashmir thus got
clubbed for the first time in history, and included Ladakh and Gilgit
additionally, as all hill country between Indus and Ravi came under the rule
of the Maharaja. Only Lahoul, Kulu and certain other areas were left out by
the British for strategic purposes, for which they agreed to deduct a sum of
rupees twenty five lacs from the sum of rupees one crore. The net amount
was thus rupees seventy five lacs.
The only territory that Gulab Singh did not already control before the
signing of the Treaty was the Kashmir valley. But, it was not as if it was
waiting to be taken over. It was not under the control of the British. In
Kashmir, the last Governor appointed by the Sikhs refused to abdicate and
gave tough resistance, at the prodding of the Lahore Darbar. It was only
after many months of campaign that Gulab Singh brought Kashmir under
his control.
Sheikh Abdullah used this 75 lacs aspect to be abusive to the Maharaja
and to derive political mileage, by proclaiming to the public at large that
they had been bought by the Maharaja for mere 75 lacs! Many writers too
have highlighted only this aspect to show the Maharaja in bad light, without
giving the whole background. These 75-lac-wallas must ask themselves
these questions. Did Hari Singh do the transaction? No. It was his ancestor,
Gulab Singh, who did it, long before Hari Singh was even born. Were not
75 lacs for the whole of J&K, and not just for the Valley? Did people of
Jammu and Ladakh ever claim that they were bought over for mere 75 lacs?
No. It was only those from the Valley, misguided by Sheikh Abdullah, who
made this claim? All the other 561 Princely States that were under the
British Paramountcy also compensated the British in some way or the other
to retain their power. Why didn’t the people of those states claim they were
sold for X-amount? Whom should one accuse—the British who sold, or the
other party which purchased? Islands of Mumbai—then, Bombay—were
brought in 1661 as marriage dowry by Catherine of Braganza to Charles II
of England. Why don’t Mumbaikars resent having been given away as
dowry to the British? Anyway, let us move forward. Indian history has been
so emasculated that the less said about it the better.
By 1850, Gulab Singh ruled over Jammu, Kashmir valley, Ladakh,
Baltistan and Gilgit. The States of Hunza, Nagar and Ishkuman adjoining
Sinkiang were added to the State by his son Ranbir Singh some years later.
The ruler of Chitral accepted suzerainty of J&K, and Chitral remained a
feudatory of the Dogra Kingdom until 1947.
Maharaja Hari Singh
Gulab Singh was followed by his descendents Ranbir Singh, then Pratap
Singh, and finally Hari Singh, who ascended the gaddi in 1925. Hari Singh
was educated at the Mayo College, Ajmer; and also served with the British
army. He became Lt General Maharaja Sir Hari Singh.
As a ruler, Hari Singh was about as good or as bad as the rest of the
rulers of the other 561 Princely States of India—there was hardly a ruler
who could be considered good: most were uncaring, incompetent and vile
to downright degenerate. In that bleak scenario, Hari Singh was perhaps
better than many, and worse than some. For example, consequent to
political agitations, Maharaja had formed Grievances Commission in 1931
leading to the formation of Praja Sabha—elected Legislative Assembly—in
1934 comprising 33 elected and 42 nominated members. That is, compared
to many other Princely States, there was at least some movement forward
on people's representation.
About half his army was Muslim, which unfortunately deserted him,
when Pakistani raiders attacked J&K. Compare this with the Nizam of
Hyderabad: the Police, the Army, and the Civil Services were almost
completely the preserve of the Muslims, even though Muslims formed mere
15% of the population.
The Maharaja had made primary education compulsory in the State. He
had thrown open places of worship for the lower castes, and had introduced
laws prohibiting child marriage.
KASHMIR, NEHRU’S HUBRIS & PATEL’S RESIGNATION
As described in detail in earlier chapters, the matter of Princely States
was under the States Ministry, which was under the charge of Sardar Patel.
Patel had ably dealt with the complexity of over 500 Princely States. As
such J&K should also have been left to Patel. However, Nehru intervened
and interfered, and without formally consulting Sardar Patel, or, as a matter
of courtesy, informing him, sought to take the matter of J&K away from the
States Ministry under Sardar.
Nehru, as Prime Minister, had decided to handle J&K himself. Without
the concurrence of Sardar, and without even the courtesy of informing him,
Nehru appointed N Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a former Dewan of J&K and a
constitutional expert, as a Cabinet Minister without portfolio, to assist him
(Nehru) in handling Kashmir. It was this Gopalaswami who had very badly
messed up India’s case in the UN later. Nehru was a bad judge of persons—
unlike Sardar, he lacked that leadership quality—and had a flair for
choosing either the incompetents, or those who deceived him and India
later, like Sheikh Abdullah.
Sardar became aware of Gopalaswami’s role indirectly when he
[Gopalaswami] issued a note in connection with J&K, without consulting
Sardar. Wrote Patel to Gopalaswami on 22 December 1947: “This question
should have been referred to and dealt with by the Ministry of States… I
would suggest that the relative papers may now be transferred to the States
Ministry and in future the Kashmir administration may be asked to deal
with that Ministry direct.”
Gopalaswami let the position be known to Sardar (that what he was
doing was at the behest of the PM Nehru), and expressed his willingness to
dissociate himself from the J&K matter if the DyPM Patel so desired.
Realising the position, Patel wrote back to Gopalaswami the next day on 23
December 1947: “I would rather withdraw my letter and let you deal with
matters as you deem best than give you cause for annoyance.”
Meanwhile, Nehru, when he became aware of Patel’s above letter of 22
December 1947, chose to write a rather harsh and bossy letter to Patel on 23
December 1947{Arpi5}:
“Gopalaswami Ayyangar has been especially asked to help in
Kashmir matters. Both for this reason and because of his intimate
knowledge and experience of Kashmir he had to be given full
latitude. I really do not see where the States Ministry comes into the
picture, except that it should be kept informed of steps taken. All
this was done at my instance and I do not propose to abdicate my
functions in regard to matters for which I consider myself
responsible. May I say that the manner of approach to Gopalaswami
was hardly in keeping with the courtesy due to a colleague?”{RG/447/L-
7686}
Response to such an intemperate letter was on expected lines. Patel
wrote to Nehru on 23 December 1947 {Arpi5}:
“Your letter of today has been received just now at 7 p.m. and I am
writing immediately to tell you this. It has caused me considerable
pain. Before I received your letter I had already written to
Gopalaswami a letter of which a copy is enclosed herewith. If I had
known (that) he had sent you copies of our correspondence I would
have sent to you a copy of my letter to him straightaway. In any
case, your letter makes it clear to me that I must not or at least
cannot continue as a Member of Government and hence I am hereby
tendering my resignation. I am grateful to you for the courtesy and
kindness shown to me during the period of office which was a
period of considerable strain.”{RG/447}
Apparently, the letter was not sent at Gandhi’s instance, upon
Mountbatten’s advice that without Patel the Government could not be run.
{BK2/162}
Disenchanted and frustrated with Nehru’s hubris, and his improper and
thoughtless ways, Patel expressed to Gandhi his wish to dissociate himself
from the government in December 1947 and again in January 1948.
Writes Balraj Krishna:
“In taking away Kashmir from the States Ministry and placing it
under the charge of Ayyangar who was Minister without Portfolio,
Nehru was acting under Abdullah’s influence. To all intents and
purposes, he was discarding Patel for Abdullah, ignoring how Patel
had stood by his side both as a loyal friend and as a pillar of strength
through the tempestuous, nerve-wracking, fateful months preceding
and following the transfer of power.”{BK/388}
Nehru wrote a long note to Gandhi on 6 January 1948 seeking his
arbitration for his differences with Patel. Gandhi referred the letter to Patel.
Patel responded to Gandhi:
“I have tried my best to appreciate what he [Nehru] says on the
subject [Hindu-Muslim relations], but howsoever much I have tried
to understand it on the twin basis of democracy and Cabinet
responsibility, I have found myself unable to agree with his
conception of the Prime Minister’s duties and functions. That
conception, if accepted, would raise the Prime Minister to the
position of a virtual dictator, for he claims ‘full freedom to act when
and how he chooses’. This in my opinion is wholly opposed to
democratic and Cabinet system of government. The Prime
Minister’s position, according to my conception, is certainly pre-
eminent; he is first among equals. However, he has no overriding
powers over his colleagues; if he had any, a Cabinet and Cabinet
responsibility would be superfluous…”{LMS/177}
Wrote Durga Das: “Two days earlier [before Gandhi’s assassination on
30 January 1948] I had met Azad and learnt from him that tension between
Nehru and Patel had mounted to a point where the Prime Minister had
angrily thumped the table at a Cabinet meeting and said: ‘Patel, you do
what you like. I will not have it.’ …Nehru’s outburst was basically sparked
by the feeling, fed by his courtiers and hangers-on, that Patel was taking the
country to the Right… [Now, what was wrong in taking the country to the
right! Nehru took the country to dogs with his leftism and poverty-
perpetuating socialism!] …When I called on Patel the following day, he
told me that Nehru had ‘lost his head’ and he, for his part, had made up his
mind not to stand ‘the nonsense any more’. He said he was going to see
Gandhi and tell him he was quitting. I said Bapu would never agree to let
him go… Patel quietly replied: ‘The old man has gone senile. He wants
Mountbatten to bring Jawahar and me together.’…”{DD/277}
Before Gandhi could resolve Patel-Nehru differences, he was
assassinated on 30 January 1948. That forced Nehru and Patel together. For
the sake of the nation, and to honour the request of the departed soul
(Gandhi), Patel sacrificed himself.
Logically speaking, Patel should NOT have given way to sentimentality
upon Gandhi’s death, and for the sake of the good of the nation, he should
have fought out Nehru to its logical end: that is, he should have marshalled
all his forces, unseated Nehru, saved India from the depths to which Nehru
had ultimately condemned it to, and taken India towards the heights like
only he could have.
J&K TIMELINES, BRITISH GAMES & NEHRU’S BLUNDERS
When the J&K problem is discussed, more often than not, the role of the
Indian and the Pakistani leaders, and that of Maharaja Hari Singh, Sheikh
Abdullah, the Pakistani tribal raiders and the Indian and the Pakistani
armies are discussed, assigning a minor role for the British; when actually
Britain was at the root of the origin of the problem and its subsequent
complication. However, one has to admire the British cunning in managing
to dissociate themselves from all the blame of either partition or the
Kashmir problem, and squarely putting the blame on India and Pakistan,
and on Hindus and Muslims. Had Britain acted just, had it not played the
mischief, J&K problem would have never originated, and even if it had, it
would have been solved in India’s favour long ago in 1947 itself! However,
unfortunately, the British mischief, coupled with Nehru’s, not one, but a
series of blunders, and ignoring of the wisdom of Sardar Patel, cost India
dear—something for which we are paying with our blood and money even
today. It is advisable to first know the British motivation upfront.
The J&K issue got stretched and complicated thanks to the vested
interests of the UK. In fact, both the Partition and the J&K imbroglio are
interlinked. Let us look at the logic of the approach of the British.
As we proceed, we would highlight the specific strategies, moves and
tactics of the British by labelling them as “the British Game–n”, that is, “the
British Game–1, 2, 3...”; the blunders committed by Nehru as “Nehru’s J&K
Blunder–1, 2, 3, ...”; and Sardar Patel’s right advice or moves as “Sardar’s
Wisdom-1, 2, 3…”. Why? To establish that it was not just one game played
by the British or just one unfortunate blunder committed by Nehru that
caused the problem; but that it was a series of games played by the British
that India failed to check-mate and that it was a series of blunders by Nehru
that led to the tragedy; and that the tragedy happened despite Sardar’s
Wisdom, as he was side-lined.
Pakistan, an Ally
(The British Game-1)
The largest oil reserves happened to be in the Middle-East, and therefore
the Middle-East had to be secured for the UK, and the West. How to
secure? You had to have the countries in the Middle-East under your power
and influence. Not only the countries having oil, but also countries
surrounding or bordering or nearer to the countries having oil. And that was
India—particularly the western India, adjoining Afghanistan. Proposed
Pakistan was pliable, while India was not. The area nearer to the Middle-
East had therefore to go to Pakistan.
Pakistan was a Muslim country, and so was the Middle-East. Being a
Muslim country, Pakistan was in a better position to influence the Middle-
Eastern countries, thought UK. Seen from this strategic requirement of the
UK of securing the Middle-East oil, India was dispensable, but Pakistan
was critical. The US and the West went along with the UK, for they were
allies in the cold war, and all of them wanted to secure the Middle-East oil.
The West wanted to check the expansionist ambitions of communist
Russia and China towards the Middle-East and the Indian Ocean. How to
do that? The regions adjoining Russia and China had to be under their
influence: that is, northern India bordering Russia and J&K. Pakistan was
willing to be an ally of the West in their cold war with the communists,
hence critical to their strategy, along with J&K; while India, with its
socialist dogma, non-alignment and pro-Russia bend, was dispensable.
The British military establishment too had become a strong proponent of
Pakistan, and of J&K as part of Pakistan, on account of its promise of
cooperation in the military matters.
Congress vs. League
(The British Game-2)
The British found to their dismay that the Indian leaders had other ideas
—they were unlikely to cooperate with Britain on foreign policy, military
matters, cold war against the communists and in securing Middle-East oil.
The INC and others fighting for independence sought to spoil the British
party. They became the “bad boys”.
Fortunately for the British, the Muslim League gladly ticked the dhobi-
list of the British requirements. You wish to continue to have presence here
even after independence—ok. You want us to be anti-communists—ok. You
want to station your troops here—ok. You want to use our air-fields—ok.
You want our army to fight against your enemies—ok.
If Jinnah had not been co-operative, the British would have picked up
some other Muslim leader and made a Jinnah of him.
The Muslim League and other pro-Pakistan organisations never gave
trouble to the British. No agitations, no marches, no fast. Hence, no jail or
Andaman for them. Jinnah or any of his colleagues never went to jail. For
the British, the Pakistanis and those Muslims, who always sucked up to
them, were “the compliant, good boys”. Once the British establishment
firmed up that their national and foreign policy interests were best served
by having the regions that ultimately formed West-Pakistan and J&K under
their influence, they became even more rabidly pro-Muslim League, pro-
Pakistan, and in favour of J&K going to Pakistan.
Religion as Camouflage
(The British Game-3)
How did the British ensure Pakistan was created, without allowing the
blame to come on them? They actively promoted the canard that Hindus
and Muslims cannot live together.
British used Islam to divide India and create Pakistan; just as US later
used fundamentalist Islam to drive out the Russians from Afghanistan. Each
used Islam for their own selfish purpose, and created monsters that are
bedevilling the world. The British used Islam to favour J&K accession with
Pakistan.
Nehru’s Blood Brother, Sheikh Abdullah
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-1)
Another critical player in the J&K saga was Sheikh Mohammed
Abdullah, born in 1905 in Soura, a village on the outskirts of Srinagar. He
became famous as Sher-e-Kashmir: the Lion of Kashmir.
Sheikh Abdullah’s father was Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim, a middle
class manufacturer and trader of shawls. Sheikh Abdullah’s grandfather was
a Hindu Kashmiri Pandit by the name of Ragho Ram Koul, who was
converted to Islam in 1890 and was named Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah,
the name his grandson took.
He married Akbar Jahan in 1933. She was daughter of Michael Harry
Nedou and his Kashmiri wife. Michael owned a hotel at the tourist resort
of Gulmarg. His father was a European proprietor of a chain of hotels
in India including Nedous Hotel in Srinagar.
Sheikh Abdullah did MSc in Chemistry from Aligarh Muslim
University in 1930. It was at the University that he became politically
active. He formed the Muslim Conference, Kashmir's first political party, in
1932, and later renamed it to National Conference in 1938. The Muslim
Conference founded by Sheikh Abdullah was reportedly communal: some
say that he later changed its name to National Conference only for tactical
reasons. Sheikh Abdullah was a protagonist of Kashmiri nationalism linked
to Islam; and his role model was Dr Mohammad Iqbal, a scion of another
Kashmiri Pundit convert to Islam—like himself—who propounded the
ideology of Pakistan way back in 1930.
Although Gandhi had thought it prudent to keep himself aloof from the
affairs of the Princely States, Nehru had set up The All-India States'
Peoples' Conference for the States in 1939. Nehru had associated himself
with Sheikh Abdullah in that capacity. He was supportive of his agitations.
Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues were arrested on several occasions by
the Maharaja for their political agitations.
Sheikh Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir agitation against the
Maharajah in May 1946 leading to his arrest. The Agitation, felt most
Congress leaders, was opportunist and malevolent, and driven by selfish
consideration of self-promotion—after all, Maharaja was not an outsider
like the British. Sheikh Abdullah indulged in such acts knowing he would
receive tacit support of Nehru. Although Sheikh Abdullah had tried to
project his fight against the Maharaja as a fight against the feudal order, and
a fight for the people of J&K—something the unwise, gullible, socialist
Nehru believed—in reality his purpose was communal, to get Muslim
support, and grab power.
Alarmed at the acts of Sheikh Abdullah, and Nehru’s support to him, the
Kashmiri Pandits had telegrammed Sardar Patel on 4 June 1947:
“The statements of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru concerning Kashmir
affairs being entirely unverified and tendentious are universally
condemned and resented by Hindus of Kashmir. By encouraging
Sheikh Abdullah’s Fascist and Communal Programme he is doing
great disservice to the people of Kashmir. His [Abdullah]
unwarranted and wrong statements about facts and demolishing
mosques inflame Muslims against Hindus…”{Mak/406-7} {BK/374}
Sheikh Abdullah had endeared himself to Nehru—who had called him
my blood-brother—and others by projecting an anti-feudal, democratic,
leftist, pro-India, pro-Congress, and above all, a secular image: perhaps to
get Hari Singh out of the way, and then to sit in his place; for his later
actions belied that image, and disappointed and shocked Nehru.
S. Gopal, Nehru’s biographer, had written that Nehru regarded Abdullah
as ‘an old friend and colleague and blood-brother’. Nehru held Abdullah
beyond suspicion, and trusted him fully. For Nehru, Abdullah was Kashmir,
and Kashmir was Abdullah!{BK/372}
To have reposed such blind faith in Sheikh Abdullah and in his
capability to deliver, grossly overestimating his popularity and remaining
innocently unsuspicious of his intentions, even to the extent of being unfair,
unjust and insulting to the Maharaja, reflected negatively on the expected
leader-like qualities from Nehru.
Sheikh Abdullah was made ‘Head of the Emergency Administration’ in
J&K on 30 October 1947 by Maharaja Hari Singh at the instance of Nehru
and Mahatma Gandhi. He took oath as Prime Minister of Kashmir on
17 March 1948. He was accused of rigging elections to the Constituent
Assembly in 1951. He was dismissed as Prime Minister on 8 August 1953,
and was arrested and later jailed for eleven years upon being accused of
conspiracy against the State in what came to be known as the ‘Kashmir
Conspiracy Case’. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was appointed in his place
—it was him who had arrested Sheikh Abdullah. Wrote MO Mathai:
“When Feroze Gandhi [Indira Gandhi’s husband] heard of the arrest
of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 he came to my study beaming. He said
that Bakshi did a foolish thing in arresting Sheikh Abdullah, and
added that Bakshi should have had Sheikh Abdullah taken to the top
of a lonely hill on the Azad Kashmir border, pushed down and shot,
and published the news that Abdullah had fled to Pakistan.” {Mac2/L-
5660}
Sheikh Abdullah was released on 8 April 1964. Nehru passed away on
27 May 1964. Sheikh Abdullah was later interned from 1965 to 1968. He
was exiled from Kashmir in 1971 for 18 months. Consequent to the Indira-
Sheikh accord of 1974, he became the Chief Minister of J&K and remained
in that position till his death in 1982.
Write Balraj Krishna:
“Nehru himself came round to Patel's view later in 1962, when he
told Mullik of Abdullah's ‘communal activities throughout the
period he had acted as the National Conference leader. It was the
Pakistani aggression which had mellowed him a little for a short
time, because the tribals had committed gruesome atrocities on the
Muslim population in the Valley. But, as soon as he became Prime
Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his
anti-Hindu activities... his entire outlook and behaviour was based
on the fact that the Kashmir Valley had a Muslim majority.'”{BK/395-6}
There is a strange irony between the words and the deeds of Sheikh
Abdullah and also his mentor, Nehru. Abdullah impressed Nehru with his
stated democratic credentials and railed against feudalism, the Maharaja
and the dynasty; but once in power himself, he ensured continuance of his
own dynasty! Nehru, who used to rail against the Maharajas, the Princely
States, and the feudal order, perpetuated his own dynasty. Did Abdullah do
better for the people than the Maharaja he replaced? Or, did Sheikh
Abdullah’s descendants did better?
Continued hold of the British after Independence
(The British Game-4 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-2)
Another factor that had a decisive bearing on the Kashmir issue was the
continued hold of the British on India in certain critical matters even after
independence. Of course, you can’t really blame the British for that as it
were the Indian leaders who invited or allowed the British “help” or
interference.
During the initial period of independence, the Commander-in-Chiefs of
both the Indian and the Pakistani Army were British—Lockhart, followed
by Bucher for India; and Messervey, followed by Gracey for Pakistan—
with another British, Sir Claude Auchinleck, as the Supreme Commander,
to whom the chiefs of the army, the air force and the navy of both India and
Pakistan reported. There were also many British officers in both the
armies: many more in the Pakistani Army, than the Indian, as the British
were mostly pro-Pakistan and anti-India.
Further, God only knows why India chose to appoint Mountbatten, a
British, as the Governor General of India after independence! Jinnah didn’t
do that blunder—he himself became the Governor General of Pakistan.
Dubious Role of Mountbatten & the British Army Chiefs
(The British Game-5)
The role of Mountbatten in the integration of the three states that created
problems—Junagadh, Hyderabad and J&K—was dubious. Where the
British interests were not affected—in respect of the other Princely States—
he did try to help India. But, where the British interests clashed with the
Indian interests, he helped the British interests.
Mountbatten attempted to refer both the Junagadh and the Hyderabad
cases to the UN. Fortunately, they were firmly rejected by Sardar Patel.
British did all that was possible to prevent Indian army action in Junagadh,
Hyderabad and Kashmir.
A British as the first governor-general and the British army chiefs of
independent India—that’s queer. What kind of independence movement
was it that installed a British to the top-most position of independent India!
Totally lacking in any self-respect!! Couldn’t we find a competent Indians
for the posts? If Jinnah could handle the responsibility as governor-general
of Pakistan; couldn’t an Indian play a similar role? Did Indian
independence struggle of many decades fail to throw up a single such
Indian? Why Gandhi didn’t volunteer to take up the responsibility? Indeed,
why did Gandhi shy away from any official responsibility in independent
India?
If the top-post had to go to a British, what stopped them from borrowing
also a British PM, and maybe, some members of the British cabinet too?
Writes Claude Arpi: “Nehru's sentimental attachment to the
Mountbattens deeply vitiated the Kashmir issue. It was certainly the most
important factor for the failure to find a solution in the first years of the
conflict.”{Arpi3} {Arpi4/323}
And, what was the contribution of Mountbatten? He created more
problems for India. He was instrumental in creating the Kashmir problem
for India, which still bedevils us. Left to him, he would have made
Hyderabad a second Kashmir or Pakistan—right in the heart of India.
It does appear that India would have been better off in not having
Mountbatten as its Governor General—it should have appointed a suitable
Indian to the post—and also, India should have dispensed with the services
of the British in the army after independence, especially the British as army
chiefs; for they didn’t do India any good—they only caused damage, as
amply proved by history. It is amazing how India could entrust India’s
national security to the British knowing their cunning and their tricky and
deceitful ways over the last two centuries and who hadn’t done anything
lately to earn that trust—and true to their past record, they betrayed India’s
trust.
It is only after Mountbatten and the British in the army departed that
India came to grips with its problems. Hyderabad was liberated only after
Mountbatten left. Of course, for J&K, Mountbatten and the British Chiefs
of army had done enough damage. Rather than as governor-general or C-in-
C, they could, at best, have been retained as advisors, and no more. They
should not have been made privy to important decisions and confidential
information, and they should certainly not have been allowed to participate
in the decision making process.
In so far as Mountbatten’s claimed assistance in accession of the other
Princely States is concerned, well, the major job was done by Sardar Patel
and VP Menon, and surely an Indian governor-general would have been
much more effective.
Mountbatten was a representative of Britain, and it was natural for him,
rather, expected of him, to safeguard and promote the interests of Britain;
and keeping British Government informed of the goings on, including
confidential matters. Britain wanted Kashmir, a strategic territory, to be
under their influence. That was possible if it was either independent or with
Pakistan, which was pro-West. Towards this aim, Mountbatten ensured that
as governor-general he did not remain just a titular head. He manipulated to
get himself appointed as head of the Defence Committee of India ensuring
that C-in-C of both the Indian and the Pakistani Army and the Supreme
Commander, Auchinleck, reported to him. In that capacity, Mountbatten
secretively co-ordinated with the transitional British Commander-in-Chief
of the Pakistan Army; had private strategy sessions with the transitional
British C-in-C of the Indian Army, without the knowledge of the Indian
leaders; and manipulated to the extent feasible, decisions and actions in the
direction the British Government wanted.
Sarila points out: “Another factor that distinctly influenced the situation
was Nehru’s offer to Mountbatten to chair the Defence Committee of the
Indian Cabinet. It was this committee and not the Indian Cabinet as a whole
that made decisions on Kashmir war policy. This power gave the governor-
general enormous power to influence the course of fighting.”{Sar/357}
Nehru, by allowing the critical decisions on Kashmir to be taken by the
Defence Committee headed/chaired by Mountbatten between August 1947
to June 1948, rather than by the Cabinet (which was the right and legitimate
forum), allowed the matters to be controlled by the British and
Mountbatten, having their own vested interests, that were in conflict with
those of India. Ultimately, through these machinations, the clever British
managed to dupe India into referring the J&K affair to the UN. {DG/43}
Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-
48’:
“The role of Mountbatten and the British service chiefs made it
virtually impossible for India to meet this requirement [of secrecy
and surprise of military operations in J&K] in 1947-48. Not only
were brakes applied on plans to strike at the invaders at their bases
across the border but the British government was kept informed at
every stage and was thus enabled to take diplomatic steps to close
India’s military options.”{DG/109}
Height of the matter was that General Cariappa, who lead successful
operations in Kashmir, including ‘Operation Kipper’ and ‘Operation Vijay’,
in order to succeed, had to not only fight the enemy headed by the British
Army Chief for Pakistan, Messervey, but had to keep his own British Army
Chief for India, Roy Bucher, in the dark, lest he leak or abort the plans.
{DG/137}
Earlier, “the decision that arms should be supplied to Kashmir [in early
October 1947] on top-priority basis was simply derailed by the [British]
Commander-in-Chief [of India], General Lockhart, acting in collusion with
Field Marshal Auchinleck.”{DG/42}
Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known
of Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld
that vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133}
Writes Dasgupta: “The strategic solution envisioned by Nehru as early
as in December 1947 could not be implemented in practice so long as a
British general held the post of Commander-in-Chief.”{DG/190}
But, this aspect is what the Indian leaders should have known and
accounted for. In case they felt that having a British as governor-general
and also a British C-in-C of the Indian Army in the transitional phase did
help in some way (Though, why Indian leaders fighting for freedom should
not have had the vision, rather the common sense, to keep India ready for
the eventuality, and to have people ready to man critical posts, is a mystery!
For example, why didn’t Gandhi take the responsibility as governor-
general, which Jinnah took?), they should have also known that it could
also be counter-productive in certain cases—and it did prove to be so, at
least for the three disputed states—J&K, Hyderabad and Junagadh. Their
basic allegiance being to Britain, between them, these British were able to
manipulate matters—many contrary to the interests of India. This India and
Nehru should have taken into account.
Why not Maharaja Hari Singh as the first Governor General?
If Mountbatten’s “royal blood” helped—as some claim—in netting the
princely states; and if indeed the newly-independent, democratic India was
looking for “royal blood”, why not the local variety, unless the Gandhian
freedom fighters preferred the “firangi” one. Perhaps they could have
offered that post to Maharaja Hari Singh himself.
It would have ensured timely accession—before 15 August 1947—of
J&K into India and avoidance of the Kashmir problem altogether. J&K was
also the biggest princely state geographically. Besides, the Maharaja was
well-versed in military matters. Having the Maharaja himself as the
governor-general would have given a further fillip for the other princely
states to join India.
Alternately, India could have made the Nizam of Hyderabad the
governor-general if he was ready to merge his state without ado. That would
have made India automatically secular, and made states with Muslim rulers
join India with lesser hesitation. Besides, Hyderabad was the largest state in
terms of revenues and the second largest, after J&K, geographically. Or,
made Hari Singh the governor-general, and the Nizam the joint governor-
general! If not them, it could have been Gandhiji or Dr Ambedkar or Dr
Rajendra Prasad or Rajaji or some such competent person.
Not Being Tactical with the Princely States
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-3)
The British Government’s Cabinet Mission published Memorandum on
States’ Treaties and Paramountcy on 12 May 1946, as per which, the policy
for the Indian Princely States was that when the Dominions of India and
Pakistan would be created, the political arrangements between the Princely
States and the British Crown would be brought to an end, and the rights
surrendered by the States—defence, foreign policy and communications—
to the Paramount Power, that is, Britain, would revert to the States. Thus,
with the withdrawal of paramountcy, the Princely States were to become
independent, and the division of British India between the two dominions of
India and Pakistan was not to affect the Princely States at all.
The Constituent Assembly appointed a Negotiating Committee on 21
December 1946 to negotiate with the body appointed by the Chamber of
Princes to work out the representation of the Princely States in the
Constituent Assembly. Nehru talked about the representation of the people
of the Princely States in the Assembly, rather than only the princes or their
representatives. Viewed from an idealistic framework, Nehru's stand was
obviously just and correct. However, from a practical and realistic point of
view, for Congress to raise this delicate issue, without having any strength
to enforce it, especially when the purpose was to get the co-operation of the
States, seemed tactless, imprudent, and uncalled for, and amounted to
needless assertion of principles over practicability.
June-47: Mountbatten Lobbied for J&K Accession to Pakistan
(The British Game-6)
Mountbatten visited Kashmir between June 18 and June 23, 1947 and
reportedly lobbied with Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan. He even
assured the Maharaja that India would not take it otherwise if he did
so{VPM1/271}—blatantly advancing the British and the Pakistani interests to the
detriment of India! Why was such a person made the first Governor General
of free India? Why was Nehru so sold out on Mountbatten? Was it thanks to
Lady Mountbatten?
June-47: States Dept & Sardar–VP in Action
(Sardar’s Wisdom-1)
The States Department was set up on 25 June 1947 to deal with the
Princely States. Sardar Patel was appointed its head on 27 June 1947, and
VP Menon its secretary.
The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the British Parliament for
the partition of British India into the dominions of India and Pakistan
received royal assent on 18 July 1947. 15 August 1947 was declared as the
appointed date for the partition. The Act also provided for the lapse of
British paramountcy, as per the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and
Paramountcy of 12 May 1946, over the Princely States with effect from
15 August 1947.
To avoid the terrible consequences of having 562 independent states,
Sardar Patel's States Department came up on 25 July 1947 with the idea of
Instrument of Accession through which the Princely States could surrender
the three functions to the Dominion which they had earlier surrendered to
the British—Defence, Foreign Policy and Communications.
Sept-47: Nehru Refused J&K Accession Offer
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-4)
By June-July 1947 Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K had begun to take steps
towards final accession with India. For example he dismissed his Prime
Minister Ram Chandra Kak, a Kashmiri Pandit, who had been advising him
on aligning with Pakistan! And, later, replaced him with Mehr Chand
Mahajan, a lawyer, who had been a Congress nominee on the Boundary
Commission, and, after independence, became the third Chief Justice of
India on 4 January 1954. Looking to all this, Nehru should have been
tactical in creating a conducive atmosphere, and in taking Hari Singh into
confidence, so that Maharaja’s decision to accede with India would have
been expedited, and all the subsequent troubles on account of his late
accession would have been avoided. Instead, Nehru acted adversarial with
the Maharaja, putting forth conditions for accession (as if Nehru was doing
the Maharaja a favour by allowing him to accede to India, rather than the
other way round!) that were repugnant to the Maharaja.
“There have been suggestions that the Maharaja had decided in August
1947, or certainly by mid-September, that he had no option but to join
India, and that he was just waiting for the best moment and the most
advantageous terms,” writes Andrew Whitehead in ‘A Mission in Kashmir’.
{AW/101}
By August–September 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh had decided to offer
Kashmir's accession to India; but, most unbelievably, it was refused by
Nehru, who first wanted Sheikh Abdullah to be freed and installed as the
prime minister of the State—something not acceptable to the Maharaja.
Was it not queer? The nation being favoured with accession laying down
conditions, rather than the state agreeing to merge! But, that was Nehru!!
For Sardar Patel’s reaction to this unwise stand of Nehru, please read
below.
Sept-47: Sardar’s Frustration with Nehru’s Action
(Sardar’s Wisdom-2)
States Sarila in ‘The Shadow of the Great Game’: “Mountbatten added:
‘He [Patel] has also attacked Nehru for the first time saying “I regret our
leader has followed the lofty ideas into the skies and has no contact left
with earth or reality”’...This outburst probably reflected Patel’s frustration
with Nehru at the time, for refusing to accept the Maharaja of Kashmir’s
accession to India unless and until a government under Sheikh Abdullah
was installed.”{Sar/370}
Aug-Oct, 47: British-Pak Conspiracy of Tribal Invasion of J&K
(The British Game-7)
Writes Andrew Whitehead in ‘A Mission in Kashmir’:
“Indian military sources have sometimes alleged that the tribal
invasion of Kashmir was planned in detail by Pakistan more than
two months in advance, with the knowledge and approval of the
British officers commanding the Pakistan army. The most
substantial supporting evidence is the memoirs of an Indian general,
O.S. Kalkat, who in August 1947 was serving as a brigade major in
the Frontier. He recounted opening a letter on 20 August addressed
to his British commanding officer marked ‘Top Secret’. It was a
note from Pakistan’s commander-in-chief, Frank Messervy,
detailing plans for ‘Operation Gulmarg’—the plan for the invasion
and capture of Kashmir. The ‘D’ day of Operation Gulmarg was
fixed as 22nd October [1947] on which date the various tribal
Lashkars were to cross into Jammu and Kashmir territory. He went
on to relate how he and his family were then put under informal
house arrest in Pakistan, managed to escape, reached Delhi, and on
19 October informed senior Indian military officers about the
planned invasion...”{AW/59}
Invasion did occur as stated in Kalkat’s report. Whitehead, however,
casts doubts on the story, noting: “...it is very difficult to imagine any senior
British officer in Pakistan putting his name to a plan for the invasion of a
neighbouring state, when that was clearly in contravention of British
government policy and prejudicial to Britain’s desire for a peaceful and
orderly transfer of power.”{AW/59}
Whitehead’s opinion of the British is very kind and favourable.
Unfortunately, the facts were otherwise. If we look at Kalkat’s story in the
light of the British interests and their machinations that we have discussed,
Kalkat’s story appears to be true indeed.
As per ‘Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48’ by Rohit
Singh{URL11}:
“Op Gulmarg was conceived at the Pakistan Army HQ in Rawalpindi
soon after independence. DO letters detailing the operational instruction
had the stamp of approval of the then British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army,
Gen Sir Frank Messervy. According to the plan, lashkars of 1000 pathans
each were to be raised by every pathan tribe. For this purpose, separate
instructions were issued to the Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents.
Once recruited, these lashkars were to concentrate at Bannu, Wana,
Peshawar, Kohat, Thal and Naushera by the first week of September 1947.
“The Brigade Commanders at these places were to then equip them with
arms, ammunition and some clothing. On paper, these issues were shown
against regular Pakistan Army units. Each Tribal lashkar was commanded
by a Major of the Pakistan Army who was to act as the advisor to the Malik
or the nominal commander of the lashkar. The Major had a Captain and 10
JCOs under his command. Each irregular company was commanded by a
JCO. All the Pakistan Army regulars were Pathans. Each Lashkar was
provided with at least four guides/informers.
“Forward ammunition dumps were to be established at Abbottabad on
18 October and subsequently moved to Muzaffarabad and Domel after D
Day. The invasion force was led by Major General Akbar Khan (code-name
Tariq) and assisted by Brig Sher Khan. Their HQ was located inside the
Pakistan Army HQ in Rawalpindi.
“All lashkars were instructed to travel in civil buses at night and
concentrate at Abbottabad by 18 October 1947. The D Day for Op Gulmarg
was 22 October 1947.”{URL11}
Writes Kuldip Nayar: “After the accession, the Maharaja provided New
Delhi with more evidence (plans bearing proper seals and maps) to prove
that a ‘conspiracy for the establishment of a new Muslim State by the
Muslim League in Jammu and Kashmir’ was hatched as early as 1945.”{KN}
In fact, that the raisers and tribesmen had invaded Kashmir at the
instance of, and with the planning, help and backing of the Pakistani
government, was confirmed by none other than Jinnah himself, as per
Mountbatten’s record of his conversation with him:
“Mr Jinnah said that both sides [Indian and Pakistani forces] should
withdraw at once [from Kashmir]. He emphasized that the
withdrawal must be simultaneous. When I asked him how the
tribesmen [Pakistan had claimed they were tribesmen, and not
Pakistani armymen, or those backed or controlled by the Pakistani
army] were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was to give
them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not
comply, he would send large forces along their lines of
communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with
him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within
24 hours. I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control he
appeared to exercise over the raiders.”{AW/138}
Oct-47: Invasion of J&K and
Negligence in Protecting Kashmiris
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-5)
Having failed earlier, Pakistan again tried its best in September 1947 to
woo the NC—the National Conference—to make J&K accede to Pakistan.
GM Sadiq of the NC also met Liaqat Ali Khan, the prime minister of
Pakistan. However, the NC told them it was not in favour of acceding to
Pakistan, and that they should not force the issue. Frustrated at the failure of
these attempts, Pakistan decided to invade J&K.
Kashmir was invaded by over 5,000 Pathan tribesmen in October 1947,
backed by the Pakistani army men. The raiders engaged in looting, killing
and raping Hindus and Sikhs on their way to Srinagar. Although Hindus
were the main target, there were occasions where they didn’t spare the
Muslims either.
Those who have any doubts on the havoc wrecked by the raiders from
Pakistan backed by the Pakistani army men should read the eyewitness
account of Krishna Mehta in her book “Kashmir 1947”. Krishna Mehta was
born in Kishtawar, a town on the banks of Chenab in Kashmir. She was a
descendent of one Basti Ram who had helped annex Ladakh and had been
its governor. Her husband, Duni Chand Mehta, was appointed in July 1947
by the then J&K government as the wazir-e-wazarat [district commissioner]
of Muzaffarabad, now the capital of PoK or what Pakistanis call “Azad
Kashmir”, situated on the banks of the Jhelum and Neelum rivers. She
describes the plunder that commenced in October 1947 by the raiders,
killing of her husband by the raiders, her terrible travails and desperate
attempts at escape, her being taken a prisoner with her little children, finally
landing in a refugee camp and then making it to India.
Andrew Whitehead, in his 2007 book, ‘A Mission in Kashmir’,
graphically describes the horror that befell the Christian mission in
Baramulla and its inmates; who the attackers were—Pathan tribesman from
Pakistan’s NWFP; and who instigated them and from whom were they
taking their orders—Pakistani army men. Whitehead has based his book on
the eyewitness accounts of the survivors. Baramulla is about 54km from
Srinagar and 123km from Muzzafarabad, PoK.{AW/1-11}
Wrote Andrew Whitehead further: “The looting was evident from the
start. [Major General] Akbar Khan [of Pakistan], one of the architects of the
invasion, reminisced many years later with startling candour that the
tribesmen had been promised booty as their reward for fighting in Kashmir.
‘It was part of their agreement with Major Khurshid Anwar of the Muslim
League National Guards who was their leader that they would loot non-
Muslims. They had no other remuneration.”{AW/61}
Reportedly, Nehru had advance information on Pakistan’s aggressive
designs in September 1947 itself. It is not clear why India had to wait for
the Pakistani raiders to enter Kashmir, create mayhem, engage in plunder
and rape, and almost takeover Srinagar, before initiating military action.
The reason or the excuse could be that since Kashmir had not till then
signed the Instrument of Accession how could India intervene. It was, of
course, another matter that the offer of the Maharaja to accede in September
1947 was rebuffed by Nehru! If the accession had been done then, India
could have protected the people of J&K by sending in its army. Pakistan
could send in the raiders, backed by their army, even though no Instrument
of Accession was signed in their favour, but we could not send in our forces
even to prevent rape and mayhem! Sounds odd.
7-Oct-1947: Arms for Kashmir
(Sardar’s Wisdom-3)
In the wake of Pakistani activity, Maharaja Hari Singh had requested
arms aid from India in early October 1947, much before J&K’s accession to
India on 26 October 1947. Sardar Patel had requested the then Defence
Minister, Baldev Singh, to do the needful urgently on 7 October 1947, who
had, in turn, instructed the Indian army chief General Lockhart. However,
“the decision that arms should be supplied to Kashmir on top-priority basis
was simply derailed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Lockhart, acting
in collusion with Field Marshal Auchinleck.”{DG/42}
These British army officers, though in the employment and pay of India,
did what suited Pakistan’s and the British interests! Later, Sardar Patel saw
to it that the term of Field Marshal Auchinleck was curtailed, despite the
support of Mountbatten.
Oct-47: Proposal of Sending Indian Army to J&K
(The British Game-8 & Sardar’s Wisdom-4)
Looking to the precarious situation, Sardar Patel proposed sending the
Indian Army to J&K. However, Mountbatten insisted that unless the
Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India
should not send army to Kashmir. This, notwithstanding the fact that
Pakistani raiders, backed by their army had invaded J&K, and were
engaged in killing and looting and raping! About half the Maharaja's forces
were Muslim, the rest being Dogra. The Muslim elements had deserted and
had joined the Pakistani forces.
It had been claimed by Pakistan and also conveyed to Mountbatten that
the tribesmen were acting independently and Pakistani army was not
involved. Suffice it to say that much later, during negotiations, when
Mountbatten had queried Jinnah on “How the tribesmen were to be called
off?” Jinnah had promptly responded that all he had to do was to give them
the orders to come out!
24,25-Oct-47: Dilly-Dallying by Mountbatten & Nehru
(The British Game-9)
On Friday, 24 October 1947, the raiders, backed by the Pakistani army,
attacked the Mohore Power House causing black out in Srinagar. On the
same day, the Maharaja of J&K sought military help from India.
The Defence Committee of India, headed by Mountbatten, met on the
morning of Saturday, 25 October 1947. However, rather than ordering
action to save Srinagar, it directed VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw and a few
senior military officers to fly to Srinagar the same day to check the position
first hand. This was actually a deliberate ploy of Mountbatten to pass time
and not allow counter-action by India, and let Pakistan gain an upper hand
by force, as the British desired—because Mountbatten would have known
through the British C-in-C of the Pakistan army as to what Pakistan was up
to. VP Menon and company flew to Srinagar and found the state of affairs
to be worse than what was reported. They advised Hari Singh to hurry to
the safety of Jammu, along with his family and valuables—which he did.
Hari Singh drove the same night to Jammu, 200 kilometres away.
There are books which claim that Hari Singh just ran away with his
jewels, abandoning his people, like a coward. This is not true. He was no
coward. These were just the canards—deliberately spread. He belonged to a
line of very brave Dogras, about whom we have discussed earlier. He
studied in Mayo College, Ajmer; after which he went to Imperial Cadet
Corps at Dehra Dun for military training. He was appointed C-in-C of J&K
State Forces when he was only 20. He was a member of the Imperial War
Cabinet during the Second World War from 1944 to 1946. In the situation
then obtaining, there was little he could have done. Half the J&K forces,
who were Muslims, had abandoned his army!
In fact, much later, Hari Singh felt so alarmed at the situation in J&K,
about the reference to the UN, and about India not getting the whole of J&K
vacated from the intruders, that he wanted the Instrument of Accession
annulled, so that he took charge, led the army, fought, and acquired back the
territories, as is clear from his letter to Sardar Patel of 31 January 1948:
{URL12}
“...Sometimes I feel that I should withdraw the accession that I have
made to the Indian Union. The Union provisionally accepted the accession
and if the Union cannot recover back our territory and is going eventually to
agree to the decision of the Security Council which would result in handing
us over to Pakistan, then there is no point in sticking to the accession of the
State to the Indian Union. For the time being, it may be possible to have
better terms from Pakistan, but that is immaterial, because eventually it
would mean an end of the dynasty and end of the Hindus and Sikhs in the
State. There is an alternative possible for me and that is to withdraw the
accession and that may kill the reference to the UNO, because the Indian
Union will have no right to continue the proceedings before the Council, if
the accession is withdrawn. The result may be return to the position the
State held before the accession. The difficulty in that situation however, will
be that the Indian troops...have to work as volunteers to help the State. I am
prepared to takeover command of my own forces along with the forces of
the Indian Army personally to help the State. I am prepared to lead the
Army personally and to command if the Indian Union agrees, also their
troops. I know my country much better than any of your generals will know
it even during the next several months or years and I am prepared to take
the venture boldly rather than merely keep on sitting here doing nothing. It
is for you to consider whether the Indian Union will accept this in both the
situations, whether after the withdrawal of the accession or even if the
accession continues. I am tired of my present life and it is much better to
die fighting than watch helplessly the heartbreaking misery of my
people...”{URL12}
VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw, MC Mahajan, the premier of J&K, and
colleagues returned to Delhi from Srinagar early morning on
Sunday, 26 October 1947, and reported the desperate situation to the
Defence Committee. They advised that it would not be possible to save
Srinagar and its people unless the troops were immediately air-lifted. Even
the Srinagar air-strip was in danger of being imminently occupied by the
raiders, in which case even that only possibility of air-lifting troops would
close.
26-Oct-47: J&K Signs Instrument of Accession
(The British Game-10)
Notwithstanding the desperate situation, and knowing that unless help
was sent immediately, both the Muslims and the Pandits of Srinagar would
be butchered by the Pakistani raiders, and the Valley of Kashmir would be
lost to Pakistan, Mountbatten, to buy time, still insisted that unless the
Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India, India
should not send army to Kashmir. It seemed to be a deliberate delaying
technique on the part of Mountbatten to ensure Pakistani possession of J&K
by force, and a fait accompli for India—as the British desired.
VP Menon flew to Jammu the same day—Sunday, 26 October 1947—
with the Instrument of Accession to have it signed by Hari Singh, which he
did.
The Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh on Monday, 26
October 1947, and brought back by VP Menon, was accepted by the then
Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, on 27 October 1947. With
the signing of the Instrument and its acceptance, J&K legally became a part
of India, and it became incumbent upon India to defend its territory, send in
its army and throw out the raiders.
That all the above events and dates are authentic, and cannot be
disputed, is borne out of the signed-note of the three British Commanders-
in-Chief of the Army, Air Force, and Navy reproduced by VP Menon in his
book which states that, “The following is a true time-table of events, as
regards decisions taken, plans made, orders given, and movements started,
in this matter…”{VPM1/276}
Was the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh for
J&K different from other Princely States, and did it incorporate some
special provisions? No. The Instrument of Accession was standard and
common for all Princely States. There was no provision in it for any ruler to
add or subtract conditions. It was required to be signed unchanged. With
regard to J&K, it is worth re-emphasising that (a)the Instrument of
Accession signed was no different from those signed by the other Princely
States; (b)it was signed by Hari Singh unconditionally; and (c)it was
accepted by the Governor General, Lord Mountbatten, unconditionally.
That is, the whole process was no different from the one that applied to the
other 547 Princely States that acceded to India.
Unconditional Accession Made Conditional
by Mountbatten–Nehru
(The British Game-11 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-6)
Enclosing his signed ‘Instrument of Accession’ in the standard format
(like for all the other princely states—please see above), Maharaja Hari
Singh wrote to the Governor-General of India Mountbatten on 26 October
1947:
“With the conditions obtaining at present in my state and the great
emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask
for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the
help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of
India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the
Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government.”{Jag/86}
Through a separate letter, Mountbatten advised Maharaja Hari Singh
that the accession was subject to reference to the people of J&K:
“In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my
Government [so, Mountbatten regarded independent India’s
government as his government!] have decided to accept the
accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistent
with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of
accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession
should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of
the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order
have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader,
the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference
to the people...”{AW/114}{Jag/86}
Notably, Maharaja Hari Singh had stipulated NO condition when he
signed the Instrument of Accession. Even Sheikh Abdullah, who had
favoured accession to India, never insisted on any condition—rather, he
wanted accession to be unconditional, lest any uncertainty should remain.
It was Mountbatten who wrote a separate letter to Hari Singh advising
that the accession was temporary, and was conditional upon ascertaining the
wishes of the people of Kashmir, that is, holding a plebiscite. Who gave
Mountbatten the authority to write such a letter? Who was he to make the
accession conditional? Did he obtain the Cabinet approval? [No!] As
Governor General of India, appointed by Indians, was he serving the Indian
interests, or the Pakistani and the British interests? He was no more the
Viceroy of the British India to be taking independent decisions on his own.
Why had the Indian leaders, particularly Nehru as the head of the
government, not made it clear to Mountbatten that he could not act on his
own on critical matters—that he had to take the permission of the cabinet?
When the other 547 states acceded to India, did he write such a letter to
each of them or put this condition?
One can understand conditions being stipulated by the party offering
you the favour of accession. That is, the Maharaja stipulating conditions for
his accession to India—however, he stipulated no conditions! But, for the
party being favoured with accession to stipulate conditions—that’s absurd!
Why should India have put conditions upon J&K for its accession? Was
India doing a favour to J&K for allowing it to accede to India?
Had it been a Governor General who was an Indian like say Gandhi or
Rajagopalachari or Ambedkar, and not a British like Mountbatten, would
he have tried to make the accession conditional? And, had he done so,
would the Indian public have ever forgiven him?
Or, was it Nehru who acquiesced to writing of such a letter by
Mountbatten? Even if the deed was done without his knowledge, Nehru
should have objected to it and should have got it annulled or withdrawn.
However, most likely Nehru was a party to it.
Illegal Stipulation of ‘Reference to People’
(The British Game-12, Nehru’s J&K Blunder-7 &
Sardar’s Wisdom-5)
The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the British Parliament
also incorporated the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of
12 May 1946 as per which the princely states were to regain full
sovereignty with the creation of the two dominions of India and Pakistan
from the British India on 15 August 1947, with the ruler of the Princely
State being the ONLY authority to offer accession to India or Pakistan, or to
remain independent, regardless of the religious composition of the people of
that state, there being NO provision for ‘reference to the people’ or
plebiscite.
Therefore, with the signing of the unconditional Instrument of Accession
by the Maharaja of J&K on 26 October 1947 in favour of India, J&K’s
accession to India was full, final, irrevocable and totally legal as per the
International Law.
Legally, that separate letter of Mountbatten (please see above) made
absolutely NO difference.
In fact, Mountbatten’s action of writing the above letter was
unconstitutional and illegal. Even Nehru had NO legal authority to approve
of such a letter. What is more, there was NO cabinet sanction for it!
India should have stuck to this incontestable legal position of the
irrevocable accession of J&K to India, like for the other 547 states, on the
strength of the signing of the Instrument of Accession. This is what Sardar
Patel strongly advocated. Even US considered ours as an ironclad legal
position in 1948. Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in
Kashmir 1947-48’: “The fundamental difference between the American and
British positions lay in the fact that the United States was prepared in 1947-
48 to recognise India’s sovereign rights in Kashmir.”{DG/121} However, Nehru
failed to leverage on that.
The funny thing is that the "reference to the people" or plebiscite was
requested neither by Maharaja Hari Singh, nor by Sheikh Abdullah, nor by
the people of J&K, nor even by Jinnah(!!) at that time! It was only thanks to
Mountbatten and Nehru!{Hing/200} The position was retrievable, but together
they spoiled the case, by going with it further by referring it to the UN, as
would be seen in the blunder to follow.
The British, through Mountbatten, managed to dupe Nehru and India. Of
course, Mountbatten’s game would have fallen flat had India and Nehru
factored-in the vested interests of the British and Mountbatten.
27-Oct-47: Air-lifting Troops
(The British Game-13, Nehru’s J&K Blunder-8 &
Sardar’s Wisdom-6)
The Defence Committee meeting was held on 27 October 1947,
presided by Mountbatten. It was attended by Nehru, Patel, Sardar Baldev
Singh and other ministers. VP Menon, HM Patel and Sam Manekshaw were
invitees. After the accession papers were presented by Sardar Patel, Sam
Manekshaw apprised the Committee of the Military situation. Sam
informed the Committee that the raiders were hardly seven to nine
kilometres from Srinagar; and unless the troops were flown in immediately,
Srinagar would be lost, because going by road would take days, and once
the raiders got to the airport and Srinagar, it would not be possible to fly-in
the troops. He further informed that everything was ready at the airport, and
the troops could be immediately air-lifted, once the orders were issued.
Mountbatten—serving the pro-Pakistani British interests—tried to stall,
saying it was too late. Even though J&K had satisfied Mountbatten’s
condition of accession for sending in the Indian army, Mountbatten tried his
best to stall the Indian military help to J&K on the pretext that it was too
late, raiders being already at the door of Srinagar. But, who made it late in
the first place—Mountbatten himself. Sardar Patel then took the necessary
action, ignoring both Mountbatten and Nehru.
Even when the need for action became urgent, “Mountbatten threw his
weight against any precipitate action, emphasising the need for further
information,” writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in
Kashmir 1947-48’{DG/45}. Even after further information was available
through VP Menon and Sam Manekshaw, who had been specially flown to
Srinagar for the purpose on 25 October 1947, and who advised urgent airlift
of troops, Mountbatten showed reluctance. Writes Dasgupta “...the service
chiefs [all British], supported by Mountbatten, sought to dissuade the
ministers from an airlift on the grounds that it involved great risks and
dangers.”{DG/47}
British were serving pro-Pakistani British interests. But, Nehru? Why
couldn’t Nehru recognise the British machinations and come to grips with
the unfolding crisis that required prompt action from India of airlifting
troops to Srinagar, failing which there was a definite possibility of India
losing Kashmir forever. What was critical was timely action, not dithering.
Sending troops later or leaving the matter to the UN would have meant
allowing Pakistan to occupy Kashmir by force, and Kashmir becoming part
of Pakistan as a fait accompli, which Pakistan wanted, and to which Britain
was more than willing to turn a blind eye. But for Sardar Patel, it is
doubtful—because the British didn’t want it and Nehru had hang-ups and
was reluctant—if the prompt action of airlifting troops to Srinagar would
have been taken, as corroborated by the following words of Sam
Manekshaw.
Recounted Sam Manekshaw, who later became the first Field Marshal in
the Indian army, in his interview with Prem Shankar Jha{Jha1}:
“At the morning meeting he [VP Menon/Patel] handed over the
(Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘come on
Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the
military situation?’ I gave him the military situation, and told him
that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost
Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the
tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn't fly troops in.
Everything was ready at the airport. As usual Nehru talked about the
United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until
Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want
Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He (Nehru) said, ‘Of
course, I want Kashmir.’ Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your
orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me
and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we started
flying in troops...”{Jha1/135}
It has also been reported that the J&K premier, Mehar Chand Mahajan,
even threatened to proceed to Karachi and offer Kashmir to Jinnah, if India
could not secure safety of the people of J&K. Despite tremendous practical
difficulties, lack of preparation, and the short notice, the Indian Army rose
to the occasion and chased the raiders out of the valley.
It is worth factoring-in the fact that had the Indian army not reached
Srinagar in time, there would have been a large scale massacre and mayhem
by the Pakistani raiders in Srinagar and surrounding areas, which in turn
would have had repercussions all over India. But, Mountbatten and the
British didn’t seem to value Indian lives.
28-Oct-47: Radio Announcement of Plebiscite by Nehru
(The British Game-14 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-9)
Writes V Shankar:
“Lord Mountbatten persuaded Pandit Nehru to make a broadcast in
which he was to announce that the accession would be subject to a
plebiscite under the UN auspices. This was scheduled at 8.30pm on
28 October [1947]. Sardar used to insist on seeing the texts of
important broadcasts including those of the prime minister. Pandit
Nehru had a very busy day and could not send the text before
8.15pm. Sardar read it and noticed the embarrassing commitment.
He tried to contact Pandit Nehru but the latter had left for the
Broadcasting House. Sardar then commissioned me to go to the
Broadcasting House and ask Pandit Nehru to delete the offending
phrase 'under UN auspices'...”{Shan1}
However, by the time Shankar reached the place, the deed was done.
It was imprudent on the part of Nehru to have made this commitment of
“plebiscite under UN auspices” at the instance of a British, Lord
Mountbatten, having his own axe to grind, without taking the cabinet and
the patriotic Indians who mattered—Sardar Patel and others—into
confidence!
It seems that Nehru, the claimed expert on international affairs, was
innocent about the functioning of the UNSC—UN Security Council. He
was apparently under the impression that UNSC functioned on the basis of
the high ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and looked to the merits of the
cases referred to it. That the member-nations of the UNSC acted in their
own selfish national interests and engaged in power-game was apparently
not known to the foreign-affairs expert Nehru.
Oct-Nov, 47: Forcible Annexation of Certain Areas by Pakistan
(The British Game-15 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-10)
When, despite their machinations, J&K acceded to India, the British not
only created huge difficulties for India, they ensured that substantial part of
Kashmir, especially its northern and western part remained with Pakistan.
What is just, proper, right, ethical and moral was never in the dictionary of
the English, else they would not have been able to loot India, and other
colonies.
Britain had marked out two areas that had to absolutely go to Pakistan—
despite J&K accession to India. One was the northern area along the
Chinese, Russian and Afghanistan borders comprising Gilgit, Hunza,
Nagar, Swat and Chitral. This area commanded as much strategic
importance to Britain and the West as NWFP in Pakistan. Mountbatten had
ensured NWFP went to Pakistan, even though its leader, Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan, was opposed to the partition of India. The other area was the
western strip adjoining Pakistani Punjab to secure Pakistan from India,
comprising Muzzafarabad, Mirpur, Bhimbar, Kotli and adjoining areas.
Muzzafarabad is now the capital of PoK, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
How Gilgit was acquired for Pakistan
After J&K acceded to India on 26 October 1947, Major William Brown
of the Gilgit Scouts, although a British contract officer of the Maharaja of
J&K, had the Governor Ghansara Singh imprisoned on 31 October 1947, as
per a pre-meditated plan, and hoisted the Pakistani flag there on
2 November 1947, and declared its accession to Pakistan! Major Khurshid
Anwar was one of the Pakistani army officers who had organised and lead
the Pakistani Pathan tribal invasion of J&K. His deputy, Major Aslam
Khan, took charge of Gilgit from Brown. In 1948, Brown was honoured
with the “Most Exalted Order of the British Empire”.
This was totally an illegal action on the part of the British meant to
deliberately deny India access to Central Asia.
However, as India’s was quite capable of freeing Gilgit, and was about
to do so, Mountbatten played his game. He assured Nehru that with India
choosing the UN option rather than the military option, the UN would
anyway direct Pakistan to withdraw the raiders. India’s military action was,
therefore, unnecessary.{Sar/335} Gullible Nehru fell for the convenient, no-
action advice, and Mountbatten thereby ensured Gilgit remained with
Pakistan.
Interestingly, when the UN Security Council Resolution of
13 August 1948 (please see details further down) called for, inter alia,
ceasefire and Pakistani withdrawal of all its regular and irregular forces
from J&K, the British had problem, despite the US approval. Why?
Explained the UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to the US Secretary of
State on 27 October 1948 at the time of the UN General Assembly Meeting
in Paris: The main issue was who would control the main artery leading
into Central Asia.{Sar/336} The ‘main artery’ was the British-built track from
Gilgit to Kashgar in Sinkiang across the Karakoram range.{Sar/336}
The British were not really concerned about the legality of Gilgit being
in India or Pakistan. All they wanted was that it should continue to remain
under their control—and Pakistan was willing to co-operate with them in
that regard. If the naïve leaders in India, including the “internationalist” and
the “foreign-affairs expert”, had grasped those aspects of power-politics
they could have cunningly reassured Britain and the West on that score to
get support for India, and in the subsequent years actually done what they
deemed fit in the best interests of the country. Had they done so there would
have been no Kashmir problem, nor perhaps even partition.
Notably, Nehru had hinted in his letter to the then Indian High
Commissioner in the UK, Krishna Menon, on 20 February 1948 that in the
worst case scenario he might accept Poonch and Gilgit being partitioned off
to Pakistan. Further, on 23 July 1948 VP Menon had informed the US
Charge d’affairs of their embassy in Delhi that India could accept a
settlement of the J&K issue based on the partitioning off of Gilgit, Mirpur,
Muzaffarabad, and Poonch to Pakistan. This dilution of India’s stand
actually came as a surprise to the US who had been of the opinion that
leaving the occupied territories in the Pakistani control would be
unacceptable to India.{Sar/338}
Oct-Nov, 47: Mudding Waters to Weaken India’s Position
(The British Game-16)
When Jinnah learnt of the presence of the Indian Army in Srinagar, he
ordered his acting Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Douglas Gracey, to
send Pakistan Army to J&K. This Gracey refused. Auchinleck, the Supreme
Commander, met Jinnah and advised him that on account of the Instrument
of Accession of J&K having been signed by Hari Singh in favour of India,
J&K was legally part of India, and sending in Pakistan Army there would
amount to declaration of war. And, if Pakistan did so, all British officers
from the Pakistan Army would be withdrawn. This was as per the British
policy of Stand Down in case of conflict between the two dominions of
India and Pakistan.{Pani/56}
Auchinleck suggested a round table conference in Lahore of Jinnah,
Liaqat Ali, Mountbatten, Hari Singh, Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru, and others to
sort out the matters. Jinnah agreed, looking to the reversals. However,
Sardar Patel was opposed to it. Nehru agreed, but was indisposed. Finally,
Mountbatten alone attended the conference. Queer that Mountbatten, with
his British axe to grind, should have represented India; and Nehru should
have agreed for it!
Mountbatten suggested “reference to the people” as an option to Jinnah,
which Jinnah did not agree to! Pakistan has been insisting on a plebiscite,
when actually it was Pakistan which refused it, when first asked!! Jinnah
feared that given the atrocities committed by the raiders and the Pakistani
Army in J&K, and the strong position of Sheikh Abdullah among the
Muslims, people of J&K would not opt for Pakistan. He wanted merger
purely on the fact that the majority population of J&K was Muslim.
This contradicted Jinnah’s own stand in the case of Junagadh, whose
accession he had accepted, even though Junagadh was a Hindu-majority
Princely State, whose nawab was a Muslim. It was also strange considering
that he had been wooing Jodhpur and Jaisalmer, the Hindu-majority states,
to accede to Pakistan. It also contradicted his stand on Hyderabad. But, that
was Jinnah, the politician. Ever an opportunist.
While India’s stand was quite consistent—in case of dispute, go by the
will of the people, that is, referendum; Jinnah’s and Pakistan’s stand was
quite disingenuous. They advocated prerogative of the ruler, rather than a
referendum, in case of Junagadh and Hyderabad, because it was obvious
that with their overwhelming Hindu majority, both the states would opt for
India in a referendum. However, for J&K, they desired neither the ruler’s
prerogative nor referendum! They desired J&K’s accession to Pakistan
purely on the fact of its Muslim majority. Why? Because, while J&K’s
Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, had already opted for India; they knew
that they would lose a referendum. If indeed any referendum had been
conducted between 1947 and 1950, the state, including the Muslims, would
have opted for India for two reasons: loot and rape suffered by the
Kashmiris, whether Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs, at the hands of raiders
assisted by the Pakistani army; and the popularity of Sheikh Abdullah, who
was till then pro-India.
Writes Kuldip Nayar: “Chester Bowles, then the US ambassador, told
me that India would have won the plebiscite if it had held it before 1953.
Then New Delhi had popular backing in Kashmir, but things changed
subsequently...”{KN}
Finding that neither ruler’s prerogative nor referendum could get them
J&K, Pakistan resorted to brute force and mayhem to achieve their
objective. Strangely, or expectedly, persons like Philip Noel-Baker, the UK
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and others resorted to
blatant lies and shielded and supported the aggressors, because the basic
foreign policy aim of the UK was to ensure J&K went to Pakistan or
remained independent, under their influence.
2-Nov-47: Nehru Reiterated Reference to the UN
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-11)
Reference to the UN was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and
others were against, however, Nehru again went ahead with it publicly in
his radio broadcast on 2 November 1947. Incidentally, plebiscite was held
in Junagadh also, but it was conducted by India itself on 20 February 1948,
as arranged by Sardar Patel.
With the reference to the UN not yet a reality, being only a stated Indian
intention, and with the Indian troops landing in J&K to spoil the British
plan, the British cooked up an alternate plan to ensure that their selfish
purpose (most of J&K adjoining Russia and China remaining under their
influence by being part of Pakistan) was served without even reference to
the UN (where it could take indeterminate time), or by resorting to the
democratic option of a plebiscite, where the results could go the Indian way.
A top-secret note dated 6 November 1947 of Noel Baker, UK Secretary of
State of Commonwealth Relations, proposed partition of J&K whereby only
Jammu was to be allocated to India.{Pani/34-36} That there had been such a
proposal was confirmed when Nehru wrote to the then Indian High
Commissioner in the UK, Krishna Menon, on 20 February 1948 informing
that Mountbatten had similarly hinted at the partition of Kashmir with only
Jammu going to India.{Sar/338}
What was galling was that unlike the wise Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar
and others, Gandhi was in favour of reference to the UN. Mountbatten had
met Gandhi in November 1947, and found that Gandhi was favourably
inclined to invocate the UN.{Sar/366}
Apparently, India’s great freedom fighters, despite their overlong years
in jails where they could read, study, think, and discuss to their heart’s
content, found no time to deliberate on India’s foreign policies, external and
internal security, and defence upon independence—perhaps they were too
busy spinning yarn. Blissfully ignorant of the realities of the world and its
power politics, Gandhi had even naively suggested to Mountbatten in
September 1947 that Attlee mediate between India and Pakistan{Sar/366},
without appreciating the vested interests of the British that were contrary to
the interests of India.
Nov-47: Early Termination of the British Army Chief
(Sardar’s Wisdom-7)
Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-
48’:
“The Supreme Commander’s [Field Marshal Auchinleck] days in
India were, however, numbered. He had incurred the wrath of
Sardar Patel for what the latter perceived as partiality towards
Pakistan in the matter of division of military stores. His role in
Junagadh affair added fuel to the fire. Patel justifiably concluded
that in the final analysis the British officers at the helm of the armed
forces took their orders from the Supreme Commander, not the
Indian government. He charged the Field Marshall with ‘throttling
the initiative of the Headquarters Indian Army and acting as the
advanced outpost of Pakistan’. Mountbatten tried his best to defend
Auchinleck, but to no avail.”{DG/51}
Nehru discovered that India’s British Commander-in-Chief had known
of Pakistani-led tribal invasion of Kashmir in advance, but had withheld
that vital information from India. He had to subsequently resign.{DG/133}
Expectedly, Pakistanis wanted him [Auchinleck—to whom both Indian
and Pakistani army heads reported] and his Supreme Headquarters,
comprising all British officers, to continue, but they had to wind up by 30
November 1947 in view of India’s stand, thanks to Sardar Patel’s
uncompromising position, even though they were originally scheduled to
remain for a year after independence, that is, up to 15 August 1948.
Nov-47: Sardar & Strengthening of J&K Defence
(Sardar’s Wisdom-8)
Sardar Patel and Defence Minister Baldev Singh visited Srinagar on
4 November 1947, and instructed Brigadier Sen to save Srinagar and eject
raiders, promising to send reinforcements at the earliest. They also took a
decision to set up the Divisional HQ of the Army there. This indicated that
India meant to stay put for a long haul in Kashmir. This utterly frustrated
Pakistan and all its grand designs. Patel’s timely visit saved Srinagar and
J&K.
Writes Rajmohan Gandhi: “In the judgement of Sheikh Abdullah, scarcely an uncritical Patel
fan, ‘events took a decisive turn’ after Vallabhbhai’s Srinagar visit. ‘The Sardar did not lose even one
minute. He studied the situation and said that the enemy must be driven back.’…Major
General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown to
Srinagar the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed
Baramula on November 8...”{RG/445}
25-Nov-47: Nehru Reiterated UN Reference in Parliament
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-12)
Rather than retrieving himself from his radio-broadcasts in which he had
talked of ‘Reference to the UN’ on J&K, Nehru made the follow-up blunder
of making a statement about “reference to the people” of J&K in the
Parliament on 25 November 1947. He also reiterated the possibility of UN-
overseen plebiscite.
All the representations made to Nehru against the UN-overseen
plebiscite by Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others fell on deaf ears—
Nehru was too much under the ill influence of Mountbatten.
Nov-47: Sardar’s Push for Strong Military Action
(Sardar’s Wisdom-9)
Mountbatten arranged a meeting between Nehru and Liaqat Ali on
26 November 1947 to stop the hostilities, but to no avail. Liaqat Ali, upon
return to Pakistan, made provocative speeches and talked of sending more
raiders into J&K.
Meanwhile the atrocities committed by the Pakistani raiders became
widely known. Given this, where was the question of talking about
plebiscite, when people were being raped and killed and subjected to worst
atrocities. The Indian Cabinet at the instance of Sardar Patel pushed for a
very strong military action to fully clear J&K of the raiders. Further, it
wanted creation of a demilitarized zone beyond the borders, and proper
monitoring, lest any raiders camp be reactivated. This would have ensured
there was never a so-called Azad Kashmir or a PoK (Pakistan-occupied-
Kashmir). But, Nehru failed to rise to the occasion.
Nov-47: Sabotaging Plan to Clear Invaders
(The British Game-17 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-13)
With the willing support of Mountbatten heading the Defence
Committee, General Roy Bucher, the acting British commander-in-chief of
the Indian Army, had derailed in November 1947 the plan of General
Kulwant Singh, GOC, Kashmir Operations, to clear the invaders from the
entire belt along the Pakistan border.
Mountbatten managed to sabotage the course of action suggested by
General Kulwant Singh by getting it referred to the Joint Planning Staff
comprising British officers, and making them give an adverse report that the
planned military action was too risky and not practicable.{Sar/358} This he
could do as he had managed to become the Head of the Defence
Committee. As the Governor General of India, rather than serving India, he
was actually serving the cause of Britain and Pakistan.
Nehru did nothing to support General Kulwant Singh’s plan.
Nov-47: Nehru’s Shocking Callousness towards Mirpur Victims
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-14)
Here is an account by of a Hindu survivor who was a witness to the
Mirpur tragedy reproduced from Swarajya Mag{Swa2}:
“On November 23 [1947], Prem Nath Dogra and Professor Balraj
Madhok met Brigadier Paranjape, the Brigade Commander of the
Indian Army in Jammu, and requested him to send reinforcements
to Mirpur [where more than one hundred thousand Hindus and
Sikhs were held up during first Pakistani aggression over Kashmir].
Paranjape shared their agony but expressed his helplessness because
—as per instructions from the army generals—consultation with
Sheikh Abdullah was mandatory in order to deploy Indian troops
anywhere in Jammu and Kashmir. Paranjape also informed the
delegation that Pandit Nehru would come to Srinagar on November
24 [1947] and they should meet him. On November 24, Pandit
Dogra and Professor Madhok met Nehru and once again told him
about the critical situation in Mirpur. They requested him to order
immediate Indian troops reinforcement to the beleaguered Mirpur
City. Professor Madhok was amazed at Pandit Nehru’s response—
Pandit Nehru flew into a rage and yelled that they should talk to
Sheikh Abdullah. Prof Madhok again told Pandit Nehru that Sheikh
Abdullah was indifferent to the plight of the Jammu province and
only Pandit Nehru could save the people of Mirpur. However,
Pandit Nehru ignored all their entreaties and did not send any
reinforcements to Mirpur.”{Swa2}
On 24 November 1947, Mirpur fell to Pakistani artillery, and became
part of PoK. The Hindus and Sikhs encountered a genocide, and worst
orgies of rape and barbarity.
Nov-Dec, 47: Not Clearing Raiders from Poonch & Mirpur
(The British Game-18 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-15)
When the Indian army was on the verge of clearing the whole of
Kashmir during November-December 1947, Mountbatten persuaded Nehru,
against the advice of the Indian generals, to call for ceasefire, thus allowing
a large chunk of J&K to remain in Pakistan. In other words, when the
Pakistani game of forcibly occupying Kashmir was becoming a complete
failure, Mountbatten, by persuading Nehru, ensured that Pakistan kept a
portion of the territory.
Why was Mountbatten allowed to jeopardise India's interest? Writes
C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’:
“...Whitehall [Britain] believed that Indian control of western
borderlands of Jammu would pose a grave strategic and economic
threat to Pakistan. It is against this background that we must view
Mountbatten’s opposition to plans for clearing the raiders from the
Poonch and Mirpur areas.”{DG/69}
But, the question is why Nehru agreed to the detriment of India?
1-Jan-48: Internationalisation of the J&K Issue by Nehru
(The British Game-19, Nehru’s J&K Blunder-16 &
Sardar’s Wisdom-10)
There was a Joint Defence Council meet at Lahore on 9 December 1947
with representatives from India and Pakistan, including Nehru and
Mountbatten, but it did not throw up any solution. With no headway in
sight, Mountbatten again started harping on bringing in the UN as a third-
party mediator. It is likely that the British Government must have told him
that they could better manage pro-Pakistan stand in the UN. It is bizarre
how British managed to make a fool of India, even after Independence. Was
Nehru’s understanding of the world affairs, strategic interests of the British,
power politics, British games and the motivations of Mountbatten so
wanting?
Till then there was only a talk about “reference to people” and
“reference to the UN” by Nehru. The matter was not actually referred to the
UN.
Finding that the things had begun to go in India’s favour (thanks to
Sardar Patel’s actions), despite all the mischief of the Pakistanis and the
unjust support of the British, Mountbatten persuaded Nehru to refer the
matter to the UN, thus internationalising the issue, to the detriment of India.
Mountbatten seemed to have a single point remedy for any controversial
issue of accession of a princely state to India: refer it to the UN. It is not as
if there was any real evidence of the UN having solved any contentious
issue. In fact, things were more likely to get messed up by referring to the
UN, as political considerations of various countries would come into play.
However, the purpose of Mountbatten to suggest such a reference to the
UN was to allow for further consideration from the Pakistani angle. That
was to please the British establishment back in London, where almost all
favoured Pakistan over India. And, in some cases, like J&K, get the big
powers like the UK and the US manipulate the outcome at the UN in their
favour.
While Sardar Patel was against internationalising the issue by making
such a reference to the UN, Nehru ultimately agreed. That was a huge error
on the part of Nehru, for it converted a domestic issue into an international
issue. J&K had signed the Instrument of Accession, and was thus part of
India, and hence anything concerning J&K was an internal, domestic issue.
At the instance of Mountbatten and under pressure from Nehru, the
Indian Cabinet agreed to refer the matter to the UN on 20 December 1947
under Article 35 of the UN Charter, as a follow up of what Nehru had
already publicly committed several times, even though Sardar Patel and Dr
Ambedkar were not in favour of the same. India scored a self-goal, with
Nehru formally referring the J&K matter to the UN on 1 January 1948.
With the issue internationalised, India suffered greatly, both domestically
and internationally—it became like the sword of Damocles. And continues
to be so! Was Edwina a factor in persuading Nehru to go by Mountbatten’s
suggestion? Maulana Azad, a pro-Nehru person, expresses bewilderment in
his autobiography{Azad} as to how Nehru was won over by Lord
Mountbatten; mentions Nehru’s weakness of being impulsive and amenable
to personal influences, and wonders if the Lady Mountbatten factor was
responsible.
Wrote Durga Das: “...Patel added that Nehru was unduly amenable to
Mountbatten’s influence. Nehru had ‘always leaned on someone’. He was
under Bapu’s protective wing and ‘now he leans on Mountbatten’.”{DD/240}
Nehru himself regretted his decision: “Kashmir issue has given us a
great deal of trouble… the attitude of the great powers has been
astonishing. Some of them have shown active partisanship for Pakistan…
We feel we have not been given a square deal.”{BK2/159}
It is indeed strange that Nehru, who claimed to be an expert in
international affairs, and who had therefore also kept charge of the External
Affairs, didn’t know the basics of international dealings: every country
advances its own self-interest; that UN was a forum for power game; and no
country is bothered about what is just and what is unjust. Further, he didn’t
take the practical lesson from what Sardar Patel did in the case of Junagadh:
Patel ignored Mountbatten’s advice to refer the Junagadh case to the UN. If
one had to talk of "reference to the people", why "reference to the people
overseen by UN". It could have been "reference to the people conducted by
India itself, as for Junagadh”.
Jan-48: Disastrous Indian Presentation in the UN
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-17)
India and Pakistan presented their cases at the UN in January 1948. The
Indian case was presented by Gopalaswami Aiyangar, Minister for Kashmir
Affairs, specifically appointed by Nehru in his cabinet. Aiyangar was the
leader of the Indian team that also included Sheikh Abdullah.
Quipped Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985), the
Pakistani representative in the UN, when he came to know about
Gopalaswami Aiyangar as India’s representative: “You are offering me
Kashmir on a platter.”{BK/387}
It is worth noting that Zafrullah Khan had an illustrious career. Educated
at London’s King’s College, he was the foreign minister of Pakistan (1947-
54), the president for the UN General Assembly (1962), and the judge
(1954-61, 1964-73), vice-president (1958-61) and the president (1970-73)
of the International Court of Justice. He had been a member of the All-India
Muslim League, and had served as its president between 1931 and 1932. He
was the Minister of Railway of British India in 1935. He sat on the British
Viceroy's Executive Council as its Muslim member between 1935 and
1941. He represented India at the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939. He
was the Agent-General of British India to China in 1942. He became judge
at the Federal Court of India. (Incidentally, Zafrullah Khan was an Ahmadiyya, like Abdus
Salam (1926–1996), a Pakistani theoretical physicist, who shared the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physics.
Abdus Salam left Pakistan in 1974 in protest against the passage of the parliamentary bill declaring
the Ahmadiyya Community as NOT-Islamic. Jinnah and Aga Khan, both Shias, were the prime
movers of Pakistan. Shias too are at the receiving end in Pakistan.)
Expectedly, while Zafrullah Khan’s presentation was brilliant, and
received all-round praise, that of Aiyangar’s was an unmitigated disaster!
Earlier, instead of Aiyangar, the name of Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, the
then Secretary-General (senior-most position) in the Ministry of External
Affairs and certainly a much more capable person, was suggested; but, on
account of opposition he was dropped, as he was known to have been too
close to the British during the pre-independence period.{Akb3/129} But then,
why was he made the Secretary-General at all!
Jan-48: Sardar Suggested CP instead of Aiyangar
(Sardar’s Wisdom-11)
Sardar Patel was opposed to Gopalaswami Aiyangar leading the Indian
team in the UN. He considered him to be not competent enough. Patel had
instead suggested the name of CP Ramaswami Iyer, who had been the
Diwan of Travancore (please see details about him in the earlier chapter
‘Integration of the Princely States’, subchapter ‘Travancore’). CP, as he was
called, was a very competent intellectual, statesman and a diplomat, with
many foreign contacts in the UK and the US. He would have presented
India’s case effectively.
But, Nehru ignored Patel’s advice, and stuck to Gopalaswami Aiyangar.
Here is a tell-tale description of what happened in the UN, as told by
Shakunthala Jagannathan, CP’s granddaughter:
“I was a student living in New York, when the question of Kashmir
came up in the U.N. Accompanied by several Indian and American
friends, I attended the Security council session, oozing with
confidence on India’s stand. First came Sir Zafrullah Khan’s
impassioned and brilliant speech on behalf of Pakistan which was
powerful enough to shake up our confidence. When he sat down, we
Indians breathed a sigh of relief. The Indian delegation was then
asked to present their case. The delegate concerned put up his hand,
stood up, and said, “I protest!”… We had expected that our case, so
much stronger, would shake up the U.N.! Instead our presentation
on that day resulted in a debacle, right before our eyes...”{SJ/45-46}
1948: British Lobby at the UN for J&K to go to Pakistan
(The British Game-20)
Britain lobbied in the UN that J&K should go to Pakistan as 77% of its
population was Muslim. This was despite The Indian Independence Act
1947 enacted by them and their own Memorandum on States’ Treaties and
Paramountcy of 12 May 1946 which did not provide for religious majority–
minority consideration, or reference to the people, and unambiguously
stipulated that the ruler of a Princely State was the sole legal authority to
decide on accession. Hence, Britain was lobbying for something that was
ILLEGAL and UNCONSTITUTIONAL as per the laws they had
themselves enacted.
Further, if Hindu or Muslim majority was a factor, why was it that the
British advanced no similar arguments of Hindu majority when the issues of
Hyderabad and Junagadh came up?
Looking to what transpired in the UN, Nehru realised his folly of
referring the matter to the UN. The UK, the US and their allies, led by the
UK, began playing politics of favouring Pakistan over India, ignoring the
fact of Pakistani aggression in J&K.
Patel later told the British Under Secretary of State, Arthur Henderson:
“Unfortunately, it is my experience that the attitude of an average
Englishman in India is instinctively against us… We should never
have gone to the UNO… at the UNO, not only has the dispute been
prolonged but the merits of our case have been completely lost in
the interaction of power politics… we were so terribly disappointed
at the attitude of your delegation… it was, we maintain, the attitude
of Noel Baker that tilted the balance against us. But for his lead, I
doubt if the USA and some other powers would have gone against
us.”{BK2/159}
Significantly, the US demonstrated an honest appreciation of India’s
stand during 1947-48. The US admitted the unchallengeable legality of
J&K’s accession into India. The US further elaborated that the accession
could be reversed only if India lost the plebiscite, which India had itself
offered.{Sar/404}
1948: Britain Claimed in the UN:
No Pakistani Aggression in J&K
(The British Game-21)
In the UN Security Council the British delegation took the position that
there was no case of aggression by Pakistan, as Pakistan was in no way
involved in sending the tribal raiders to J&K, despite enough proof to the
contrary. The British had to tell those lies because they were themselves a
party to it, having connived with the Pakistani army. And, not just
connived, the British army officers, including General Gracey, actively
helped the Pakistani forces and tribal-raiders both in the planning and in the
execution of aggression against India, and in the illegal occupation of
India’s territory.{Pani/59}
All through the British acted anti-India. It is amazing that these brutal
British who looted India, became rich at its cost, humiliated and exploited
its people, misbehaved and acted arrogant, insulted its culture and religion,
used grossly intemperate, crude and abusive language while they lorded
here, used Indians in its armed forces to subjugate other nations, and were
even abusive towards them despite using their services; acted even more
uncivilised when in the process of leaving India and after having left India.
You won’t find another example of such thankless, uncivilised people in the
history of civilisation. Just one quote of Winston Churchill should suffice to
illustrate their unabashed thanklessness, utter crudeness, lack of culture and
their being out and out racist: “I hate Indians. They are a beastly people
with a beastly religion.”{Chur1}
1948: India Outmanoeuvred
(The British Game-22 & Nehru’s J&K Blunder-18)
British managed to outmanoeuvre Indian leaders. They not only
managed to partition the country, they also managed to put the blame on
India and Pakistan, and on Hindus and Muslims, absolving themselves of
all wrong-doing. Similarly, the British managed to create a huge problem
for India on J&K by getting it internationalised through reference to the
UN, and having the accession questioned in that forum. And how did they
do it? By making India itself refer the case to the UN!
If we go by the results, while the Britain, thanks to their iniquitous
methods, managed to protect their strategic interests that were endangered
with their losing the two-century-old empire, and Jinnah got his Pakistan,
India was a big loser—it was severed into two and was left to lick its
wounds!
Judging from the angle of the UK, the US and the West, Britain’s
Partition Strategy was very successful, and yielded excellent results for
them: they secured their oil-interests; Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact,
then CENTO, then entered into a bilateral pact with the US, provided air
bases to them, helped spy against Soviet Union, and so on, followed by
active involvement in driving away the Russians from Afghanistan—which
ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR.
However, despite all these facts, there have been so many in India, and
there are so many still who sing for the British! They are the victims of
subtle British propaganda. Or, influenced by the pro-British Indian writers
and lackeys. Or, are simply ill-read and plain ignorant. There is no cure for
being ill-informed or ignorant.
But, of course, the blame for the J&K mess and the partition cannot be
put on the English alone, absolving us of all responsibility. The British were
doing what suited their interests. India should have been smart enough to
know their games and to protect its own interests. Ultimately, the blame has
to be taken by the Indian nationalists. They were upholding ideals quite
divorced from the realities. They ignored the reality of the power politics in
international affairs. They seemed to have disinterest in foreign affairs—the
disinterest extended to the questions of security and defence,
notwithstanding Nehru’s self-certification as a foreign-affairs expert and an
“internationalist”! Their political assessments and judgements were poor.
They miscalculated.
Nehru, Gandhi, and the Congress whom the Indian public trusted with
leadership, statesmanship, acumen, vision and far-sightedness were left
blinking their eyes—the leaders were woefully out of depth to understand
the British designs.
Mar-48: Upgrading Abdullah
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-19)
Maharaja Hari Singh, most reluctantly, signed a proclamation promoting
Sheikh Abdullah from the Head of Emergency Administration to the Prime
Minister of J&K on 5 March 1948, downgrading himself to non-executive
Head of State. This was done by Nehru to placate and reward Sheikh
Abdullah who till then had been taking pro-India and anti-Pakistan stand.
21 April 1948 : UN Commission
The UN Security Council passed a resolution on 21 April 1948
appointing a five-member Commission to restore peace in J&K and conduct
plebiscite.
21 June 1948: Mountbatten Leaves India
Mountbatten left India on 21 June 1948. Before leaving, he had
suggested partitioning J&K: Nehru was willing to consider the same, but
Pakistan ignored it.
30-May-48: Sardar Dismissed Jinnah–Mountbatten Demand
(Sardar’s Wisdom-12)
Unlike Nehru, Sardar Patel was very firm in his dealings. Writes
Rajmohan Gandhi: “Returning from London on the night of May 30 [1948],
Mountbatten, in his own words, ‘sent V.P.Menon to see Patel to obtain his
agreement to six months joint control [with Pakistan] of Calcutta’, which is
what Jinnah had been pressing for. The Viceroy recorded Patel’s reply: ‘Not
even for six hours!’ Earlier...Jinnah had demanded an 800-mile ‘corridor’ to
link West and East Pakistan. Patel called the claim ‘such fantastic nonsense
as not to be taken seriously’. It died a quick and unremembered death.”{RG2}
13 August 1948: UNSC Resolution on J&K
On 13 August 1948 the UN Security Council (a)called for ceasefire;
(b)agreed that India could retain part of its troops in J&K; (c)asked
aggressor Pakistan to withdraw all its regular and irregular forces from
J&K; and (d)said that the status of J&K would be determined by reference
to the people, after (a), (b) and (c) were complied with.
Pakistan refused implementation of (a) and (c). Pakistan later realised it
was not able to force a military solution, and agreed for ceasefire effective 1
January 1949.
1-Jan-49: How Nehru Allowed Creation of PoK
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-20)
Thanks to the Indian Army, the raiders were forced to retreat, and were
on the run. This war, started by Pakistan in October 1947, lasted 15 months,
and ended on 1 January 1949.
Indian Army’s Grand Achievements
Let’s look at the two concrete cases from among the many feats of
daring and bravery by the Indian army which helped throw the enemy out.
Pakistani raiders’ determined bid to occupy Ladakh was frustrated by
the superior Indian strategy of airlifting troops to Leh. Air Commodore
Mehar Chand flew his plane amazingly to 23,000 feet above sea-level—
without oxygen—on an unchartered course to land his plane, with troops, at
Leh at the height of about 12000 feet!
Another daring feat was that of Major-General Thimayya. He took his
tanks to a height of about 12000 feet on the snow-capped Zojila Pass—
something unique in history, as nobody had taken tanks to such heights and
in such hazardous conditions before—and routed the enemy, destroying all
their bunkers. Incidentally, it was this brave and competent Thimayya who
was humiliated by Krishna Menon, when he was Defence Minister in
Nehru’s cabinet, forcing Thimayya to resign! Later, after Thimayya
withdrew his resignation at the instance of Nehru, even Nehru behaved with
him in a way that amounted to his double humiliation!!
How Nehru Allowed Creation of PoK
The military commanders directly involved in the operations of clearing
J&K from the raiders and the Pak-army were KM Cariappa, the General
Officer C-in-C, Western Command, and Major-General Thimayya, the
operational commander.
As per the biography of late Field Marshal KM Cariappa, they both
requested Nehru in December 1948 for a little more time to clear J&K of
Pakistani raiders completely, but Nehru did not heed them. Thimayya had
told Nehru that the Army needed two weeks more to regain lost territory but
Nehru was adamant. It is said that Thimayya found Nehru’s attitude
inexplicable, and left Teen Murti Bhavan, the official residence of the PM,
in disgust.
The capture of Muzzafarabad, now the capital of PoK, was imminent.
The Army, however, was ordered to suspend all offensive operations with
effect from 1 January 1949, even though the enemy did not cease fighting.
The Indian Army was very disappointed by the decision, but orders were
orders. Thanks to ordering of ceasefire with immediate effect by Nehru,
PoK—Pakistan Occupied Kashmir—came into existence; else the whole of
Kashmir would have been with India. And, now it is this PoK which is used
by Pakistan to send terrorists into J&K.
When Cariappa asked Nehru about the decision a few years later, Nehru
conceded that the ceasefire order ought to have been delayed!
Shakespeare had rightly articulated:
There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries;
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.
As per a report, the ceasefire decision was remote-controlled by
Mountbatten, who was by then back in England—such influence
Mountbatten still exercised over Nehru.
Commented General SPP Thorat:
“Our forces might have succeeded in evicting the invaders, if the
Prime Minister had not held them in check, and later ordered the
ceasefire… Obviously great pressure must have been brought to
bear on him by the [former Governor-General]… Panditji was a
great personal and family friend of Lord Mountbatten.”{BK2/160}
Wrote NV Gadgil, the then Cabinet Minister for Works and Mines in the
Nehru’s Cabinet, in his autobiography ‘Government from Inside’:
“In truth, Nehru did not show much enthusiasm for Kashmir’s
accession at the time… Both the Maharaja and [Meherchand]
Mahajan [Premier of Kashmir] pressed for the acceptance of
Kashmir’s accession, but Nehru would not move. [Nehru then was
being guided by Sheikh Abdullah]… If our army had not received
instructions to stop fighting before that date [1 January 1949], it
would have cleared the raiders from whole of Kashmir… The
restrain imposed upon our army was motivated by the hope that
Pakistan would be satisfied with a bit of Kashmir occupied by it. Of
course, some of us opposed this view… Sheikh Abdullah was an
ordinary person elevated to an extraordinary position by the
Government of India… I am afraid that Nehru is responsible for the
prolongation of the problem through his willingness to compromise
at every stage... Had Vallabhbhai [Patel] been the man to handle the
Kashmir question, he would have settled it long ago. At least, he
would never have settled with a partial control of Jammu &
Kashmir. He would have occupied the whole of the State and would
never have allowed it to be elevated to international
importance.”{Mak/445-6} {DFI} {HJS}
MO Mathai wrote: “Nehru… ordered a ceasefire in Kashmir at a time
when our forces were in a sound position and poised to roll back the enemy.
Nehru’s decision, which was impulsive, was a grievous error much resented
by the armed forces. Nehru’s was an imitative and an absorptive mind…
Essentially, Gandhi’s was an original mind, while Nehru’s was a second-
rate one. He was all heart and less mind. This is reflected in his books
also.”{Mac/170}
Wrote BM Kaul in ‘Confrontation with Pakistan’: “We were politically
unwise in accepting the ceasefire in view of our successes at the time in Uri,
Tithwal, and Kargil.”{YGB/17}
As per the article “Nehru’s Pacifism and the Failed Recapture of
Kashmir” by Sandeep Bamzai in ORF: “...To keep abreast with the
developments in Kashmir, Nehru had dispatched his private secretary and
‘eyes and ears’ Dwarka Nath Kachru to the frontline... Some of Kachru's
correspondence is extremely damaging, the prism far too revealing of how
the Indian Army first pushed back the raiders and then vanquished the
Pakistan Army regulars, even having them on the run... Previously
unpublished correspondence [Nehru-Kachru] reveal that Nehru's pacifism
—guided by the principles of fair play [?!] and the fact that India had
referred the Kashmir matter to the United Nations erroneously on Lord
Mountbatten's insistence—meant that the Indian Army was refused
permission to go all the way and reclaim what eventually became PoK and
the Northern Areas…”{URL51}
9 June 1949: Maharaja Hari Singh Leaves J&K Forever
Unhappy with the things in J&K, and with Sheikh Abdullah in
particular, but citing poor health as the reason, Maharaja Hari Singh handed
over power to his son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, and left Kashmir on 9 June
1949—never to return.
Mid-1949: Pak Refused Plebiscite &
India Refused J&K Partition
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-21)
India was prepared for an immediate plebiscite in mid-1949, but
Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistani PM, refused the plebiscite, knowing that
Pakistan was likely to lose the same. Plebiscite was earlier refused by
Jinnah also, when Mountbatten proposed the same. The irony is that
Pakistan now talks of plebiscite, although they themselves refused it twice!
Pakistan then sent a feeler to India suggesting J&K’s partition along the
ceasefire line. This India refused (Nehru’s blunder), thinking that India
could win the whole of J&K, if plebiscite was held! But, this is something
which India now wants—the second irony!!
Pakistan’s position hardened after it made a deal with the US and the
UK wherein for their support of its position on J&K, it agreed to join
Anglo-American military bloc.
Sardar’s Correct Assessment of Sheikh Abdullah
(Sardar’s Wisdom-13)
BN Mullik, who was the then Deputy Director of the IB—the
Intelligence Bureau—with charge of Kashmir, and later head of the IB,
wrote in his book, ‘My Years with Nehru: Kashmir’ that his report of
Kashmir of 1949 stating, inter alia, intense local anti-Pak feelings and no
weakening in Sheikh Abdulla’s ideological commitment to India so pleased
Nehru that he had copies of the report circulated to all embassies and
ministries. However, the realist and wise Sardar Patel, with a gifted for
making right judgements, was not amused. Here are extracts from the book:
“…Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was unhappy. This report of mine
apparently went against the views which he had held about Kashmir
in general and Sheikh Abdullah in particular. He suspected that the
Sheikh was not genuine and was misleading Pandit Nehru and was
not happy that the report should have been given such wide
circulation… A few days after I had sent the report, the Home
Secretary informed me that the Sardar did not agree with my
assessment and had taken exception to the fact that I had submitted
this report without first consulting him…
I got a summons to see the Sardar the next day. He was not well and
was seated on his bed. He looked at me quietly for some time. Then
he asked me whether I had written the report, a copy of which was
in his hands. I replied in the affirmative. He asked me why I had
sent a copy of this to Jawaharlal without consulting him. I replied
that I had submitted the report to the Director. Sardar Patel then
enquired whether I knew that Jawaharlal had sent copies of this
report to all our embassies abroad and what was my reaction to this.
I said that I had heard about the circulation only the previous day
from the Home Secretary and I was naturally happy to hear that the
Prime Minister thought so well of my report that he had thought fit
to circulate it to our Ambassadors abroad. The Sardar then said that
he did not agree with my assessment of the situation in Kashmir in
general and of Sheikh Abdullah in particular…
The Sardar then gave me his own views about Sheikh Abdullah. He
apprehended that Sheikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India
and Jawaharlal Nehru and would come out in his real colours; his
antipathy to the Maharaja was not really an antipathy to a ruler as
such, but to the Dogras in general and with the Dogras he identified
the rest of the majority community in India. In his slow voice, he
firmly told me that my assessment of Sheikh Abdullah was wrong,
though my assessment of public opinion in Kashmir valley about
accession was probably correct. After having pointed out what he
considered to be my error in judgment, he was, however, good
enough to say that he agreed with my views that I should submit
only independent assessments to the Government and not tailor
them to suit the known or anticipated views of particular leaders.
He said that I would soon discover my error but, at the same time,
he complimented me on the way the report had been written and the
pains I had taken over it. This was the greatness of the Sardar.
Whilst disagreeing with my views, he recognised my right to
express them…
That day I came back to my office wondering whether I had really
made a mistake in my assessment of Kashmir and whether what the
Sardar had said was not right after all. Events, as they turned out
subsequently, proved that the Sardar was right and I was not. Within
three years we found ourselves fighting against Sheikh Abdullah.
Sardar Patel was dead by then. Yet, I feel that possibly events might
have turned out differently and the subsequent pain, turmoil, and
embarrassments could have been avoided if the special difficulties
of Kashmir had been understood by all concerned and they had
guided their talks and modified their actions on the basis of this
understanding. Probably, things would not have come to this pass at
all if the Sardar was still living, because Sheikh Abdullah had a very
wholesome respect and fear for him.”{BNM2/16-17}
Writes Howard Schaffer: “The Indians had made Abdullah a member of
their UN delegation, no doubt in the expectation that he would be an
effective spokesman for India’s cause. They could not have calculated that
he would undercut their position by calling for Kashmir’s independence in a
private conversation with Austin. Apparently caught by surprise, the
ambassador gave Abdullah no encouragement...”{Sch} Incidentally, Warren
R. Austin was the US permanent representative—their ambassador—to the
UN.
Why Hari Singh Vacillated?
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-22)
Let’s pose a counterfactual: If only Hari Singh had signed the
Instrument of Accession earlier—before 15 August 1947! Why did
Maharaja Hari Singh vacillate?
It is true that had Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of
Accession earlier to 14 August 1947, perhaps the J&K issue would not have
erupted at all, because Pakistan itself would not have come into existence
by then. But, you never know. Pakistan would have still created problems.
And it certainly had strong backing of Britain and Mountbatten. However,
let us try to understand why he signed belatedly.
Writes B Krishna:
“Nehru’s bias in favour of Abdullah was evident from what he said
in August 1945 at the annual session of the National Conference at
Sopore in the Valley, ‘If non-Muslims want to live in Kashmir, they
should join the National Conference or bid goodbye to the
country...If Pandits do not join it, no safeguards and weightages will
protect them.’”{BK/374}
Half a million Kashmiri Pandits would, some forty-five years later, pay
for Nehru’s sins, and be ethnically cleansed out of Kashmir—their home for
thousands of years.
After his election as the Congress president in 1946, Nehru gave his full
support to Abdullah, whom he called his blood brother. Sheikh Abdullah
launched the Quit Kashmir agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946
leading to his arrest. Quit Kashmir, fashioned after Quit India was
obviously misleading, for Maharaja Hari Singh, unlike the English, was not
an outsider. Sheikh Abdullah would have indulged in such acts knowing he
would receive tacit support from Nehru.{SB2} Kripalani, who visited Kashmir
in May 1946, stated that he was convinced that the Quit Kashmir movement
was ‘abusive and mischievous’{BK/375}. Sheikh Abdullah was sentenced to
three years imprisonment. In June 1946, Nehru decided to go to the Valley
to free Abdullah. Though prohibited to enter the State, Nehru decided to
defy the ban. He proclaimed that he wanted to take on the autocratic and the
feudal rule that prevailed in Kashmir.
Nehru did not seem to realise that the support of the princes and their
collaboration would be indispensable in the coming months for persuading
them to accede to India. To take on the Maharaja at that stage, and that too
as Congress president, did not appear to be politically wise. Sardar Patel
and others tried to dissuade him, yet he went.
Sardar wrote to DP Mishra:
“He [Nehru] has done many things recently which have caused us
great embarrassment. His actions in Kashmir…are acts of emotional
insanity and it puts tremendous strain on us to set the matters
right.”{BK/243-4}
Even Gandhi, when he went for his only visit to Kashmir in 1947,
pointedly rejected the hospitality of the Maharaja, and remained the guest
of the National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah.
Rebuffed thus by Gandhi, having been consistently rubbed the wrong
way, experiencing the hostility of Nehru towards him over the last many
months, and watching the commitment being shown to his arch enemy,
Sheikh Abdullah, why Hari Singh, anybody in his place—Nehru himself,
were he in Maharaja's shoes—would have hesitated to accede to India. Hari
Singh calculated that he only stood to lose by joining India, and that he
would have no future with Nehru and Gandhi at the helm. Pakistan he
surely did not wish to join. But the Maharaja certainly did not relish the
insistence from Nehru to hand over power to Sheikh Abdullah—as if he
[the Maharaja] were some foreign power who should hand over power to a
native. So, Hari Singh started considering his option for independence,
which was legally permissible.
Hari Singh did have preference for India over Pakistan . Incidentally,
while Pakistan had signed Standstill Agreement (status quo) with J&K;
India did not sign it, even though offered. Why?
If Nehru had dealt with Hari Singh wisely looking to the political
options, had Nehru not allowed his personal bias to dominate, had Nehru
accommodated Maharaja suitably, had Nehru convinced him that his
interests would be suitably protected if he joined India, Hari Singh may not
have dithered and would have signed the Instrument of Accession well
before 15 August 1947; and J&K would never have been an issue at all!
There was nothing bad about being anti-feudal and hence anti-Maharaja,
only it was imprudent, given the situation. Nehru should have tackled Hari
Singh like Sardar Patel tackled the other 547 rajas and maharajas. However,
Nehru, rather than giving a sympathetic hearing to Maharaja, and tackling
him in a way that could lead to a favourable decision, appeared to be
vindictive.
Mountbatten was reported to have remarked about Nehru:
"I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his boots..."
{MND/47}
Further, the Maharaja did offer accession in September, 1947, which
Nehru refused, laying down conditions unacceptable to the Maharaja! Was
it not queer—the nation being favoured with accession laying down
conditions!! But, that was Nehru!!!
Reliance on Maharaja, rather than on Abdullah
(Sardar’s Wisdom-14)
States V Shankar:{Shan}
“...Pandit Nehru regarded it as axiomatic that only Sheikh Abdullah
could deliver the goods and was prepared to make any concessions to him
to seek his support...Sardar did not trust Sheikh nor did he share Pandit
Nehru's assessment of his influence in the State. He felt that our case in
Jammu and Kashmir had to be met on the basis of the Maharaja executing
the Instrument of Accession, the thought of antagonising the one on whose
signature on that document alone we could justify our legal case in Jammu
and Kashmir was distressing to him...
“Sardar also felt it would be in the long-term interests of India to utilise
the Maharaja's undoubted influence among the various sections of the
people to force a permanent bond between the State and India...He was
doubtful if the weakening of the administrative authority by the Maharaja to
the extent demanded by the Sheikh was in the interests of the State and
India. He felt that the last thing that should occur at that critical period was
for the Maharaja and the Sheikh to work at cross-purposes with each other
or for the already disillusioned people of the State to harbour doubts about
the future of the Government or the Maharaja…
“Sardar Patel also came into conflict with Pt Nehru and Gopalaswami
Ayyangar owing to the personal rift between the Maharaja and Sheikh
Abdullah. It can scarcely be denied that the latter wanted the Maharaja’s
head on a charger and taking advantage of the wrong assessment by Pandit
Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar of the extent of his influence in the
Valley he literally wanted to dictate his own terms. Sardar Patel had
shrewdly come to the conclusion that Sheikh Abdullah would not be able to
deliver the goods in the event of a plebiscite which, thanks to Lord
Mountbatten, was the ruling consideration of the time. Consequently, he did
not want to put all eggs in the Abdullah basket.”{Shan}
Delaying Arms to Pakistan
(Sardar’s Wisdom-15)
This is as per an episode described by General SPP Thorat in his book
‘From reveille to retreat’. After partition, a process was set in motion for
both India and Pakistan to exchange each other’s share of arms and
ammunition left in the territory of the other.
Pakistan was cunning enough to divert to Kashmir a portion of what it
had to send to India. In a tit-for-tat, General SPP Thorat rightly wanted to
slow down to a snail’s pace what India had to send to Pakistan. However,
General Roy Bucher, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army
(the chiefs of both the Indian and the Pakistani armies were initially
British!), wanted Thorat to be honest and fair, and unlike Pakistan (most
British were anyway pro-Pakistan).
Thorat then took appointment with Sardar Patel, and told him the
details. Patel asked him as to why he had come to him, for it was not his
domain—he should have gone to Prime Minister Nehru. Then realising why
Thorat would have come to him (as was his wont, Nehru would not have
taken any decision), Patel told Thorat: “All right, don’t be too prompt in
doing your duty.” Asked Thorat of Patel: “Sir, but these are orders of the C-
in-C. What will I tell him when he discovers it?” Patel promptly responded,
smiling: “Surely you can tell a plausible lie for the delay. I am with you.”
Thereafter, Thorat saw to it that the shipments to Pakistan were sharply
delayed.
Action-Oriented Sardar
(Sardar’s Wisdom-16)
Sardar Patel first forced army action in Kashmir despite Nehru’s
reluctance and Mountbatten’s resistance; and then proceeded to strengthen
Indian army’s position in Kashmir, as would be clear from the following.
Sardar Patel and Defence Minister Baldev Singh visited Srinagar on
3 November 1947, and took a decision to set up the Divisional HQ of the
Army there. This indicated that India meant to stay put for a long haul in
Kashmir. This utterly frustrated Pakistan and all its grand designs.
Writes Rajmohan Gandhi: “In the judgement of Sheikh Abdullah,
scarcely an uncritical Patel fan, ‘events took a decisive turn’ after
Vallabhbhai’s Srinagar visit. ‘The Sardar did not lose even one minute. He
studied the situation and said that the enemy must be driven back.’{RG/445}
“Major General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown
to Srinagar the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed
Baramula on November 8...
“‘In the last week of October 1947,’ N.V. Gadgil has recalled, Patel
‘took out a map and pointing to the Jammu-Pathankot area said that the 65-
mile road between the two towns had to be made capable of carrying heavy
army traffic within eight months.’ He had seen at once that the battle would
be long. When Gadgil, the Minister for Works, pointed out that ‘rivers,
rivulets, hills and mountains’ were not so obvious on the map, Vallabhbhai
said simply, ‘You have to do it.’ Around 10,000 workers were brought from
Rajasthan in special trains. Floodlights enabled night work. Labour camps,
dispensaries, mobile cinemas and markets supported the drive. The 65 miles
were completed on time.”{BK/369-70}
ARTICLE-370, THANKS TO NEHRU
(Nehru’s J&K Blunder-23)
Gopalaswami Aiyangar, appointed by Nehru, moved Article 306A—
which later became Article 370 in the Indian Constitution—in the
Constituent Assembly on 17 October 1949 guaranteeing special status to
J&K. This was at the instance of Sheikh Abdullah, and with the
concurrence of Nehru. Although many in the Constituent Assembly were
not in favour of it, they consented, keeping in view Nehru’s wish, who was
then the main person steering the J&K policy. Those not in favour included
Ambedkar, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Sardar Patel, and many others.
India, which was a Dominion, became a Republic on 26 January 1950,
and Article 370 came into force for J&K.
Having achieved what he wanted through the Article 370, having got rid
of the Maharaja, and with Nehru having surrendered all leverages by
putting all eggs in one basket (that of Sheikh Abdullah), Sheikh Abdullah
gradually began to act difficult. By this stage, ambassadors of the US and
other countries began to meet him. This made Abdullah feel powerful
enough to start unfolding his actual agenda—of independent Sheikhdom.
The British were supportive. Said Clement Attlee in London on 11
November 1953: “Kashmir should belong neither to India nor to Pakistan
but be independent.”{Jag/98} Nehru now began to feel the heat. To his
colleagues he could not say, as he had gone against their advice. However,
in his letter to his sister, Vijaylakhmi Pandit, he expressed his bitterness.
Why was special provision made for J&K? Why Article 370? Let’s
examine.
J&K had nominated four representatives to the Indian Constituent
Assembly in June 1949—the nominations were made by Yuvraj Karan
Singh on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State’s Interim
Government led by Sheikh Abdullah.
The J&K representatives in the Indian Constituent Assembly chose to
act differently from the other Princely States—at the behest of Sheikh
Abdullah. While the other Princely States were agreeable to a common
Constitution, J&K representatives stated they were not inclined to accept
the future Constitution of India, and they would rather have their own
separate State Constitution. This, they insisted, was allowed as per clause 7
of the Instrument of Accession. It is another matter that the representatives
of the other States could also have taken the same position as J&K, for they
too had signed the Instrument of Accession, which had the same content and
format as that signed for J&K by the Maharaja. The J&K representatives
also stated that till their new State Constitution was framed, they would be
governed by the old Constitution Act of 1939.
It was to accommodate this that a special provision had to be made for
J&K in the Constitution of India. That provision is Article 370. Of course,
Article 370 was conceived as a temporary arrangement, with hopes of a full
integration in time to come. The Article itself is labelled "Temporary
provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir". J&K State
Constitution came into effect on 26 January 1957, comprising 158 Sections,
of which Section 3 says, “The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be
an integral part of the Union of India.”
But why were such special provisions allowed. They could have been
blocked by the Constituent Assembly?
Interestingly, poor Hari Singh was already out of the picture. Special
provisions or no special provisions—he stood neither to gain nor to lose. It
was Abdullah, who after getting rid of the Maharaja, was trying to secure
and upgrade his status.
Nehru had brought in Gopalaswami Ayyangar as a Minister without
Portfolio to look after the J&K affairs. Before his visit to Europe, Nehru
had finalised the draft provisions relating to J&K with Sheikh Abdullah,
which later became Article 370. He had entrusted to Gopalaswami
Ayyangar the task of piloting these provisions through the Constituent
Assembly. Ayyangar did the needful. His presentation provoked angry
protests from all sides. Most were opposed to any discriminatory treatment
for J&K. The proposal of Article 370 was torn to pieces by the Constituent
Assembly. Ayyangar was the lone defender, and Maulana Azad was not
able to effectively support him.
In the debate, Maulana Hasrat Mohani of UP stated that while he was
not opposed to all the concessions that were being granted to his friend
Sheikh Abdullah, why make such discrimination; if all those concessions
were to be granted to the Kashmir, why not to the Baroda ruler too.
Even Ambedkar was opposed to it. Nehru had sent Abdullah to Dr
Ambedkar to explain to him the position and to draft an appropriate Article
for the Constitution. Ambedkar had remarked:
“Mr Abdullah, you want that India should defend Kashmir, India
should develop Kashmir and Kashmiris should have equal rights as
the citizens of India, but you don’t want India and any citizen of
India to have any rights in Kashmir. I am the Law minister of India.
I cannot betray the interest of my country.”{SNS/106}
Nehru, who was then abroad, rang up Patel and requested him to get the
Article 370 through, and it was for that reason alone that Patel relented, as
Sardar did not wish to embarrass Nehru in his absence. But Sardar
commented, “Jawaharlal royega [Nehru will rue this].”{RG/517}
Strangely, Nehru made a statement on Kashmir in 1952, when Sardar
Patel was no more, “Sardar Patel was all the time dealing with these
matters.”
Wrote V Shankar:
“When I was working as his [Gopalaswami Ayyangar] joint
secretary the self-same Article [370] came in for criticism in the
Lok Sabha. In defence, Pandit Nehru took the stand that the Article
was dealt with by Sardar in his absence and he was not responsible
for it. I met Gopalaswami the same day evening as he was walking
on the lawn of his residence. I questioned the bonafides of Pandit
Nehru’s stand. Gopalaswami’s reaction was one of anger and he
said, ‘It is an ill return to the Sardar for the magnanimity he had
shown in accepting Panditji’s point of view against his better
judgment.’ He added, ‘I have told Jawaharlal this already.’”{Shan2/63}
There are many adverse consequences of Article 370. Some of them
are: (1)Regionalism, parochialism and secessionism. (2)Denial of
fundamental right to an Indian citizen to settle in J&K permanently.
(3)Denial of fundamental right to an Indian citizen to purchase property in
J&K. (4)Deprivation of right to vote to an Indian citizen, as he or she
cannot become a citizen of J&K. (5)Denial of jobs—an Indian citizen, who
is not also a citizen of J&K, cannot get a job in J&K. (6)A woman, who is a
permanent citizen of the State, loses her property, including ancestral
property, if she gets married to a man who is not a citizen of the State. Also,
she can’t get a job in the State, nor can she get admission in colleges getting
financial aid from the State or the Union Government. (7)Hindu immigrants
who were ousted from their ancestral homes in West Pakistan at the time of
partition and settled in J&K have not yet been given citizenship. This
includes their children and grand-children. Of course, the biggest negative
is that it has come in the way of full integration of the State, which has
gravely harmed both J&K and India.
Article 370 helps protect the corrupt J&K politicians from the more
stringent central provisions, and keeps them out of reach of CAG. To the
general public, it does not benefit. It is actually counter-productive. If J&K
were like any other state in India, there would have been much more private
investment in it, leading to prosperity.
Jagmohan, who had also been Governor of J&K, writes in his book, ‘My
Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir’:
“Article 370 is nothing but a feeding ground for the parasites at the
heart of paradise. It skins the poor. It deceives them with its mirage.
It lines the pockets of the ‘power elites’. It fans the ego of the new
‘sultans’. In essence, it creates a land without justice...It suffocates
the very idea of India and fogs the vision of a great social and
cultural crucible from Kashmir to Kanyakumari...Over the years,
Article 370 has become an instrument of exploitation at the hands of
the ruling political elites and other vested interests in bureaucracy,
business, the judiciary and bar...It breeds separatist forces which in
turn sustain and strengthen Article 370. Apart from politicians, the
richer classes have found it convenient to amass wealth and not
allow healthy financial legislation to come to the State. The
provisions of the Wealth Tax and other beneficial laws of the Union
have not been allowed to operate in the State under the cover of
Article 370...”{Jag/230}
Even if Article 370 had to be introduced for whatever reason, it could
have been made applicable only to the Valley, and Jammu and Ladakh
could have been kept out through certain special provisions, or by spinning
them off as separate mini-states or union territories. That would at least
have ensured Jammu and Ladakh developed unhindered by the needless
restrictions that were the by-products of Article 370. Why make them suffer
for the politics of the Valley? There are enough statistics to show that the
people of Jammu and Ladakh have been short-changed and benefits have
been largely cornered for the Valley.
SARDAR’S 547 SUCCESSES & NEHRU’S KASHMIR FAILURE
A troubling question is that if Sardar Patel and VP Menon could manage
accession of 547 states, why could Nehru not manage smooth accession of
even one state he had taken charge of—J&K?
The answer actually boils down to political wisdom, political acumen,
political competence and astuteness; and also the ability to size-up people.
Sardar Patel and VP Menon so dealt with the princes that their egos were
satisfied, their patriotic feelings were aroused, and their apprehensions were
removed. Princes also got to retain certain material benefits, and were
bestowed with some honorary positions. They, thus, felt respected. In
return, they agreed to merge their States with India. Had Sardar and Menon
acted otherwise, they would not have been able to achieve the desired
results. Of course, in exceptional cases, arm-twisting too was resorted to.
Expansion of India’s geography by about 40% and consolidation of its
post-independence stability through the integration of the Princely States
demanded great foresight, sharp mind, deep wisdom, high-level diplomacy,
sagacity, boldness, guts, readiness to act and timely action—thankfully for
India, Sardar Patel answered to that rare combination of qualities and
requirements. Nehru just did not have it in him to accomplish all that; he
would have flinched from even attempting it; and had he taken the plunge,
he would have made a royal mess of it.
Like Durga Das wrote:
“VP Menon gave me details of these prolonged talks. Mountbatten
was just flattering the old man[Gandhi], he said. He is doing
business with Sardar and has Nehru in his pocket. Sardar is playing
a deep game. He, in turn, is flattering Mountbatten and using him to
net the Princes...”{DD/240-41}
See the wisdom and tact of Sardar Patel to get all the Princely States to
unite with India! Incidentally, Durga Das was a highly respected and
renowned journalist who was a contemporary of the leaders of the
Independence movement. He also contributed to the Indian Independence
Struggle. He was born in 1900 and passed away in 1974. Prior to
Independence he was with the API, the Associated Press of India, which
later became the PTI, then with The Statesman and The Hindustan Times.
He retired as the Managing Director and Editor-in-Chief of The Hindustan
Times in 1959. He knew most of the leaders like Gandhi, Nehru, Patel,
Rajaji and Prasad personally. He had also communicated with the viceroys.
By ranting against feudalism and princes and maharajas—which Nehru
did, however right he may have been technically—one did not achieve the
desired results or reach an amicable solution. As if by accommodating the
rajas and maharajas, Sardar Patel and VP Menon gave fillip to the feudal
forces. In fact, they finished them by minimal, modest accommodation,
without a shot being fired—except for Hyderabad.
On Sardar’s personal views on the princely order, please check the
subchapter ‘Pathetic Princes & their Princely States’ above. Patel had told
them:
“Many Princes seem to believe that they should collect arms to
establish their authority. But India is not the same today as she was
when the British came here… In the end, every State will have to
come in [join/merge with India]. But those who come in last will
deny themselves the honour they will enjoy now… Those among
them who have ability, intelligence and bravery can take up
leadership of the Army. They can also enjoy the glory of serving
India abroad as our ambassadors. What for are you rotting in your
small pits? Come out into the open ocean of national life.”{BK/318-9}
Patel’s such addresses to the Princes had their salutary effect, and many
came over offering their state’s merger.
Patel knew where and when and how to criticise them; when to keep
quiet about them; when to threaten, and when to dangle carrots; and how to
encourage them to merge their State and join the mainstream, the ultimate
aim being to acquire for India all those States that the princes controlled.
However, Patel had said: “In those days we were thinking that it was no use
fighting with the princes because they themselves were not free agents
under foreign rule.”
Nehru’s over-activism and blind support for Muslims and Sheikh
Abdullah in Kashmir during 1946-47 at the expense of the Kashmiri
Pandits, and his rancour and hostility towards the Maharaja made the
Maharaja apprehensive and distrustful of Nehru and India, and he therefore
delayed the state’s integration with India till forced by the Pakistani
aggression of October 1947. Curiously, the woolly-headed ‘secular’ Nehru
did not show similar enthusiasm and activism in the states ruled by
Muslims like Junagadh or Hyderabad, despite the widely-known cruelties
of Razakars against Hyderabad state’s Hindu subjects!
Why did Nehru think he could afford to treat Maharaja Hari Singh the
way he did? He felt that in Sheikh Abdullah he had a great ally. Nehru
thought that the majority of the people were with Sheikh Abdullah, who, he
felt, was a great democrat, a leftist, and a secular person. Nehru wanted to
demonstrate how he was totally against the feudal forces, and how their
days were numbered, and how much he was for the progressive, secular and
left forces like Sheikh Abdullah. It was an honest and sincere attempt on the
part of Nehru, but appeared to be a little immature—lacking in political
wisdom.
Later, when it was too late, Nehru realised what Sheikh Abdullah
actually was. BN Mullik recounted how Nehru came round to Patel’s views,
and told him in 1962 of Sheikh Abdullah’s communal activities all through.
Nehru trusted Sheikh to deliver—an uncertain and doubtful possibility
—ignoring what he could have got through Hari Singh with much, much
lesser hassle. So, by unnecessarily rubbing Maharaja Hari Singh the wrong
way, Nehru perhaps spiked what could have been a smooth merger of
Kashmir with India.
Apart from, “I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his
boots...”{MND/47}; Mountbatten had made another observation:
“I am glad to say that Nehru has not been put in charge of the new
[Princely] States Department, which would have wrecked
everything. Patel, who is essentially a realist and very sensible, is
going to take it over...Even better news is that VP Menon is to be
the Secretary.”{BK2/91}
Durga Das wrote: “All were agreed on one thing: While Gandhi was the
architect of India’s freedom, Sardar [Patel] was the architect of India’s
unity.”{DD/305}
On Kashmir, Dr Mookerjee wrote forthrightly to Nehru on various
occasion in 1953:
“…One common feature of your speeches has been and is the
abundance of abuses and vituperation which you have poured forth
on those who differ from you. You have ascribed us all sorts of base
motives and have even dubbed us as betrayers of the country’s
interests. I have no desire to emulate you in this respect… [On
communalism] This is most unfair charge and unconsciously you
have been recently indulging in such attacks only to hide the
weakness of your case. Our approach to the [Kashmir] problem is
actuated by highest national and patriotic considerations…. You will
forgive me if I fail to appreciate your repeated reference to possible
international complications as a result of Jammu movement. No one
today will claim that your handling of the Kashmir problem has
enhanced our international prestige or has won us wide international
support or sympathy. On the other hand, your policy in this behalf
has added to complications both at home and abroad…”{Mak/429}
SARDAR, VP MENON & KASHMIR
An intriguing question is: Why Sardar Patel and VP Menon did not put
in as much efforts for Kashmir to accede to India by 15 August 1947, or
even later, as they did for the other 547 princely States? Why did they leave
it to Nehru?
Wrote Sardar Patel to Maharaja Hari Singh on 3 July 1947:
“...I am sorry to find that there is considerable misapprehension in
your mind about the Congress. Allow me to assure your Highness
that the Congress is not only not your enemy, as you happen to
believe, but there are in the Congress many strong supporters of
your state...as a sincere friend and well-wisher of the state, I wish to
assure you that the interest of Kashmir lies in joining the Indian
Union and its Constituent Assembly without any delay...”{URL13}
V Shankar writes:
“So long as Pakistan's armed intervention persisted in Kashmir,
Sardar was firm on settling the dispute on the battle-field, rather
than through parleys in the UN Security Council. In this matter he
found himself completely opposed to the line of action and policies
adumbrated by Lord Mountbatten who was successful in persuading
not only Pandit Nehru but also Gandhiji to accept them.
Mountbatten diverted the mind of Pandit Nehru in two directions—
conferences with Pakistan and a reference to the UN. For the latter
he secured Gandhiji's blessings...He [Sardar] was for utilising the
opportunity to finalise the accession without much ado or any
further formalities.”{Shan1}
It was not as if Sardar Patel and VP Menon had left the J&K matter to
Nehru. It was Nehru who had decided to handle J&K himself. Please check
details under the heading “Kashmir, Nehru’s Hubris & Patel’s Resignation”
above.
Notably, even the Deputy Prime Minister of J&K between 1947-53,
Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad of the National Conference, had become so
disturbed and alarmed at the way the J&K issue was being messed up that
he met Sardar Patel and requested:
“Why do you [Sardar Patel] not take over the problem and finish it
like Hyderabad? Patel replied cryptically: You go to your friend
[Nehru] and tell him to keep his hands off Kashmir problem for two
months and I will undertake to solve it.”{Mak/440-41}
Although VP Menon had stated that given their preoccupation with
tackling the other 547 states, they had little time for Kashmir, it was more a
case of sour grapes, the effective charge of J&K being with Gopalaswami
and Nehru.
Writes Rajmohan Gandhi in his book ‘Patel–A Life’:
“Patel was as strongly against the reference to the UN and preferred
‘timely action’ on the ground, but Kashmir was Jawaharlal’s baby
by now and Vallabhbhai did not insist on his prescriptions when, at
the end of December, Nehru announced that he had decided to go to
the UN. Jawaharlal obtained Mahatma’s reluctant consent... Patel’s
misgivings were amply fulfilled after India invited the UN’s
assistance...”{RG/448}
Jayaprakash Narayan, who had been pro-Nehru and anti-Patel had this
to admit later:
“Kashmir issue, being left to Nehru, proved to be unfortunate for the
nation. Because of Panditji’s mishandling, the issue did no longer
remain an internal affair, as it should be, but is smouldering as an
international issue in the United Nations and its Security Council,
making it possible for Pakistan to rake it up every now and then.
Many a veteran leader in the country maintains that had the matter
been handled by the Sardar, he would have found a satisfactory
solution, and thus prevented it becoming a perennial headache for us
and a cause of bitterness and animosity between India and
Pakistan.”{BK/396-7}
Sardar Patel had reportedly remarked to HV Kamath that had Nehru and
Gopalaswami Aiyangar not made Kashmir their close preserve, separating
it from his portfolio of Home and States, he would have tackled the
problem as purposefully as he had already done for Hyderabad.
Sardar Patel had told Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst:
“If all the decisions rested on me, I think that I would be in favour
of extending this little affair in Kashmir to a full-scale war with
Pakistan… Let us get it over once and for all, and settle down as a
united continent.”{BK2/157}
Remarked Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, a close friend and a confidant of
Nehru: “You know, I never go to Nehru to seek advice or guidance. I take a
decision and just present it to him as a fait accompli. Nehru’s mind is too
complex to wrestle with the intricacies of a problem. Those who go to him
for advice rarely get a lead—and that only serves to delay matters...Nehru
does not understand economics, and is led by the nose by ‘professors’ and
‘experts’ who pander to his whims and fancies...We should have absorbed
Kashmir for good and all...I do not know where we are going. The country
needs a man like Patel.”{DD/379}
Communist MN Roy, no friend of Patel, was also of the opinion that had
Kashmir affair remained with Patel, and had Nehru not taken it away from
him, Patel would have solved the J&K issue soon after partition. He wrote
in “Men I Met” on Patel:
“…Could Sardar Patel have had his way on the Kashmir issue, India
would not be today spending fifty percent of her revenue on military
budget… the Sardar had no choice but to play the game, but one
could be sure that he loathes the stupidity clothes in the glamour of
popular heroes [hint on Nehru]…”{Roy/17}
There is also a view that being a realist, Sardar Patel, looking to the
reality of the Muslim majority in the Valley, was amenable to the idea of a
mutually acceptable arrangement between India and Pakistan where
(a)India got to retain Jammu and Ladakh, (b)Pakistan got to retain the areas
occupied by it—PoK, and (c)India gave away Kashmir Valley to Pakistan,
(d)in return for adjustments in favour of India elsewhere, like in East
Bengal.
Patel had never really opened his mind on Kashmir—in view of what all
Nehru had [wrongly] done, and the fact Nehru had kept to himself the
Kashmir portfolio, he thought it was best he was not explicit, lest the
matters got more complicated. Although his odd remarks here and there
reveal his discomfort. For example, he was reported to have remarked to Dr
Rajendra Prasad that when India had given away Punjab, Sind, the NWFP,
and East Bengal on account of their Muslim-majority, what value was there
in a small valley of Kashmir—will the people there ever agree to live
happily with us? Sardar had also reportedly told Minoo Masani that but for
Nehru, he could have settled the Kashmir issue with Pakistan through East
Bengal—Kashmir Valley (other than Ladakh and Jammu) swap.{BK/518} VP
Menon’s view was similar. Even Field Marshall Auchinleck was of the
opinion that since East Bengal Muslims were closer to West Bengal
Muslims culturally and linguistically, “East Bengal—Kashmir Valley” swap
was a sensible proposition.{BK2/163-64}
{ 2 }
PREVENTING PAKISTAN-II :
SARDAR VS. NEHRU
Integration of Hyderabad,
thanks to Sardar Patel, and despite Nehru
For complete details on the integration of all the 548 (14 that bordered
Pakistan out of a total of 562 had gone to Pakistan) Princely States into
India, please read the author’s book on Sardar Patel available on Amazon.
Here, we would cover only Hyderabad, which could have become another
Kashmir or Pakistan-II, had the matters been left to Nehru, and had Sardar
Patel not firmly intervened.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The State of Hyderabad was founded by Mir Qamruddin Chin Qilich
Khan, son of Aurangzeb's general, Ghazi-ud-din Khan Feroz Jaug, who
traced his ancestry to Abu Bakr, the first Khalifa.
The State of Hyderabad then ruled by Nizam Ali Khan first came under
the paramountcy of the British in 1766. However, breaking his treaty with
the British, the Nizam allied himself with Hyder Ali of Mysore in 1767.
Their joint forces were defeated by the British in 1768, and Hyderabad
State again came under the paramountcy of the British. In 1799 the Nizam
helped East India Company defeat Tipu Sultan. Nizam Mir Usman Ali
Khan, the seventh Nizam, ruled the State at the time of Independence. He
was granted the title ‘Faithful Ally of the British Government’.
STATUS AT INDEPENDENCE
At the time of Independence, Hyderabad was a premier State, with an
area of about 2,14,000 square kilometres, population of 16 million, and an
annual revenue of 26 crores. It had its own coinage, paper currency and
stamps. 85% of its population of 1.6 crores was Hindu. However, the
Police, the Army, and the Civil Services were almost completely the
preserve of the Muslims. Even in its Legislative Assembly set up in 1946
the Muslims were in majority, despite forming a mere 15% of the
population.
There is a gulf of difference between AP[Andhra Pradesh] of today and
the Hyderabad State of that time. The old Hyderabad State comprised
Telangana, four current Kannada districts in the Gulberga division, and four
Maharashtra districts in the Aurangabad division. Upon linguistic
reorganisation in 1956, while the Telangana region of the old Hyderabad
State remained in Andhra, the other districts went to Maharashtra and
Karnataka. Coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema belonging to the Madras
Presidency were added to AP. Hyderabad city is part of Telangana.
RAZAKARS AND NIZAM
A fanatical Muslim organisation, Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, headed by one
Kasim Razvi had been fomenting trouble. They came to be known as the
Razakars. At the instance of Kasim Razvi, Nizam appointed Mir Laik Ali as
Prime Minister and president of his Executive Council. Laik Ali was a
Hyderabadi businessman, who had also been a representative of Pakistan at
the UN till September 1947. With this the Hyderabad Government came
virtually under Razvi.
Razvi met Sardar and Menon in Delhi to tell that Hyderabad would
never surrender its independence, and that Hindus were happy under
Nizam; but if India insisted on a plebiscite, it is the sword which would
decide the final result. Razvi further told Sardar Patel, “We shall fight and
die to the last men,” to which Patel responded, “How can I stop you from
committing suicide?”{RG/476}
In his speeches in March 1948 and later, Kasim Razvi exhorted the
Muslims “to march forward with Koran in one hand and a sword in the
other to hound out the enemy.” He declared that “the 45 million Muslims in
India would be our fifth columnists in any showdown”{BK2/138}.
Razvi challenged that “if the Indian Union attempted to enter
Hyderabad, it would find nothing but the bones and ashes of 15 million
Hindus residing in the State.”{BK/408}.
He boasted on 12 April 1948 that “the day is not far off when the waves
of bay of Bengal would be washing the feet of our Sovereign”{BK/409}; and
that he would “hoist the Asaf Jahi flag on the Red Fort in India.” Razakars
continued their criminal anti-Hindu activities.{BK/409}
At the suggestion of his British and Muslim advisers, the Nizam had
planned out several ways to strengthen his position: acquiring port facilities
at Goa from Portugal; getting approval for a rail-corridor from Hyderabad
to Goa; taking mine-leases in mineral-rich Bastar; readying more air-fields;
acquiring weapons; recruiting more Muslims in the army; recruiting British
soldiers; getting Muslims from other states to move into Hyderabad state;
converting Dalits to Islam; unleashing militia comprising local Muslims,
Pathans and Arabs to intimidate non-Muslims; scaring away Hindus out of
Hyderabad state; and so on.
Mir Laik Ali had bluffed and boasted: “If the Union Government takes
any action against Hyderabad, a hundred thousand men are ready to join our
army. We also have a hundred bombers in Saudi Arabia ready to bomb
Bombay.”{URL16}
NIZAM–BRITISH–MOUNTBATTEN–NEHRU VS. SARDAR PATEL
Soon after the announcement of the 3-June-1947 Plan or the
Mountbatten Plan of the partition of India, Nizam declared on
12 June 1947 that he would neither join India nor Pakistan, but would
remain independent. He wanted to secure the Dominion Status for his State
from the British, like the one proposed for partitioned India and Pakistan,
although the same was not allowed for any Princely State.
After much haggling, Sir Walter Monckton, Constitutional Advisor to
Nizam, suggested to Mountbatten that Hyderabad could offer a treaty to
India surrendering Defence, External Affairs and Communications as
required in the Instrument of Accession, but would not sign the Instrument
of Accession. Interestingly, Monckton was a friend of Mountbatten, and it
was Mountbatten who had secured Monckton’s services for the Nizam to
negotiate with India.{BK/399} The British, Mountbatten and Monckton were
indeed working in co-ordination to fool India, and get independent or
autonomous status for Hyderabad—by talking about ‘association’ rather
than ‘accession’ with India—so that it remained under the British influence
and control.
Sardar Patel rejected the above proposal point blank, for it would have
affected the position with the other States, who were ready to sign the
Instrument of Accession. Sardar also told that if it was not acceptable to
Nizam, referendum should be held and the mandate of the people should be
treated as final. Mountbatten accordingly advised Nizam of the offer of
holding referendum supervised by the British officials. This Nizam rejected.
Wrote VP Menon:
“Warming up Sardar said, ‘You know as well as I do where power
resides and with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie
in Hyderabad. The gentleman [Kasim Razvi] who seems to
dominate Hyderabad has given his answer. He has categorically
stated that if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad it will find
nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crore of Hindus. If
that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future of
the Nizam and his dynasty. I am speaking to you plainly because I
do not want you to be under any misapprehension. The Hyderabad
problem will have to be settled as has been done in the case of other
States. No other way is possible. We cannot agree to the
continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the very Union
which we have built up with our blood and toil. At the same time,
we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek a friendly
solution. That does not mean that we shall ever agree to
Hyderabad's independence. If its demand to maintain an
independent status is persisted in, it is bound to fail.’”{VPM1/242}
“But every time any action against Hyderabad was mooted, the
communal bogey was put forward as an excuse for
inaction.”{VPM1/254}
Like their pro-Pakistan attitude, many in the Press in Britain and many
prominent British leaders were pro-Hyderabad and anti-India. Hyderabad
had been their most faithful ally, and they wanted it to be independent and
pro-Britain. They did not care if it was a cancer right in the heart of India
and had predominant Hindu population of over 85%. Their stand and
support, and that of Pakistan, emboldened the Razakars and the Nizam.
While Mountbatten and the British had nothing to say on the grossly
unethical, illegal and even barbarous acts of Pakistan in J&K, and of states
like Hyderabad; it is significant that Mountbatten, thanks to the elevated
position accorded to him by Nehru and Gandhi, was liberal in his moral
lectures to India, and wanted India “to adopt ethical and correct behaviour
towards Hyderabad, and to act in such a way as could be defended before
the bar of world opinion.”{BK2/129} However, moral lectures to Pakistan were
out of his ambit. Pakistan or Muslims could behave or misbehave however
they chose: that’s how not just the British, but even the great, liberal
Mahatmas and seculars—Gandhi and Nehru—indulged them.
V Shankar writes in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel’{Shan}:
“Hyderabad occupied a special position in the British scheme of
things and therefore touched a special chord in Lord
Mountbatten...The ‘faithful ally’ concept still ruled the attitude of
every British of importance... all the other rulers were watching
whether the Indian Government would concede to it a position
different from the other states...
“Lastly, on Hyderabad, Pandit Nehru and some others in Delhi were
prepared to take a special line; in this Mrs Sarojini Naidu and Miss
Padmaja Naidu, both of whom occupied a special position in Pandit
Nehru’s esteem, were not without influence. There were also forces
which were not slow or hesitant to point out the special position of
the Muslims in the state... Apart from Lord Mountbatten’s
understandable sympathy for the Muslim position in Hyderabad,
shared by Pandit Nehru, in anything that concerned Pakistan even
indirectly, he was for compromise and conciliation to the maximum
extent possible...
“Sardar [Patel] was aware of the influence which Lord
Mountbatten exercised over both Pandit Nehru and Gandhiji; often
that influence was decisive... Sardar had made up his mind that
Hyderabad must fit into his policy regarding the Indian states... I
know how deeply anguished he used to feel at his helplessness in
settling the problem with his accustomed swiftness...”{Shan}
Nehru never showed similar indulgence towards the Maharaja of
Kashmir. Indeed, he was unreasonably hostile to the Maharaja of Kashmir,
unnecessarily friendly and brotherly towards Sheikh Abdullah; but
indulgent towards the Nizam under whose regime the innocent Hindus were
being terrorised by the Razakars and Muslim militias.
Mountbatten, also Chairman of the Defence Committee, had recorded:
“Pandit Nehru said openly at the meeting, and subsequently assured
me privately, that he would not allow any orders to be given for
operations to start unless there really was an event, such as a
wholesale massacre of Hindus within the State, which would
patently justify, in the eyes of the world, action by the Government
of India.”{RG/480-81}
What would the world think? What Mountbatten thought? What about
his own image? These seemed to weigh more with Nehru. Why couldn’t he
also think the opposite: that the world would consider India a sissy and a
fool to ignore its own national interests. But, apparently Nehru found
arguments for only those courses of action where he didn’t have to act! Or,
where he could avoid decisions and difficulties.
This, despite what DN Panigrahi writes in ‘Jammu and Kashmir, the
Cold War and the West’:
“Even more sensational disclosures were made by Nehru. Based on
intelligence reports, it was mentioned that one William Barton,
formerly of the Indian Civil Service, went to Lisbon on behalf of the
Nizam of Hyderabad to enter into a treaty with Portugal for the use
of Goa as a port in case of need. ‘We are informed,’ Nehru
continued, ‘that the British Secret Service men have been loaned to
Hyderabad government. They are working in the London office of
the Pakistan Embassy...’”{Pani/157-8}
By October 1947 Sardar Patel had got sick of negotiations with the
Nizam’s representatives, and wanted to break off the negotiations.
However, Mountbatten pleaded for more time. Why? The British didn’t
wish to displease their faithful ally. Patel was not the only person deciding.
There were Gandhi, Nehru, Mountbatten and others. Despite Sardar’s
objections, a Standstill (status quo) Agreement was signed between India
and Hyderabad in November 1947 for a year. In the subsequent months,
Hyderabad loaned rupees twenty crores to Pakistan, placed orders for arms
elsewhere, and stepped up its nefarious, anti-Hindu activities through
Razakars.
Multiple delegations had discussed numerous proposals with
Hyderabad, all to no avail. Mountbatten too tried, but failed. Finally, his
tenure over, he left India on 21 June 1948. But, before leaving, he tried
once more to get very favourable terms for the Nizam by getting Sardar
Patel to sign a document as a farewell gift to him. Sardar signed knowing
the stubborn Nizam would reject those terms. And, Nizam did reject the
document! The moment that happened Sardar declared that thenceforth
Hyderabad would be treated on par with other states, and not as a special
state.
KM Munshi recalled that a day after Mountbatten had left he had called
up Patel, who had responded cheerfully: “Well Munshi, how are you? Is
everything all right? What about your Nizam?” KM Munshi was then the
Agent-General of India in Hyderabad State. When Munshi asked Patel
about a query he had received on behalf of the Nizam on the “Mountbatten
Settlement”, Patel shot back, laughing:
“Tell him [Nizam] that the Settlement has gone to England. The
terms and the talks which Lord Mountbatten had have gone with
him. Now the settlement with the Nizam will have to be on the lines
of settlements with the other states.”{BK2/140-41}
OPERATION POLO, THANKS TO SARDAR, AND DESPITE NEHRU
Distressed about Nehru’s reluctance to act, Patel had written to NV
Gadgil on 21 June 1948:
“I am rather worried about Hyderabad. This is the time when we
should take firm and definite action. There should be no vacillation;
and the more public the action is the greater effect it will have on
the morale of our people, both here and in Hyderabad, and will
convince our opponents that we mean business. There should be no
lack of definiteness or strength about our actions. If, even now, we
relax, we shall not only be doing a disservice to the country, but
would be digging our own grave.”{BK2/141}
One JV Joshi, in his letter of resignation from the Nizam’s Executive
Council, wrote that law and order had completely broken down in many
districts and that the Nizam’s Police—comprising almost exclusively of
Muslims—was colluding with the Razakars in loot, arson and murder of
Hindus, and molestation and rape of their females. He stated having himself
witnessed such scenes and even scenes where Brahmins were killed and
their eyes gouged out. It was estimated that besides the Hyderabad State
forces of over 40,000, there were about 2,00,000 Razakars with small arms,
and a number of Pathans lately imported. It became morally difficult for
India to remain a mute witness to the mayhem, that turned worse by August
1948.
Resistance by Nehru & the British to Any Action
On the use of force by India to settle the Hyderabad issue, V Shankar
writes{Shan}:
“The entire staff for the purpose had been alerted and the timing
depended on how long it would take for Sardar to overcome the
resistance to this course by C Rajagopalachari, who succeeded Lord
Mountbatten as Governor General, and by Pandit Nehru, who found
in C Rajagopalachari an intellectual support for his non-violent
policy towards Hyderabad..” Shankar quotes Sardar's response to a
query, “Many have asked me the question what is going to happen
to Hyderabad. They forget that when I spoke at Junagadh, I said
openly that if Hyderabad did not behave properly, it would have to
go the way Junagadh did. The words still stand and I stand by these
words.”
“…The situation in Hyderabad was progressing towards a climax.
Under Sardar's constant pressure, and despite the opposition of
Pandit Nehru and Rajaji, the decision was taken to march into
Hyderabad and thereby to put an end both to the suspended
animation in which the State stood and the atrocities on the local
population which had become a matter of daily occurrence.”{Shan}
Wrote MKK Nayar: “Indian Army’s C-in-C was an Englishman named
Bucher and the Southern Command was headed by Lieutenant General
Rajendra Singhji. Patel knew that Nehru would not agree to military
intervention, but anyway sent an instruction through V P Menon to
Rajendra Singhji to be ready to act if the need arose. Major General
Chaudhry commanded the First Armored Division which was stationed in
the South and Rajendra Singhji decided to keep it ready for war.”{MKN}
In the Cabinet meeting on 8 September 1948, while the States Ministry
under Sardar Patel pressed for occupation of Hyderabad to put an end to the
chaos there; Nehru strongly opposed the move and was highly critical of the
attitude of the States Ministry [under Sardar Patel].
MKK Nayar also wrote: “Patel believed that the army should be sent to
put an end to the Nizam’s highhandedness. At about that time, the Nizam
sent an emissary to Pakistan and transferred a large sum of money from his
Government’s account in London to Pakistan. At a cabinet meeting, Patel
described these happenings and advised that the army may be sent to end
the terror-regime in Hyderabad. Nehru who was usually calm, peaceful and
good mannered, lost his self-control and said, ‘You are a total communalist
and I shall not accept your advice.’ Patel remained unfazed and left the
room with his papers. He stopped attending cabinet meetings and even
speaking with Nehru after that.”{MKN}
Writes Kuldip Nayar: “...Reports circulating at the time said that even
then Nehru was not in favour of marching troops into Hyderabad lest the
matter be taken up by the UN... It is true that Patel chafed at the ‘do-
nothing attitude of the Indian government’...”{KN}
Sardar Patel’s daughter’s ‘The Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50’ states:
“About Hyderabad, Bapu [her father, Sardar Patel] said if his
counselling had been accepted—the problem would have been long
solved...Bapu replied [to Rajaji], ‘...Our viewpoint is different. I
don’t want the future generation to curse me that these people when
they got an opportunity did not do it and kept this ulcer [Hyderabad
princely state] in the heart of India...It is States Ministry’s [which
was under Sardar Patel] function [to make Hyderabad state accede
to India]. How long are you and Panditji going to bypass the States
Ministry and carry on...Bapu told Rajaji that Jawaharlal continued
his aberration for an hour and a half in the Cabinet—that we should
decide our attitude about Hyderabad. The question will be raised in
the UN...Bapu said, ‘I am very clear in my mind—if we have to
fight—Nizam is finished. We cannot keep this ulcer in the heart of
the union. His dynasty is finished.’ He (Jawaharlal) was very
angry/hot on this point.”{Mani/210}
Nehru was so opposed to the use of force against Hyderabad that after
Patel got the same approved by the cabinet Nehru called his cabinet
colleague Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and remonstrated with him for
supporting Patel on the issue, and warned him [being a Bengali] that India’s
action would lead to retaliation by Pakistan, which was likely to invade
West Bengal, and bomb Calcutta. Unexpected by Nehru, Mukherjee
nonchalantly responded that the people of Bengal and Calcutta had enough
patriotism to suffer and sacrifice for the national cause, and would be
overjoyed when they learn that General JN Chaudhuri, a Bengali, had
conquered Hyderabad!
Sardar’s Decision for Action & Attempt to Abort it
Sardar Patel finally prevailed. A decision was finally taken on
9 September 1948 to carry out Operation Polo against Hyderabad by
sending troops under the command of Major-General JN Chaudhuri.
Jinnah died two days before—on 11 September 1948. In view of the
same, the British C-in-C General Bucher had requested for postponement of
the operations, but Patel had overruled him: British were looking for ways
to save and support Hyderabad. General Bucher had even rung up early
morning at 3am HM Patel and others on the D-day of 13 September 1948 to
have the operations cancelled or postponed. General Bucher had even
contacted his Pakistani counterpart on the Hyderabad action, against the
code of secrecy, as detailed by MKK Nair in his book ‘The Story of an Era
Told Without Ill-will’:
“V P Menon returned to his office after the meeting and quickly planned
things to do next. The Commander in-Chief of Pakistan was also an
Englishman who nursed feelings of enmity for Indian leaders. When Bucher
took over from General Lockhart as Commander in-Chief, he had sworn
allegiance to India in God’s name. Soon after Bucher heard from V P
Menon, he instructed Rajendra Singh who in turn asked General Chaudhry
to begin military action at three next morning. At seven that evening,
Bucher contacted Karachi and spoke with his counterpart there. The
conversation was in French. Next morning at ten, V P Menon walked into
Bucher’s room. Assuming that he had come for details of the Hyderabad
action, Bucher brought him up to date with its progress. VP then said, ‘I
know all that. I have come for something else. Did you speak with
Pakistan’s Commander in-Chief yesterday evening?’ Hearing this, Bucher’s
face went pale. ‘VP, are you saying that we friends cannot speak with each
other?’ ‘Was that a friendly conversation?’ ‘Do you doubt it?’ ‘Why did
you speak in French?’ ‘Have you started tapping telephones?’ “Shouldn’t
we if circumstance warrant? Was it really a friendly chat?’ ‘Of course!’ V
P Menon took out a document and gave to Bucher. It was the transcript of
the previous evening’s conversation and an English translation which read:
Bucher: Attack on Hyderabad begins tonight. Will not last many days. If
you have to do anything, do it right away. Pakistan C-in-C: Thanks. Shall
inform Liaqat Ali. Jinnah is on his deathbed. Bucher: After I do my duty, I
shall be in your hands.’ Bucher who had pretended to be offended by
telephone-tapping was sweating now. He looked sorrowfully at V P Menon
and said, ‘What should I do, VP? I have made a mistake. I am sorry.’ V P
Menon asked him, ‘Did you not swear allegiance to India in the name of
God, with your hand on the Bible?’ Bucher: ‘VP, please save me. I am
willing to atone for what I have done. Don’t humiliate me. Help me for our
old friendship.’ V P Menon obtained a letter from Bucher that read, ‘I
resign on personal and health grounds. Please accept it immediately’ and
left. General Cariappa was then given charge of the Indian Army.”{MKN}
The Actual Operations
Very tactfully, Sardar Patel waited for Mountbatten to first go from India
for ever, which he did on 21 June 1948—lest he should interfere in the
matter. Patel’s most formidable obstacle lay in Mountbatten and Nehru,
who had been converted by Mountbatten to his point of view—not to let
Indian Army move into Hyderabad. Had Gandhi been alive, perhaps Nehru-
Gandhi combine would not have allowed the action that Sardar took—
Gandhi being a pacifist.
...Sardar [Patel] was aware of the influence which Lord Mountbatten
exercised over both Pandit Nehru and Gandhiji; often that influence was
decisive... Sardar had made up his mind that Hyderabad must fit into his
policy regarding the Indian states... I know how deeply anguished he used
to feel at his helplessness in settling the problem with his accustomed
swiftness... the decision about the Police Action in Hyderabad in which
case Sardar [Patel] described the dissent of Rajaji and Pandit Nehru as ‘the
wailing of two widows as to how their departed husband [meaning
Gandhiji] would have reacted to the decision involving such a departure
from non-violence.’
—V Shankar{Shan}
Sardar Patel had fixed the zero hour for the Army to move into
Hyderabad twice, and twice he had to postpone it under intense political
pressure from Nehru and Rajaji [C.R.]. When the zero hour was fixed the
third time by Patel, again it was sought to be cancelled in response to the
appeal of the Nizam to Rajaji. Nehru and Rajaji instead directed VP Menon
and HM Patel to draft suitable reply to Nizam on his appeal. Nehru and
Rajaji didn’t realise that the Nizam was all along buying time to strengthen
himself, and not to reach any amicable settlement. By then Sardar had had
enough of Hamlet Nehru.
While the reply to Nizam was being readied, Sardar Patel, summarily
announced that the Army had already moved in, and nothing could be done
to halt it. This he did after taking the Defence Minister, Baldev Singh, into
confidence!{DD/285}
The operations commenced on 13 September 1948, and after about four
days of operations lasting 108 hours{VPM1/256}, the Hyderabad Army
surrendered, with Major-General El Edroos, commander of the Hyderabad
Army, asking his troops to yield; and Major-General JN Chaudhuri entered
Hyderabad city on 18 September 1948, taking charge as Military Governor.
His administration continued till December 1949. Kasim Razvi was arrested
on 19 September 1948.
Major-General JN Chaudhuri had recorded what Sardar Patel had told
him prior to the Hyderabad-action: “If I did well, I would take the credit;
but if things went wrong, I would be blamed, but whatever I did, I would be
supported. This was the wonderful thing about working with Sardar Patel.
He gave a feeling of intimacy.”{JNC/146} The trust that Sardar Patel reposed in
his men, and the wholehearted backing that he gave them spurred them to
action, success and victory.
Wrote MKK Nayar: “The Indian Army set out on fourteenth of August
and reached the outskirts of Hyderabad on sixteenth morning. The Nizam’s
commander advised him to surrender. The Nizam was an escapist and he
was also not averse to sacrificing others to save himself. He secretly
contacted Munshi in Delhi and agreed to sign the Instrument of Accession.
He had quickly come to this decision because of some sad tidings from
Karachi. Jinnah had died and the news had stunned Ali and Razvi who were
leading the bloodshed in Hyderabad. Razvi had in fact disappeared. Within
a few hours of receiving Nizam’s message in Delhi, V P Menon flew into
Hyderabad. He was not satisfied with obtaining a mere signature of the
Nizam on the Agreement. He made him issue a proclamation declaring
unconditional surrender to the Indian Government. VP also secured from
Nizam an authorization to his London banker to transfer to the Government
of India the money in his account there. VP oversaw the establishment of
military rule in Hyderabad under General Chaudhry and went back to
Delhi.”{MKN}
Wrote Durga Das on the above episode: “I kept the tab on this midnight
drama from my house through telephonic contact with Patel’s residence.
Not unexpectedly, Nehru and C.R. [Rajaji] were at once agitated and
worried about whether it would provoke retaliation by Pakistan. But, within
twenty-four hours, the action was successfully underway and there were
smiles all around.”{DD/285}
Had Sardar Patel not showed such determination and guts, and had he
not ignored the tame alternative suggested by Nehru and Rajaji, Hyderabad
would have been another Kashmir or Pakistan!
Nizam’s Come-Down
Nizam had not only appealed to the President of the USA to intervene;
but had also sent a delegation to the UN Security Council to present his
case. He finally withdrew his case from the UN on 23 September 1948. On
23 November 1949, the Nizam issued a firman accepting the Constitution
of India that was being framed then.
HAILING HYDERABAD’S LIBERATION
Perhaps the person most relieved with the successful Hyderabad
operation was the person who was most scared and apprehensive about it,
and who had tried his best to somehow avoid it or postpone it—the gutless,
indecisive Nehru, who admitted:
“What has happened in Hyderabad has created a situation which
should lead to a stabilisation of the communal situation in India, or
rather to a progressive elimination of the communal sentiment… I
have a feeling that India has turned the corner more specifically
since these Hyderabad operations. We are on the upgrade now. The
atmosphere is different and better…”{BK2/145}
Among the many who congratulated Sardar Patel on the bold and
decisive action in Hyderabad, and its resounding success, there was one
unexpected eulogiser—HS (Huseyn Shaheed) Suhrawardy of the Muslim
League, the hand behind the gruesome 1946 Calcutta Killings, and the then
Premier of undivided Bengal. Congratulating Patel on his “policy regarding
Hyderabad, the operations and their successful outcome”, he stated: “I also
take the liberty of offering you most sincerely my very best thanks and
congratulations on the speech that you made just before the Hyderabad
surrender. It has been widely appreciated by the Muslims in India.”{BK2/145}
Stated Gordan Graham in the Christian Science Monitor of 1 February
1951:
“…Hyderabad, a State covering 80,000 square miles in the heart of
peninsular India was at that time in the grip of an unscrupulous
minority which aimed at secession from India. Had the bid
succeeded, India might not have survived as a political unit. This
situation needed a man of iron who would not balk at coercive
action, and in Sardar, India had at that vital moment just the
man.”{BK2/146}
General Bucher, who was in charge, but was reluctant for the Hyderabad
action, finally admitted:
“I take no credit to myself for the success of the Hyderabad
operation. In all the circumstances from beginning to end, I was not
prepared to say ‘Go’, until every possible development had been
thought out and guarded against. The Sardar was, in my opinion, a
very great man indeed… Undoubtedly, he was right when he
decided that either the Government of Hyderabad must accept the
Indian Government’s conditions, or else the State would have to be
entered in order to eliminate the Razakars.”{BK/419-20}
SARDAR PATEL, POST LIBERATION
Post Liberation, the Nizam personally received Sardar Patel at the
airport when he visited Hyderabad. True to his nature of never walking over
his fallen enemies, Sardar Patel was most courteous with the Nizam. That
won the Nizam over, and both remained good friends thereafter. The Nizam
subsequently wrote to Sardar: “Your great personality is a valuable asset to
India at this critical period when the whole world is in turmoil.” The Nizam
wrote to Sardar several times enquiring about his health.
Addressing the gathering at Osmania University, Sardar Patel said:
“Now we must draw a curtain on the past. Everyone in the country should
join together in making India a great country. People must maintain
complete communal amity; for, we have all been born and brought up on
the Indian soil, and we have to live and die together on the same soil.”
On his visit to Hyderabad in October 1950, addressing a public rally at
Fateh Maidan, Patel said:
“…We are prepared to forget and forgive, but if anyone wishes to be
a martyr and gets his name registered in God’s book as such, how
can we help it?... I do wish to say to the Muslims that they are
equals, that they have equal rights as Indian citizens, and that they
are entitled to live in peace and in complete protection of the law
and the Government. At the same time, every Indian citizen,
whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim, will have to behave as an
Indian, feel as an Indian and act as an Indian, and sooner he realises
this the better. Some think that Pakistan is a place of pilgrimage for
them. If they really believe that is so, it is their duty to leave without
delay. We shall place no difficulty in their path… Such a departure
would be in the interests not only of the man who feels this way, but
also in the interests of the Muslims of India.”{BK/418}
{ 3 }
TIBET : ERASING A NATION
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Tibet is called the Roof of the World because of the height at which it is
situated. Lhasa, its capital, is at an altitude of 3658 meters, that is, 12001
feet. To give a comparative idea, altitude of Srinagar is 1730 meters, and
that of Matheran 800 meters. That is, Lhasa is more than twice as high as
Srinagar, and more than four times as high as Matheran. Tibet is separated
from China by the mountain ranges to the east of the Tibetan Plateau and
from Nepal by the towering Himalayas. Nepal and Bhutan are to its south;
India to its south and west; and China is to its east and north-east. Amdo,
Kham and U-Tsang are its three main regions.
The Tibetan Plateau is geographically grand—surrounded by range upon
range of extreme high altitude mountains. Tibet is the source for many of
Asia’s greatest rivers—Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra (called Yarlung Tsampo
in Tibet), Salween, Mekong, Yangtse, and Yellow river.
With its distinct people and race, distinct language, distinct culture,
distinct religion (its own distinct version of Buddhism), distinct socio-
cultural-political system, distinct economy and coinage, distinct diplomatic
relations with other countries, distinct geographical location and distinct
history, Tibet qualified as a distinct nation, without a shred of doubt, and
had indeed been a distinct nation historically, till forcibly annexed by China
in 1950. If Tibet does not or did not qualify as a separate nation, then China
too, and indeed most nations also don’t qualify as separate nations. Tibet
has a recorded history of nationhood extending back to the second century
BCE.
In fact, the Chinese, that is the Han Chinese, themselves never regarded
Tibetans as their part, they used to call them by the epithet “shi tsang”
meaning barbarians. The Ming Dynasty that ruled China between 1368 and
1644 labelled Tibetans as “foreigners” in their chronicles. If Tibet had a
special relationship it was with Mongolia, and not with China. Mongolian
rulers were influenced by Tibetan Buddhism.
7th to 9th Century CE
Between the seventh and the ninth century, the Tibetans often bested the
Chinese Tang dynasty in battle. During this time, the marriage of Princess
Wen Cheng of China and King Gampo of Tibet was viewed as a strategic
move to achieve co-operation and peace between Tibet and China.
8th Century CE
In the 8th century, Tibetan King Trisong Dentsen had defeated China,
which was forced to pay an annual tribute to Tibet. To put an end to mutual
fighting, China and Tibet signed a treaty in 783 CE where boundaries were
confirmed, and each country promised to respect the territorial sovereignty
of the other. This fact is engraved on the stone monument at the entrance of
the Jokhang temple, which still stands today. The engraving is both in
Chinese and in Tibetan.{DL/45-47}
10th and 11th Century CE
Buddhism came to Tibet in the tenth century. The Tsurphu Monastery,
home of the Karmapa school of Buddhism, was founded in 1155.
12th Century CE
During the Yuan dynasty, the Mongol leader, Chenghiz (Genghis) Khan,
conquered most of Eurasia including China and Tibet. Thus, going by the
Chinese logic, instead of China claiming a right to Tibet, Mongolia could
assert claim to both China and Tibet.
During the tripartite Simla Convention of Britain, Tibet and China in
1914 on the issue of Outer and Inner Tibet, Chinese representative Ivan
Chen, claiming China’s rights over Tibet, had advanced the funny plea that
Chenghiz Khan had ruled Tibet implying Chenghiz Khan was Chinese,
when actually he was a Mongol who had ruled both over China and Tibet!
13th Century CE
After the death of Chenghiz Khan in 1227, the Tibetans stopped sending
tribute to the Mongol Empire. In retaliation, Prince Godan, the grandson of
Chenghiz Khan, invaded Tibet in 1240. Sakya Pandita was the outstanding
Buddhist Lama at the time. He was the leader of the Sakya school of
Tibetan Buddhism. Godan sent him gifts and invited him to come to his
capital Kokonor to formally surrender Tibet to the Mongols. Sakya Pandita
went there in 1246. Prince Godan received various initiation rites and the
Sakya sect of Tibetan Buddhism became the religion of the ruling line of
the Mongol Khans. Sakya Pandita was appointed the Viceroy of Tibet by
the Mongol court in 1249. First North China, and then Tibet were
incorporated into the Mongol Empire, which was later inherited by the
Yuan Dynasty founded by Kublai Khan in 1271. Sakya Pandita was
succeeded by Drogön Chögyal Phagpa in 1253 at the Mongol court.
13–14th Century CE
Upon successful invasion by Kublai Khan, Mongolia ruled China from
1279 to 1368 CE. Kublai Khan had become a Buddhist and had a Tibetan
guru, who helped put an end to the Mongolian practice of drowning
thousands of Chinese to limit the population. Thus, a Tibetan helped save
thousands of Chinese lives—says the current Dalai Lama in his
autobiography ‘Freedom in Exile’.{DL/104}
16th century CE
Sonam Gyatso was the head of the Gelugpa school of Tibetan
Buddhism. He came to be known later as the third Dalai Lama. He was
invited by Altan Khan to Mongolia, where he gave teachings to a huge
crowd in Koko Khotan, the then capital of Mongolia. He announced to the
gathering that Altan Khan was a reincarnation of Kublai Khan, and that he
was a reincarnation of the Tibetan Sakya monk Drogön Chögyal Phagpa,
who had converted Kublai Khan. He announced that they both had come
together again to cooperate in propagating the Buddhist religion.
17th century CE
This led to the widespread use of Buddhist ideology. By the early
seventeenth century there was massive conversion of Mongols to
Buddhism. Incidentally, Yonten Gyatso, the fourth Dalai Lama, was a
grandson of Altan Khan. Lobsang Gyatso, the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, was
the first Dalai Lama to wield effective political power over central Tibet. He
died in sixteen eighties. He moved the centre of government from Drepung
to Lhasa. He also commenced the construction of the Potala Palace in
Lhasa. The Dalai Lamas remained Tibet's titular heads of state until 1959.
There is no historic evidence to support the assumption that the Ming
Dynasty of China ruled Tibet. In fact the Qing Emperor accepted The Fifth
Dalai Lama as a leader of an independent state in the seventeenth century.
The Chinese Emperor also treated Dalai Lama as a Divinity on Earth.
18th century CE
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Qing government of China
sent a resident commissioner to Lhasa. A stone monument regarding the
boundary between Tibet and China, agreed upon by Lhasa and Beijing in
1726, was placed atop a mountain near Bathang. This boundary ran
between the headwaters of the Mekong and Yangtse rivers.
Nepal attacked Tibet in 1791. The Lama was forced to flee. Chinese
Qianlong Emperor sent assistance in 1793. With this assistance, the Tibetan
troops drove the Nepalese troops back to Kathmandu. The Gurkhas
conceded defeat and returned all the treasure. This help rendered by the
Chinese increased their control over Tibet. This event is sometimes
stretched to imply that China helped because they had a claim of
sovereignty over Tibet. However, if that were the logic, the UK and the
USA could also claim sovereignty over France and other countries they
rescued during the Second World War.
19th–20th century CE: British Strategy of keeping Tibet as a Buffer.
Realising that Tibet as a buffer was vital to the security of British-India,
particularly northern India, Britain did all it could to keep it autonomous or
independent.
1904: British expeditionary force under Colonel Younghusband.
British expeditionary force under Colonel Younghusband entered Lhasa
in August 1904. To their surprise, they found no Chinese presence. British
found the claim of China on Tibet to be a constitutional fiction. Incidentally,
even the last British officer in Lhasa, H Richardsons, had said that there
was not a trace of Chinese authority in Tibet after 1912.
Anglo-Tibetan Treaty, among other things, recognised Sikkim-Tibet
border and provided for erection of boundary-pillars accordingly; required
Tibet not to enter into relations with any other foreign power without the
British approval; and to open its border with British India, to allow the
British and the Indian traders to travel freely and to not impose customs
duties on trade with India. It was clear from this that Britain was dealing
with Tibet as an independent nation.
1906: Sino-British treaty
Sino-British treaty of 1906 stipulated that Britain would not annex
Tibet; and that China would not permit any other foreign State to interfere
with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.
1907
In 1907, Britain and Russia agreed that neither of them would enter into
negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of China. The basic
aim of Britain was to keep Russia out of Tibet. If, to achieve that, it had to
assign certain rights to China, it did not mind, for it considered China to be
too weak to pose a threat—not anticipating the potential trouble for Tibet
and India in future, as and when China became strong.
1909-10
The warlord Zhao Erfeng of Sichuan, China invaded Tibet in 1909 and
entered Lhasa in 1910 to capture the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, who
fled to Darjeeling. Zhao had promised a reward for Gyatso’s head. Zhao
razed monasteries, killed monks, beheaded Tibetan officials and replaced
them with the Chinese—he became notorious as “Butcher Zhao”. Zhao also
encouraged Chinese settlements in Zayul, near the Lohit valley, on the
Tibetan side. Noting these developments, Britain began to factor in threat
from China—whom it had considered inconsequential till date—and not
just from Russia, in its Tibet policy.
1911-12
In October of 1911, a group of revolutionaries in southern China led a
successful revolt against the Qing Dynasty, establishing the Republic of
China. The emperor and the royal family abdicated the throne in February
of 1912. The Qing withdrawal led to a power vacuum in certain regions,
resulting in the rise of warlords, as the new government failed to unify the
country under its control. China remained relatively weak for the next
several decades till the Communists under Mao consolidated their hold after
1949.
Dec-1911: Outer Mongolia
Outer Mongolia or simply Mongolia (Inner Mongolia being an
autonomous region within China), which had come under the Manchu Qing
Dynasty of China in 1755 declared itself independent in December 1911,
after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, and installed the 8th Bogd Gegeen, the
highest authority of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia, as theocratic
sovereign, who took the title Bogd Khaan or the “Holy Ruler”.
China regarded Mongolia as its part; while Russia, wanting it to be
under their influence, was determined to make it autonomous—almost
quasi-independent. Russia concluded a secret convention with Japan in
1912 marking out Outer Mongolia and North Manchuria within their sphere
of influence; and leaving Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria to Japan.
This they could do on account of the weakness of China then.
In Russia-Mongolia treaty of 1912, Russia recognised Mongolia as an
autonomous state within China and agreed to provide it with military
assistance in return for commercial privileges in Mongolia; though, in its
version of the treaty, Mongolia called itself “independent”. However, Sino-
Russian Declaration of November 1913 recognised Mongolia as a part of
China, but with internal autonomy, with China agreeing not to colonize the
country or send troops there; and accept Russian “good offices” in China-
Mongolia issues—for obvious reasons Mongolia regarded the declaration as
illegal.
Although Mongolia had declared its independence, it had to struggle till
1921 to establish its de facto independence. In 1919, China forced
Mongolia to renounce its independence. However, in 1921 the Chinese
forces were driven out of the Mongolian capital after a massive battle.
Mongolia finally gained international recognition in 1945. A plebiscite took
place in Mongolia in the presence of Chinese observers on October 20,
1945—it yielded a 100% pro-independence vote.
1912
The 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, returned to Tibet in 1912 after
the Chinese Revolution of 1911 swept away the Qing Dynasty, following
which the Tibetans promptly expelled all the Chinese troops from Lhasa.
The International Commission of Jurists stated in their report: “Tibet’s
position on the expulsion of the Chinese in 1912 can fairly be described as
one of de facto independence… it is therefore submitted that the events of
1911-12 mark the re-emergence of Tibet as a fully sovereign state,
independent in fact and in law of Chinese control.”{DL/69}
1913
A bilateral treaty was signed between Tibet and Mongolia at Urga in
1913 in which both the countries declared themselves free and independent
from China.
The Dalai Lama issued a proclamation in 1913 which stated that the
relationship between the Chinese Emperor and Tibet had been that of the
patron and the priest, and had not been based on the subordination of one to
the other. He said: "Now the Chinese intention of colonising Tibet has faded
like a rainbow in the sky." He also stated that Tibet was a small,
independent, religious nation. To commemorate this, Tibetans celebrated
“Centenary of Reassertion of Tibetan Independence” on 13 February 2013.
1913-1914
Dalai Lama, while in Darjeeling (India) between 1909 and 1912, had
developed a rapport with the British. Looking to the weakness of China
following the 1911–revolution, Britain felt it could coerce China into an
agreement that would practically give independence to Tibet. Towards this
end, Britain arranged the Simla Convention.
SHIMLA CONVENTION, 1913-14: OUTER/INNER TIBET & MCMAHON LINE
The Shimla Convention arranged by the British, to which Tibet and
China were invited and were represented by Lonchen Shastra and Ivan
Chen respectively, conducted eight formal sessions between 6 October1913
and 3 July 1914. Sir Henry McMahon, the then foreign secretary of British-
India, was the chief negotiator and the British Plenipotentiary at the
Convention, assisted by Charles Bell. Lonchen Shastra and Ivan Chen had
to get orders and clarifications from Lhasa and Nanjing respectively, that
took a long time on account of the distances and conventional
communication network; and that was the reason the Convention stretched
for so long a period—about 10 months.
Incidentally, McMahon was also associated with Mortimer Durand of
British-India who had finalised the 2640km-long Durand Line between
[current Pakistan] British India and Afghanistan in 1893.
China initially objected to the presence of Tibet in the Convention
saying it had no independent status and was part of China, but then went
along fearing Britain may proceed unilaterally with Tibet, like Russia did
with Mongolia, ignoring China.
The Convention proposed granting China control over Inner Tibet while
recognizing the autonomy of Outer Tibet under the Dalai Lama's rule.
Outer Tibet comprised Western and Central Tibet including Lhasa, Chamdo
and Shigatse, and areas skirting the British-India frontier; while Inner Tibet
included Amdo and part of Kham. Both China and Britain were to respect
the territorial integrity of Tibet, and abstain from interference in the
administration of Outer Tibet. Further Outer Tibet could not be converted
into a province of China.
The border between northeast India and Tibet was also discussed and
finalised between Tibet and British-India during the Convention—it came
to be known as the McMahon Line. China was not invited to the
discussions on the McMahon Line because it was a boundary settlement
between Tibet and India, and not between China and India. It was not a
secret negotiation, and China knew about it—and raised no objections.
Ivan Chen initialled the draft Convention on 27 April 2014. However,
two days later, on 29 April 2014, China repudiated Chen’s action and
refused to proceed with full signature. It is worth noting that China
refrained from full signature not because it had problems with Inner–
Outward Tibet per se, but because Tibet and China could not agree to the
dividing line between the two.
The above position was re-confirmed in a memo of 4 August 1943 by
Anthony Eden, the then British Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, to Dr
TV Soong, China’s Foreign Minister, when said, inter alia: “Since the
Chinese Revolution of 1911, when Chinese forces were withdrawn from
Tibet, Tibet has enjoyed de facto independence. She has ever since regarded
herself as in practice completely autonomous and has opposed Chinese
attempts to reassert control… The rock on which the [Shimla] Convention
[of 1914] and subsequent attempts to reach an understanding were wrecked
was not the question of autonomy (of Tibet, which was expressly admitted
by China) but was the question of boundary between China and
Tibet…”{Arpi/337-8}
Tibet desperately desired its recognition as an independent state and
hence signed the Convention with Britain, even though it had actually
desired the whole of Tibet and not just the Outer Tibet. However, it chose to
make the best of the bad bargain, and even ceded Tawang and Dirang
Dzong to British-India{Arpi/126}.
Britain and Tibet signed the Convention on July 3, 1914. Ivan Chen had
initialled the Shimla Convention in April-1914, but China refused to
proceed to full signature{Arpi/126}.
As per the Shimla Convention initialled by all—China, British-India,
and Tibet—on 27 April 1914, China pledged not to convert Tibet into a
Chinese province, while Britain agreed not to annex any portion of Tibet.
However, the declaration appended to the 3 July 1914 text of the Shimla
Convention signed by Britain and Tibet states, inter alia, “...we agree that so
long as the Government of China withholds signature of the aforesaid
Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges
accruing therefrom.” The Tibetan government-in-exile points to this clause
to aver that both Inner and Outer Tibet legally remain under the Dalai
Lama's jurisdiction.
There was a parallel between the Outer-Inner Mongolia affair and the
Outer-Inner Tibet affair. Perhaps the British were inspired by the Russians.
Irrespective of the tug-of-war between Russia and China, Mongolia
ultimately became independent, and it indeed had good historical reasons to
become so. Tibet similarly had good historical reasons to become
independent too. However, that unfortunately did not happen. Had the First
World War not intervened that took Britain’s attention away, perhaps
something positive might have happened for Tibet.
1914-1950 : TIBET DE-FACTO INDEPENDENT
For the next thirty-six years since 1914, Tibet enjoyed de facto
independence. During this period, China endured its warlord era, civil war,
and World War II.
As was its tradition, Tibet continued to have limited contacts with the
rest of the world. Although Tibet never maintained extensive international
relations, those countries with whom it did maintain relations treated Tibet
as they would any other sovereign state. In 1949, Tibet maintained
diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with such countries as Nepal,
Sikkim, Mongolia, China, India, and to some extent, Russia and Japan.
Further, Nepal maintained an ambassador in Lhasa. When Nepal applied for
United Nations' membership in 1949, it cited its treaty and diplomatic
relations with Tibet to demonstrate its full international personality.
When Dalai Lama visited Beijing in 1954 and met Mao, this is what
Mao, among other things, told him, as narrated by Dalai Lama in his
autobiography ‘Freedom in Exile’:
“Tibet is a great country. You have a marvellous history. Long ago
you even conquered a lot of China. But now you have fallen behind
and we want to help you. In twenty years’ time you could be ahead
of us and then it will be your turn to help China.”{DL/98}
That is, Mao himself admitted Tibet was a separate country.
TIBET’S IMPORTANCE AND ITS WATER RESOURCES
Tibet is of immense importance for India from multiple angles.
Geographical Importance. Tibet is crucially situated to the north of
India beyond the Himalayas. It forms a natural buffer between India and
China.
Area of Influence. Tibet covers a vast area of 2.5 million sq km,
equivalent to 26% of China’s land mass, providing that much more area of
influence of China, and correspondingly, that much less area of influence of
India.
Religious Importance. Two of the most revered Hindu religious places
are in Tibet—Kailash and Mansarovar. Buddhism spread to Tibet from
Kashmir; and the two countries have been very close for centuries thanks to
Buddhism.
Economic Importance. Tibet is tremendously rich both on account of its
mineral wealth and its water resources. Apparently the British missed
appreciating this potential, else history of Tibet might have been different.
Mineral Wealth. Tibet has rich deposits of copper, chromium, gold,
lead, iron, zinc and uranium. Amdo has oil-bearing fields.
Enormous Water Tower. Unlike Nehru, Mao knew that he who holds
Tibet also hold the Asian Water Towers—the enormous water resources. As
per an estimate, about 47% of the world population survives on water
resources from Tibet. As many as 10 countries are getting water emanating
from Tibet, through 20 rivers. In the absence of any water sharing
agreement with China, they cannot ensure uninterrupted water supply in
these countries. China probably is the only country in the world that does
not have any water-sharing agreement with any of its neighbouring
countries. China has already embarked on an integrated water resource
management of all the rivers emanating from Tibet. China plans to build 59
reservoirs on the rivers flowing out of Tibet. The main river systems of
Northern India originate in Tibet. The rivers emanating from Tibet include
Brahmaputra, Indus and Sutlej, all of which originate from the slopes of
Mount Kailash near the Mansarovar lake. China can dam them, generate
power, and use fresh water for itself, depriving India and others of these
life-critical requirements, while in a war-like situations, it can release
waters to flood and destroy the Indian regions down below.
Chinese government has reportedly approved construction of a dam on
Brahmaputra. The dam would be larger than its largest dam, which is also
the world’s largest—the 18,300 megawatt Three Gorges Dam. To provide a
comparison, the Three Gorges Dam is over nine times larger than India’s
largest dam—the 2,000 megawatt Tehri Dam. How adversely India and the
other nations dependent upon Brahmaputra would be affected by the
proposed dam remains to be seen. China does not care to consult the
countries that may be affected by its dam construction—it does its
construction work furtively. Although there are treaties among co-riparian
states in South Asia, South-East Asia and elsewhere, such is not the case
with China. In fact, the very notion of water-sharing treaty with riparian
neighbours is rejected by China: it even opposed the 1997 UN Convention
on shared basin resources.
Contrast this with the India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty of 1960 under
which Nehru generously agreed to the exclusive reservation of the largest
three of the six Indus-system rivers for downstream Pakistan!
Security and Political Importance. Tibet is a buffer between India and
China: vital from the defence and security angle.
Importance of Good, Neighbourly Relationship. India and Tibet have
always been good, friendly neighbours. Tibet as an independent country
means India's northern borders are safe.
ERASURE OF TIBET AS A NATION
Chronology
1949. Mao Zedong formally came to power in October 1949. However,
in September 1949, Communist China, without any provocation, invaded
Eastern Tibet and captured Chamdo, the headquarters of the Governor of
Eastern Tibet. However, even before Mao had come to power, he had his
party had been proclaiming their determination to “liberate” Tibet.
9 July 1949. Despite the Chinese proclamations to “liberate” Tibet, this
is what Nehru wrote to the Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs:
“Whatever may be the ultimate fate of Tibet in relation to China, I
think there is practically no chance of any military danger to India
arising from any possible change in Tibet. Geographically, this is
very difficult and practically it would be a foolish adventure [Who
ultimately proved to be foolish?]. If India is to be influenced or an
attempt made to bring pressure on it, Tibet is not the route for it…
{JNSW/Vol-12/410}
“I do not think there is any necessity at present for our Defence
Ministry, or any part of it, to consider possible military
repercussions on the Indo-Tibetan frontier. The event is remote and
may not arise at all…”{JNSW/Vol-12/411}
Wishful thinking masquerading as mature assessment to guide non-
policy on Tibet! And, all this despite the contrary assessments of the more
experienced British prior to independence: please see details in the
subsequent sub-chapter ‘Independent India: Less Concerned than the
British’!. Nehru imitated and followed the British where he need not and
should not have; but he ignored them and their mature military assessment
where he should not have.
1 January 1950. China announced its intention to “liberate” Tibet.
Wrote the New China News Agency (Xinhua) on 1 January 1950: “the tasks
for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for 1950 are to liberate Taiwan,
Hainan and Tibet… Tibet is an integral part of China…”
8 September 1950. A Tibetan delegation had been desperately waiting
for months to meet Nehru in the context of Chinese threat, but Nehru had
no time for them. He finally met them on 8 September 1950. Nehru’s advice
was that the delegation should rather visit Peking and seek assurances of
autonomy from China.
7 October 1950. China carried out its plan of “liberating” Tibet. The
Chinese Second Field Army (part of PLA—People's Liberation Army)
under Deng Xiaoping and Lui Bosheng (One-eyed Marshal) comprising
about 40,000 troops crossed the Upper Yangtze, and invaded Tibet on 7
October 1950. The Chinese PLA invaded Tibet from three directions:
Chamdo, Szechuan, and from Sinkiang via Aksai Chin.
The interesting and intriguing aspect of the above was that China even
opened a second front against South Korea on the same day—so confident
were the Chinese of tackling the resistance of Tibetans, for they factored-in
the fact that pusillanimous India under Nehru would just remain an
onlooker. True to their assumption, India remained just that—they must
have taken note of the India’s precedent of gross lack of strategic thinking
on J&K.
But, what was India’s response to the Chinese invasion of Tibet?
Nothing. There was no change in India’s policy to cope with the new
situation: we wanted to keep fooling ourselves and indulge China with our
self-deluding ‘friendship’ card! We sent three diplomatic notes of protest
asking China to respect Tibetan autonomy within its claim to suzerainty,
and to settle the matter peacefully through talks with Dalai Lama, and
pointing out that its action may jeopardise its entry into UN (as if China
cared!). China rebuffed India, saying Tibet was its internal matter, and that
its autonomy would be decided as per the Chinese laws within Chinese
sovereignty.
We refused appeal for help from Tibet and instead asked them to
negotiate a solution with the aggressors. We actually “solved” the issue and
resolved our dilemma by formulating a well thought-out, brave, firm and
crisp Tibetan non-policy: “We can’t save Tibet. There is nothing we can
do.”
But, what would others say? Won’t we, who have been crying hoarse
against colonialism and imperialism, become a laughing stock for allowing
a neighbour to become colonised? So work out a face-saving formula, even
if it economised on the truth: “We don’t wish to be bound by the imperialist
legacy. Tibet was always a part of China. How can we interfere in China’s
internal affairs?” There were many more bizarre additions to this face-
saving formula in due course, which we would discuss as we go along.
Wrote Claude Arpi: “The fact remains that India had interests in Tibet
and badly needed a [Sardar] Patel-like strategic vision to protect these
interests as well as the country’s security along the Himalayan borders. This
was non-existent; it resulted in the disaster of October 1962.”{Arpi/22}
26 October 1950 . Chinese newspapers carry an official handout to the
effect that the Chinese army has been ordered to advance into and “liberate”
Tibet.
November 1, 1950 . In an interview to the United Press on 1 November
1950, Nehru declared: “I have received a ‘suggestion’ from Tibetan sources
that Tibet would like to appeal to the United Nations against the Chinese
Army’s invasion. I have replied that India does not feel free to sponsor such
a resolution in the United Nations, but Tibet is free to appeal directly, if it so
chooses, through Secretary-General. India has neither the resources nor the
inclination to send armed assistance to Tibet.”{JNSW/Vol-15-II/335} Nehru
expressed his hurt at China having ignored him and India: “We feel India
has been ill-repaid for her diplomatic friendliness toward Peking.”{JNSW/Vol-15-
II/335}
Even if India didn’t wish to militarily intervene, or provide armed
support, could not India have extended the moral support by condemning
the Chinese aggression, and sponsoring Tibetan resolution?
Far from the above, Nehru advised his position the same day (1
November 1950) in a cable to BN Rau: “Chinese military operations against
Tibet… do not affect our general policy or even our policy regarding
admission of new China in United Nations.”{Arpi/407}
In response to Rajaji expressing his concern on Tibet, Nehru responded:
“Legally our position seems to be a weak one in regard to Tibet. Morally I
find it difficult to say that the Chinese Government has deliberately
deceived us at any stage. We may have deceived ourselves…”{AS/39}
Comments Arun Shourie: “Having been unable or unwilling to do anything
to prevent the aggressor, the liberal starts speaking for the aggressor.{AS/39}
It’s clear from the above that India’s Prime Minister, who doubled as the
Foreign Minister, had no foreign policy worth the name with regard to
Tibet, and none on India’s external security in the north and northeast—it
was just wishy-washy “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” and “Give, but don’t take”
policy at all costs!
Tibet having fallen, what next? Any external security measures by
India? Work out a theory to practically do nothing! Commented Nehru: “I
think it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military
invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the
foreseeable future.”{AS/47}
November 17, 1950 . His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin
Gyatso, assumed full spiritual and temporal powers as the Head of State
because of the grave crisis facing the country, although he was barely
sixteen years old.
November 23, 1950 . Tibetan appeal came up for discussion in the UN
General Assembly on 23 November 1950. The Indian delegate, by stating
that China had assured India the issue would be settled peacefully, had the
matter dropped! If India, the affected country, was satisfied, how could
others object?
1951. On 23 May 1951, a Tibetan delegation, which had gone to Peking
to hold talks on the invasion, was forced to sign the so-called Seventeen
Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. The
presence of over 40,000 Chinese troops in Tibet and the prospect of total
obliteration of the Tibetan state left Tibetans little choice. The 14th Dalai
Lama could not freely express his disapproval of the Seventeen Point
Agreement. However, soon after arriving in India, he repudiated this
Agreement stating it was “thrust upon the Tibetan Government and its
people by the threat of arms”. The Chinese used the Seventeen Point
Agreement to carry out their plans to colonise Tibet, and violated all the
articles of that unequal treaty.
With all countries “having turned their back on Tibet” as Dalai Lama so
heart-rendingly described, Tibetans approached the US for help. The US
was willing to provide both diplomatic and military aid, but felt frustrated
that India was unwilling to either co-operate, or allow the US to do what it
could.
1954 . Dalai Lama visited Beijing, then called Peking, and also met
Mao.
1954 . India signed Panchsheel that endorsed Tibet as part of China!
1956 . Dalai Lama came to India in 1956 and sought Nehru’s help.
Nehru’s reply was, as stated by Dalai Lama in his autobiography, “But you
must realise that India cannot support you.”{DL/129} When Dalai Lama
expressed his desire to seek asylum in India, Nehru demurred, even though
Dalai Lama explained to him how the 17-Point “Agreement” of China was
an eyewash and that the situation in Tibet was very bad. Nehru made it
clear to him that there was no alternative for him but to go along with the
17-Point “Agreement” of China, and that India could be of no assistance to
Tibet. Finding no sympathy, Dalai Lama returned to Tibet from India in
early 1957.
1959 . China's military crackdown on rebels was met with massive
resistance throughout Tibet in 1959, which came to be called the Lhasa
Uprising. Fearing capture, Dalai Lama fled to India. During the Cultural
Revolution in China, Red Guards inflicted a campaign of organized
vandalism against all cultural sites, including Tibet's Buddhist heritage.
Most of the over 6000 monasteries of Tibet were destroyed or damaged
during 1959-1961. Thousands of Buddhist monks and nuns were killed,
tortured or imprisoned.
1959-65 . During the UN General Assembly debates on Tibet in 1959,
1960, 1961, and 1965, many countries—Philippines, Nicaragua, Thailand,
the US, Ireland, and others; but, NOT India—openly stated that Tibet was
an independent country illegally occupied by China. The UN passed three
resolutions in 1959, 1961, and 1965 stating that Tibetans were deprived of
their inalienable rights to self-determination.
1965 . The area that had been under the control of the Dalai Lama's
government was renamed TAR—the Tibet Autonomous Region—in 1965,
providing for an ethnic Tibetan as the head of government, with actual
power held by the First Secretary of the TAR Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, who has never been a Tibetan.
Most governments recognize the PRC's—Peoples Republic of China's—
sovereignty over Tibet. However, none has recognized the Government of
Tibet in Exile in India. The current Dalai Lama declared in 2006 that Tibet
wanted autonomy, not independence.
Could China have been prevented?
China could have been prevented from taking over Tibet by bringing
about international pressure. China was in a vulnerable position in 1950: it
was fully committed in Korea and was by no means secure in its hold over
the mainland. There would have been wide international support for the
cause of Tibet, if India, the nation which had inherited from British-India
the treaty with Tibet, and which was directly affected, had taken the
initiative. The world opinion was strongly against the Chinese aggression,
and all the countries were looking to India, the most affected country, to
take the lead. Even if India did not wish to itself meddle militarily, it could
at least have helped the military efforts by others, or tried to thwart China
diplomatically
The Economist wrote:
“Tibet has a strong claim to be regarded as an independent state. But
it is for India to take a lead in this matter. If India decides to support
independence of Tibet as a buffer state between itself and China,
Britain and USA will do well to extend formal diplomatic
recognition to it.”
Writes Prasenjit Basu in ‘Asia Reborn’: “The Americans were keen to
support Tibet’s claim to sovereignty but needed support from India (or
possibly Nepal) to solidify the claim. But the proto-communist Nehru (who
believed, in his simple heart, that communism was the wave of the future,
and the forces of history would inevitably lead to the triumph of
communism) contemptuously brushed off the American offer of support.
Nehru told his cabinet that it was not possible for India to help Tibet fend
off the well-armed PLA (but he did not address the question of whether
American support could have augmented the military potential of a
combined effort).”{PB}
Wrote Dr NS Rajaram:{URL43}
“…It is nothing short of tragedy that the two greatest influences on
Nehru at this crucial juncture in history were Krishna Menon and
K.M. Panikkar, both communists… The truth is that India was in a
strong position to defend its interests in Tibet, but gave up the
opportunity for the sake of pleasing China. It is not widely known in
India that in 1950, China could have been prevented from taking
over Tibet... Patel on the other hand recognized that in 1950, China
was in a vulnerable position, fully committed in Korea and by no
means secure in its hold over the mainland. For months General
MacArthur had been urging President Truman to ‘unleash Chiang
Kai Shek’ lying in wait in Formosa (Taiwan) with full American
support. China had not yet acquired the atom bomb, which was
more than ten years in the future. India had little to lose and
everything to gain by a determined show of force when China was
struggling to consolidate its hold... In addition, India had
international support, with world opinion strongly against Chinese
aggression in Tibet. The world in fact was looking to India to take
the lead... Nehru ignored Patel’s letter as well as international
opinion and gave up this golden opportunity to turn Tibet into a
friendly buffer state. With such a principled stand, India would also
have acquired the status of a great power while Pakistan would have
disappeared from the radar screen of world attention. Much has
been made of Nehru’s blunder in Kashmir, but it pales in
comparison with his folly in Tibet. As a result of this monumental
failure of vision—and nerve—India soon came to be treated as a
third rate power, acquiring ‘parity’ with Pakistan...”{URL43}
Even if China could not be militarily prevented, if India and other
nations had recognised Tibet as a separate nation, pressure could have been
kept up on China to get independence for Tibet on some future date.
Sardar Patel’s Approach
When one examines Nehru’s disastrous and woefully irresponsible
approach in respect of China and Tibet (detailed further down), one can’t
help wishing “if only Sardar Patel had been there in lieu of Nehru, and
Gandhi had not hoisted Nehru as the PM on India overriding Patel”.
Sardar’s Letter to Nehru on China and Tibet
Sardar Patel wrote a letter dated 7 November 1950, about five weeks
before his death, to Nehru on Tibet and China, which has since become
famous for being prophetic and is often quoted. It demonstrates that Sardar
Patel had a far firmer grasp on external affairs than Nehru had, and that he
was a much greater internationalist. It is reproduced below verbatim
(certain portions are marked in italics for emphasis by the author of this
book).{SP2} {BK2/215-22}{DD/471-5}
D.O. No. 821-DPM/50
New Delhi
7 November 1950
My Dear Jawaharlal,
Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the
same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for
which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously
thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you
what is passing through my mind.
I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External
Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the
Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as
favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but
I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study.
The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful
intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill
into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to
settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means.
There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this
correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught
on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of
perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be
guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of
Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it
appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama.
Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or
justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs
Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness
and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the
Chinese Government on our behalf.
It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called
threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if
the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as
to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or
strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of
your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard
ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their
friends. With the Communist mentality of “whoever is not with them being
against them”, this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due
note.
During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have
practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN
and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa.
We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its
apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and
correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. In spite of this,
China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us
with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of
scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility.
I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince
China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have
an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly
point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their
last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary
way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet
but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign
influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but
a potential enemy.
In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now
faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the
expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have
seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have
been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north.
We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were
divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us
about frontiers.
In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not
endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as
extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we
required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of
suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very
soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with
us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial
settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during
the last half a century.
China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the
Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a
population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and
Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our
side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the
elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and
bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism
and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other.
Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes
on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their
ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no
McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an
agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different
from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former
has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous.
In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or
historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore,
becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-
western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has
developed from the north and north-east.
Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to
concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have
so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our
calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the
north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite
ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed
towards us.
Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially
troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of
Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the
point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous
defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for
infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes.
There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of
these areas with us is by no means close and intimate.
The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or
devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from
pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been
able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes
in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with
them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In
Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that
discontent is smouldering there.
Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a
handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on
force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as
with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make
people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very
difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened
firmness, strength and a clear line of policy.
I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union,
would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in
support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my
judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be
complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish
to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any
faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in
pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and
increase the threats which are so evident.
Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face
serious internal problems as well. I have already asked [HVR] Iyengar to
send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's
appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has
found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting
supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the
difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long
seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to
Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists.
Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier.
Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telangana
and Warangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security
along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms
and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China.
The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must
come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the
objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives
are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly
comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of
preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we
have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative
and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have
already referred.
It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these
problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my
opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our
administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.
a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India
both on the frontier and to internal security.
b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our
forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding
important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary,
reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the
new threat.
d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is
that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we
would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to
stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-
west and north and north-east.
e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which
China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with
Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There
would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of
its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude
on this question also.
f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to
strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the
whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal
territory in Assam.
g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states
flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in
these areas and with the frontier outposts.
i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse
and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the
trade routes.
j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.
These are some of the questions which occur to my mind.
It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider
question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and
Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be
basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should
not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter
in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before
applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With
Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims
are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier
problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.
I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these
problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately
necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to
taking early measures to deal with them.
Yours,
Vallabhbhai Patel.
{SP2} {BK2/215-22}{DD/471-5}
Reportedly, there is nothing on record to show that Nehru acknowledged
the above letter, and took up follow-up action as suggested by Patel. He
perhaps thought that given his foreign-affairs “expertise” he didn’t need any
advice!!
In fact, like other documents inconvenient to the Dynasty, this letter of
Sardar too was kept a secret and came to light only 18 years after it was
written.
Wrote Durga Das:
“Not long afterwards, the situation across the northern border took a
turn for the worse [1950], resulting in what was perhaps the last
clash between Patel and Nehru in the Cabinet. Red China invaded
Tibet and Nepal was in the grip of internal turmoil. It was well
known that Patel and Prasad differed from Nehru on Tibet. They
had urged him to ensure that Tibet continued as an independent
buffer between China and India. Now their fears proved correct.
Nehru felt upset because Peking had disregarded his
counsel…”{DD/304}
Wrote Durga Das further:
“At the last talk I had with him [Sardar Patel], a few days before his
death in Bombay on 15th December 1950, Patel showed me a letter
dated 7th November 1950 he had written to Nehru [above letter].
(The letter was published by K.M. Munshi in Bhavan’s Journal in its
issue of 26th February 1967; because of its historic importance its
text is given in Appendix II.) After I finished reading it he [Patel]
said: ‘I have loved Nehru but he has not reciprocated. I have been
eating my heart out because I have not been able to make him see
the dangers ahead. China wants to establish its hegemony over
South-East Asia. We cannot shut our eyes to this because
imperialism is appearing in a new garb. He does not realise that
people work only when they have the employment motive or the
profit motive [that must have been in the context of Nehru’s
socialism]. He is being misled by his courtiers. I have grave
apprehensions about the future.’”{DD/305}
Nehru’s Meek, Delusional Note of 1950
In sharp contrast to the sparkling wisdom of Sardar Patel’s letter to
Nehru on China and Tibet, here are extracts from Nehru’s meek, defeatist,
fanciful, and delusional note{JN4} dated 18 November 1950 illustrating the
self-certified foreign-affairs-expert and internationalist’s lack of grasp and
depth, and gross misconceptions on China and Tibet, though not as a
response to Patel’s letter (author’s comments below are in square brackets
in italics, and are NOT part of Nehru’s Note):
“…8. I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession,
in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood
whatsoever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it. It is equally unlikely
that any foreign power can prevent it. We cannot do so… [Make convenient
assumptions so that one does not have to act. India didn’t have to go on war
on the side of Tibet, but it could surely have supported them diplomatically
in world forums!]
“…10. If world war comes, then all kinds of difficult and intricate
problems arise and each one of these problems will be inter-related with
others. Even the question of defence of India assumes a different shape and
cannot be isolated from other world factors. [Nehru was prone to talk in
terms of world war to skirt questions on what India ought to do.] I think
that it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military
invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the
foreseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration of various
world factors. [Nehru showed himself off as an expert in world affairs, and
drew conclusions that suited his meek mental makeup.] In peace, such an
invasion would undoubtedly lead to world war… It is inconceivable that it
should divert its forces and its strength across the inhospitable terrain of
Tibet and undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas. [Since China
won’t do so, why bother—carry on as usual.] Any such attempt will greatly
weaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus I rule
out any major attack on India by China. I think these considerations
should be borne in mind, because there is far too much loose talk about
China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose our sense of perspective
and world strategy [Nehruvian “big words”—talk in terms of world
strategy!] and give way to unreasoning fears, then any policy that we might
have is likely to fail…
“11. While there is, in my opinion, practically no chance of a major
attack on India by China, there are certainly chances of gradual
infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession
of disputed territory, if there is obstruction to this happening. We must
therefore take all necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must
differentiate between these precautions and those that might be necessary to
meet a real attack.
“12. If we really feared an attack and had to make full provision for it,
this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise, and it
would weaken our general defence position. There are limits beyond which
we cannot go, at least for some years [But, did Nehru do the needful even in
12 long years prior to 1962!], and a spreading out of our army on distant
frontiers would be bad from every military or strategic point of view…
“14. The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or
to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an
expansion towards India, is rather naïve. It may mean that in certain
circumstances. Those circumstances would depend upon many factors,
which I need not go into here…
“16. These arguments lead to the conclusion that while we should be
prepared, to the best of our ability, for all contingencies, the real protection
that we should seek is some kind of understanding of China. If we have not
got that, then both our present and our future are imperilled and no distant
power can save us. I think on the whole that China desires this too for
obvious reasons. If this is so, then we should fashion our present policy
accordingly… [But, did Nehru reach, or even tried to reach, proper
understanding with China? NO. Please see details in the next chapter on
India-China war.]
“17. We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very
attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. [What a convenient
assumption: if we attempt to save Tibet, it will sink into greater trouble!
Hence, as a wise, kind and empathetic gesture, let us not help Tibet!! Alas,
with Sardar Patel not in action (he was sick, and expired a month later),
there was none to challenge the wild and convenient assumptions of Nehru.]
It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without
having the capacity to help her effectively…
“18. …We have said that [we] are not going to sponsor this appeal
[Tibet’s appeal in the UN Security Council] , but if it comes up we shall
state our viewpoint. [Why should India have not sponsored Tibet’s just
appeal? Was that the way to treat our friendly and culturally close
neighbour of centuries?] This viewpoint cannot be one of full support of the
Tibetan appeal, because that goes far and claims full independence… But it
will not take us or Tibet very far. It will only hasten the downfall of Tibet.
No outsider will be able to help her and China, suspicious and apprehensive
of these tactics, will make sure of much speedier and fuller possession of
Tibet than she might otherwise have done. We shall thus not only fail in our
endeavour but at the same time have really a hostile China on our
doorstep… [So, did Nehru manage to avert the hostile China on our
doorstep? Was he able to avert war? Winston Churchill had rightly
remarked: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat
him last.”]
“19. I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibet’s appeal. I would
personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard in
the Security Council or the General Assembly. [Not only would Nehru not
sponsor appeal of a neighbour (Tibet) in distress, he fondly hoped other
countries too would spurn Tibet, and not sponsor its appeal! Why? Because,
that would have forced India into taking a stand when what India preferred
by way of its “wise” policy of the “internationalist and foreign-affairs
expert” Nehru was to bury its head in sand.] If it is considered there, there
is bound to be a great deal of bitter speaking and accusation, which will
worsen the situation as regards Tibet, as well as the possibility of
widespread war, without helping it in the least. It must be remembered that
neither the UK nor the USA, nor indeed any other power is particularly
interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What they are interested in
is embarrassing China [and, gentleman Nehru felt it was a sin to even
embarrass China]. Our interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we
cannot serve that interest, we fail…
“20. Therefore, it will be better not to discuss Tibet’s appeal in the UN.
Suppose, however, that it comes up for discussion, in spite of our not
wishing this, what then? I would suggest that our representative should state
our case as moderately as possible and ask the Security Council or the
Assembly to give expression to their desire that the Sino-Tibetan question
should be settled peacefully… [How could it be settled peacefully, unless
China, the invader, withdrew? But, that demand Nehru never made.]…”{JN4}
Nehru’s Other Delusional Notes
Wrote Nehru in a note to the Secretary General, Ministry of External
Affairs on 9 July 1949:
“Whatever may be the ultimate fate of Tibet in relation to China, I
think there is practically no chance of any military danger to India
arising from any possible change in Tibet. Geographically, this is
very difficult and practically it would be a foolish adventure [So,
what happened in 1962?]. In India is to be influenced or an attempt
made to bring pressure on it, Tibet is not the route for it.”{AS/29}
Delude yourself and others that whatever happens in Tibet, India would
remain unaffected—so why worry! Then, were the British foolish in taking
care of the norther borders and Tibet? Please see the subchapter
‘Independent India: Less Concerned than the British about Itself!’ further
down.
Nehru also wrote:
“I do not think there is any necessity at present for our Defence
ministry, or any part of it, to consider possible military
repercussions on the Indo-Tibetan frontier. The event is remote and
may not arise at all. Any present thought being given to it will affect
the balance we are trying to create in India. It may also not remain a
secret and that would be unfortunate.”{AS/29}
Contrast the above two delusional notes of Nehru with what Dalvi wrote
in his book ‘Himalayan Blunder’:
“In October 1950 I was a student at the Defence services Staff
College in Wellington, South India. Soon after the news of the
Chinese entry in into Tibet reached us, the Commandant, General
WDA (Joe) Lentaigne, strode into the main lecture hall, interrupted
the lecturer and proceeded to denounce our leaders for their short-
sightedness and inaction, in the face of Chinese action...he said that
India’s back door had been opened...He predicted that India would
have to pay dearly for failure to act... His last prophetic remark was
that some of the students present in the hall would be fighting the
Chinese before retirement.”{JPD/15}
Nehru finally admitted:
“We feel India has been ill-repaid for her diplomatic friendliness
toward Peking... Difficult to say the Chinese have deliberately
deceived us...We may have deceived ourselves...”{AS/38}
Independent India:
Less Concerned about itself than the British!
It is worth noting and admiring that British-India, a foreign power, was
much more worried about keeping India’s northern borders secure
compared to independent India!
By the early nineteenth century, Tsarist Russia was trying to expand
south into Central and South Asia. In response, Britain commenced its
“Great Game”—that of checkmating Tsarist Russia. Britain rightly realised
that Tibet as a buffer was vital to the security of British-India, particularly
northern India. However, Britain did not wish to take the trouble of
converting Tibet into a protectorate like Sikkim—it did not consider it
financially worthwhile to commit resources for the purpose. Britain wanted
Tibet to be neither under Russia nor under China. Autonomous or
independent Tibet was the best bet to ensure security of northern India, and
therefore the strategy was to ensure it remained so. Towards this end, the
British took tremendous physical risks in surveying the border areas and
sending missions through the difficult terrain to Tibet, spent considerable
sum, did meticulous planning through the decades, arranged conventions,
signed agreements, adjusted borders to make northern India as secure as
possible, even engaged in “cartographic aggression”. Trained Indian
surveyor-spies, disguised as pilgrims or traders, counted their strides on
their travels across Tibet, took readings at night, and measured the
longitude, latitude and altitude of Lhasa and other places.
According to Claude Arpi:
“A few months before India’s Independence, not only was Tibet a
de facto independent State and the British wanted it to remain so,
but they were ready to carry out a military action to protect Tibet’s
status. For this, a detailed military intervention plan was prepared
by the General Staff of the British Army...The purpose of the Memo
[a Top Secret Memo of 1946] was to find a solution in case of
‘domination of Tibet by a potentially hostile major power [which]
would constitute a direct threat to the security of India.’...Neither
Russia nor China must be allowed to violate Tibetan
autonomy...since it would then be possible for them to build roads
and airfields to their own advantage, which would vitally affect
India’s strategic position.”{Arpi/371}
That’s foresight, strategic thinking and meticulous planning!
Talking of strategic thinking, what to speak of viceroys and generals,
even a British explorer, Francis Younghusband, who led the British Mission
to Lhasa in 1904, had this to say in his book ‘India and Tibet’, first
published in 1910:
“...apart from questions of trade, we want to feel sure that there is no
inimical influence growing up in Tibet which might cause
disturbance on our frontier [northern India]. That is the sum total of
our wants. The trade is not of much value in itself, but, such as it is,
is worth having. We have no interest in annexing Tibet...but we
certainly do want quiet there... Before the Lhasa Mission, Russian
influence...was the disturbing factor; now it is the Chinese
influence, exerted beyond its legitimate limits and with imprudent
harshness [reference to Zhao Erfeng’s invasion of 1909]. Either of
these causes results in a feeling of uneasiness, restlessness, and
nervousness along our north-eastern frontier, and necessitates our
assembling troops and making diplomatic protests...”{FY/420}
Writes Brig. Dalvi:
“In October 1950 I was a student at the Defence services Staff
College in Wellington, South India. Soon after the news of the
Chinese entry in into Tibet reached us, the Commandant, General
WDA (Joe) Lentaigne, strode into the main lecture hall, interrupted
the lecturer and proceeded to denounce our leaders for their short-
sightedness and inaction, in the face of Chinese action...he said that
India’s back door had been opened...He predicted that India would
have to pay dearly for failure to act...His last prophetic remark was
that some of the students present in the hall would be fighting the
Chinese before retirement.”{JPD/15}
Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs
Department in 1945, and one of the foremost British strategic thinkers had
written:
“From the point of view of India’s internal economy and
administration the maintenance of this buffer [Tibet] between the
frontiers of India and China is of great advantage. Recent wartime
conditions have shown that China is a difficult neighbour… The
more substantial the buffer that can be maintained between India
and China, the better for future relations…”{Arpi/349}
Britain had been unambiguous in its approach: It didn’t want a new
neighbour to its north—neither China, nor the Soviet Union.
It can be said that from the Tibetan angle it was a misfortune that India
gained independence from the British in 1947. Had that independence been
delayed, and had the British been still ruling India at the time of the Chinese
aggression of Tibet in 1950, Britain would certainly not have just watched
helpless—it would have ensured the Chinese were resisted and thrown out
of Tibet. Alternately, it can be said that it was Tibet’s misfortune that Nehru
was at the helm in India. Had it been Sardar Patel, or some other Patel-line
leader, at the helm in India, China would not have got the walk-over.
Significantly, while the British and China under Mao were well aware of
the strategic importance of Tibet, India under Nehru remained irresponsibly
indifferent. For Nehru, it was the convenient, laid-back, no-need-for-action,
and non-bothersome ‘Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai’ at all costs, even at the cost
of the nation.
In sharp contrast to Nehru, there were notable prescient observers in
addition to Sardar Patel, like KD Sethna of a Mumbai weekly ‘Mother
India’, who wrote back in November 1950: “Let us not blink the fact that
Tibet is useful to China principally as a gate of entry to India. Sooner or
later attempts will be made to threaten us…”{Arpi/348}
Independent India’s Indifferent Approach
Given the critical importance of Tibet, India should have exerted its
utmost to ensure Tibet retained its independent status. But, did India do so?
Did India come to the rescue of its good neighbour, facing extinction as an
independent entity? Did India fulfil its obligation as a friend and a
neighbour? Did we come good on the trust that our weaker neighbour,
Tibet, reposed in us? Did Nehru walk the talk on anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism? Did India try to save its neighbour from being colonised? Did
India try to protect its own crucial interests? What role did India play?
What was independent India’s or Nehru’s Tibet policy? None. It was
actually a defeatist policy—throw up your hands and declare there is
nothing India can do to save Tibet. While the independent India was an
indifferent India—indifferent to its own security—British-India had done
all it could to keep India’s northern borders secure by ensuring Tibet
remained free from foreign powers.
India was in desperate need of a Patel to drive its strategic thinking.
Nehru, by stating on 1 November 1950 in an interview to the Unites Press
that “India has neither the resources nor the inclination to send armed
assistance to Tibet”{Arpi/374} and that “We can’t save Tibet” seemed to wash
his hands off the whole affair so critical to India’s security, and seemed to
suggest that other than armed intervention, which India didn’t wish to
undertake, there was nothing India could do!
Even if India did not have the military strength to confront and prevent
China, there were so many other steps that India could have taken: express
disapproval; provide moral support to Tibet; lodge protest in the UN;
mobilise world opinion against Chinese action; grant recognition to Tibet as
an independent nation; persuade other nations to also do so; demand
plebiscite in Tibet to ascertain the opinion of the public—China had agreed
for a plebiscite in Mongolia, that led to its independence; work towards
ensuring complete independence for Tibet through peaceful means. Even if
the final favourable outcome took decades it didn’t matter—at least there
would have been hope.
Had India taken the initiative many nations would have supported India.
In fact, many did pass resolution in favour of Tibet in the UN later, which
India, the affected country, did not support!
Had India been still British-India in 1950, Britain would certainly have
resisted China in Tibet in some way or the other and would have ensured
Tibet remained free from China.
One could argue that doing so would have made China an enemy of
India? Well, if China were to attack Bhutan or Burma or some other country
tomorrow, should India keep quiet lest it should cost us China’s friendship?
Did China care for our friendship when it attacked our friend and neighbour
Tibet? Are friendships only one-sided? And, even if friendship with China
was broken because of our moral support to Tibet and China had become
our enemy, so what? If it suited China to act against us, it would have found
a reason for doing so, friendship or no friendship, like it did later.
Foreign policy cannot be based on cowardice! Or, in being too nice to
the other party in the hope that they would reciprocate. The US felt
disappointed to discover that India had resigned itself to leave Tibet to its
fate, and sit back, and do nothing! The then US ambassador to India, Loy
Henderson, described the Indian attitude as ‘philosophic acquiescence’.
Several prominent Indian leaders and citizens decided to form a
committee and observe the Tibet Day in August 1953 to protest Chinese
invasion of Tibet. Nehru wrote to Balwantray Mehta of AICC on 24 August
1953: “…Obviously, no Congressman should join such committee or
participate in the observance of ‘Tibet Day’. This is an unfriendly act to
China and is against the policy we have pursued during these years. There
is absolutely no reason for observing such a day now… I think we should
inform members of the Party that they should keep aloof from this. If you
remind me, I shall mention this at the Party meeting tomorrow…”{JNSW/Vol-
23/483}
India Promoting China in the UN!
Even though China had invaded Tibet, Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador
in Beijing, went so far as to pretend that there was lack of confirmation of
the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet and that to protest the Chinese
invasion of Tibet would be an interference to India's efforts on behalf of
China in the UN! That is, complaining against China on behalf of Tibet
would show China in bad light—as an aggressor—when it was more
important for India to ensure China's entry into the UN, for which India had
been trying, and ensure that this effort of India was not thwarted by taking
up China's Tibet aggression!
What kind of crazy foreign policy was this? Our own national security
interest and the interest of Tibet were sought to be sacrificed to help China
enter the UN!!
It was pointed out during the Lok Sabha debates that India had been
advocating the case for China in international councils [for admission to the
UN] even more fervently than China itself—‘muddai sust aur gavah
chust…’”{AS/138} It was also argued during the Lok Sabha debates to the
effect (not exact words): “If we can champion the cause of Algeria’s
independence, why not that of Tibet?... If we can champion the cause of
China in the UN, why not that of Tibet? Even though Ukraine is a part of
the Soviet Union, it has its own membership of the UN…”{AS/139}
Both the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and the Chinese intervention in the
Korean War happened in 1950. The former affected our neighbour, Tibet,
and us adversely, while the latter was far away, where India had little at
stake. Yet, Nehru chose to devote his utmost attention to Korea, neglecting
what affected us most—Tibet!
Apparently, Nehru’s pursuit of international glory in Korea led India to
soft-peddle Tibet. Agreeing with Panikkar, Nehru wrote, “our primary
consideration is maintenance of world peace... Recent developments in
Korea have not strengthened China's position, which will be further
weakened by any aggressive action in Tibet.”
That effectively amounted to sacrificing India's national security
interests in Tibet so as not to weaken China's case in the UN! By some
weird logic Nehru felt that China's entry into UN would ensure World
Peace! But, what World Peace! Had India, a weakling, taken up the quixotic
task of ensuring World Peace? And, did anti-colonial and anti-imperialist
Nehru consider taking over of Tibet by China compatible with World Peace,
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism?
India gave up its right to have a diplomatic mission in Lhasa on the
ground that it was an imperialist legacy. Even the fact of undemarcated
Indo-Tibetan borders and the dispute owing to the non-mutually-agreed
boundaries were an imperialist legacy. Why then did Nehru stick to that
imperialist legacy that ultimately led to India-China War—as we shall see
when we discuss that topic.
India’s Indifference to Tibet in the UN!
November 11, 1950 . The Tibetan Government protested to the UN
against the Chinese aggression. But, as Tibet was not a member of the UN,
it was simply recorded by the UN Secretariat as an appeal from an NGO.
Their appeal, in a way, was pigeonholed. In view of this handicap, Tibetans
requested the Government of India to raise the Tibet issue in the UN. But,
India was not willing to do so, lest China should feel antagonised! What to
speak of helping our neighbour who had appealed to us for help, we
shamelessly advised the victim, that is, Tibet, to seek peaceful settlement
with the aggressor, China. Even worse, when through others, the Tibet’s
appeal came up on 23 November 1950 for discussions in the UN General
Assembly, we opposed the discussions on a very flimsy ground—that India
had received a note from China that the matter would be peacefully
resolved! With no one to sponsor the Tibetan appeal, possibility of some
joint action was discussed by the Commonwealth delegation to the UN. In
the meeting, the Indian representative advised that India did not wish to
raise the Tibetan issue in the UNSC, nor did India favour its inclusion in the
UN General Assembly agenda!
Nehru showed his insouciance by reportedly making the Tibetan
delegation that came to meet him in the connection wait for months before
it could meet him!
See the irony: Nehru referred to the UN what India should never have
referred, and he refused to refer a matter to the UN that India should
certainly have referred. Nehru took the J&K issue to the UN, which he
should never have, it being a purely internal matter; while Nehru refused to
refer the issue of Tibet to the UN, despite its criticality to the survival of
Tibet as a nation, its inherent soundness, and despite it being critical to
India’s external security! When Nehru should not have acted, he did act;
and when he should have acted, he didn’t! Both, his action and his inaction,
led to disastrous consequences for India. Nehru’s strategy was India’s
tragedy.
Some people say that by saying so one is being unjustly critical of
Nehru, because Nehru had his own world view and he had his reasons for
doing what he did. Well, he certainly had his reasons. But, what matters are
the consequences. And, the consequences are there for anyone to see. Those
who try to defend Nehru must note that Nehru himself later admitted he had
made grave mistakes—not only in respect of Tibet, but also in respect of
Kashmir and India-China issues.
Strangely, it was not India, but a remote Latin American country, El
Salvador, which came to Tibet’s rescue. It wrote to the UN for inclusion of
invasion of Tibet as an item in its agenda.
The Blunder called Panchsheel
Despite what China did to Tibet, India signed The Panchsheel
Agreement with China on 29 April 1954. The agreement itself was titled
“Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China
and India” thus acknowledging Tibet as a part of China. India gained
nothing through the Agreement, and all benefits accrued to China.
India did not even insist on prior settlement of borders. Reportedly,
Girija Shankar Bajpai of the External Affairs Ministry had advised on
settlement of the borders prior to the signing of Panchsheel, but his
suggestion was ignored by all the three concerned: KM Panikkar, Krishna
Menon, and Nehru. Our ambassador to China, KM Panikkar, was later
derisively referred to as “ambassador of China”.
Dalai Lama writes poignantly in his autobiography, “Yet I was
conscious that outside Tibet the world had turned its back on us. Worse,
India, our nearest neighbour and spiritual mentor, had tacitly accepted
Peking’s claim to Tibet. In April 1954, Nehru had signed a new Sino-Indian
treaty which included a memorandum known as Panch Sheel...According to
this treaty, Tibet was part of China.”{DL/113}
Acharya Kripalani had said in the Parliament in 1954:
“Recently we have entered into a treaty with China [Panchsheel]. I
feel that China, after it had gone Communist, committed an act of
aggression against Tibet. The plea is that China had an ancient right
of suzerainty. This right was out of date, old and antiquated. It was
never exercised in fact. It had lapsed by the flux of time. Even if it
had not lapsed, it is not right in these days of democracy by which
our Communist friends swear, by which the Chinese swear, to talk
of this ancient suzerainty and exercise it in new form in a country
which had and has nothing to do with China... England went to war
with Germany not because Germany had invaded England, but
because it had invaded Poland and Belgium…”{AS/137}
Acharya Kripalani had this to comment on Panchsheel in 1958 in the
Parliament, as quoted in ‘Born in Sin: The Panchsheel Agreement—The
Sacrifice of Tibet’ authored by Claude Arpi, the French-born writer,
historian and tibetologist:
“This great doctrine was born in sin, because it was enunciated to
put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient
nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally...It
was a nation which wanted to live its own life and it sought to have
been allowed to live its own life...”{Arpi2}
Dr Ambedkar disagreed with the Tibet policy of India and felt that
“there is no room for Panchsheel in politics”. He said that “if Mr Mao had
any faith in the Panchsheel, he certainly would treat the Buddhist in his
own country in a very different way.”
Dr Ambedkar also commented: “The Prime Minister has practically
helped the Chinese to bring their border down to the Indian border.
Looking at all these things it seems to me that it would be an act of levity
not to believe that India, if it is not exposed to aggression right now, is
exposed to aggression…”{DK/455-6}
Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:
“India, step by step, renounced the hard-won special position in
Tibet which Britain had bequeathed to her, and she accepted
Chinese suzerainty in principle and Chinese sovereignty in fact.
Nehru dismissed the notion of Tibet as a buffer state—‘A buffer
between whom?’—and described India’s previous special position
there as an outmoded relic of imperialism. India’s renunciation was
sealed in a series of Sino-Indian agreements, the most important
being the Agreement on Trade and… signed in 1954 [Panchsheel]
…”{Croc/74-75}
India did this despite its own stand to the contrary earlier. The flag of
Tibet was put up on 15 August 1947 in the Parliament, acknowledging
Tibet as a separate nation. Right up to 1949, Nehru, in his official
communications, used words like the Tibet Government, our two countries,
and so on, leaving no doubt that India recognised Tibet as a separate,
independent nation.
Upon criticism of the Panchsheel in parliament, Nehru had brazenly
stated that in the realm of foreign affairs he could never take so much credit
as for the India-China settlement over Tibet! An amazing assertion indeed!
All agreements among nations involve give and take. Panchsheel was only
a “give away” with no reciprocal “take”. Through Panchsheel India
literally gave Tibet to China on a platter, without negotiating anything in
return either for Tibet or for India. Panchsheel is actually a most eloquent
example of the naivety of the Indian diplomacy and a shining example of
what an international agreement should not be!
Why the Untenable Approach?
Why did Nehru operate in such a way?
One. To curry favour and please a bully like China. Nehru thought that
doing so would appease China and make for better neighbourly relations.
That was odd. It was like substituting a very peaceful and harmless
neighbour for a dangerous bully. Watching the way India capitulated,
Chinese perhaps developed contempt for India and its leaders. Mao
respected only the strong, and not the weak who bent over backwards to
please him. India’s pusillanimity must have emboldened China.
Two. It suited Nehru temperamentally. If Nehru had not done what he
did, India would have had to take the trouble of supporting Tibet and face
an aggressive China. Nehru was a pacifist, and did not have a stomach for
such things. He avoided facing up to difficult situations.
Three. Sacrifice the meek, and satisfy the bully. If India supported
China, Tibet, being a weak nation, would not be able to create any problem
for it. Hence, go with the bully. But then, where was the moral position that
India used to tom-tom about in the world forums!
Writes Arun Shourie in “Are we deceiving ourselves again?”:
“...response of the [Indian] Government has been to be at its craven best in
the belief, presumably, that, if only we are humble enough to the python, it
will not swallow us...”{AS/26}
Said Winston Churchill: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile,
hoping it will eat him last.”
What was the result? Those who abandon their friends and neighbours,
especially weaker ones, in their difficulties, should know that their own
time would also come. And it came. As India realised in 1962. What was
once a most secure border became the most insecure border, thanks to
Nehru.
Late Indian President Dr Rajendra Prasad had famously remarked, “I
hope I am not seeing ghosts and phantoms, but I see the murder of Tibet
recoiling on India.”{RP2} He had also written: “In the matter of Tibet, we
acted unchivalrously, but even against our interest in not maintaining the
position of a buffer state, for it had thus exposed the frontier of 2,500 miles
to the Chinese… I have very strong feeling about it. I feel that the blood of
Tibet is on us… but the Prime Minister does not like the name of Tibet to be
mentioned even now and regards any mention of its liberation as ‘manifest
nonsense’.”{KMM/Vol-1/289}
During his last days in 1964, Nehru was reported to have said: “I have
been betrayed by a friend. I am sorry for Tibet.” Betrayed? One does not
understand. In international politics, if you are naive and are incompetent to
take care of your own interests, you would keep getting betrayed.
Strange and Baffling Rationalisation
Reportedly, Nehru tried to rationalise India’s inaction on various
pretexts, the most bizarre among them being that Tibetan society was
backward and feudal, and that reforms were bound to upset the ruling elite,
and so on.
Walter Crocker writes in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’: “It was
being said in Delhi in 1952-53 that Nehru, in private and semi-private,
justified the Chinese invasion of Tibet...”{Croc/73}
Says Arun Shourie in “Are we deceiving ourselves again?”:
“Panditji has now come down firmly against the order in Tibet: it
isn’t just that we cannot support Tibet. His position now is that we
must not support Tibet. The reason is his progressive view of
history! The Tibet order is feudal. And how can we be supporting
feudalism?...{AS/79}
“Panditji reiterates the other reasons for neither acting nor regretting
the fact of not acting: ‘We must remember that Tibet has been cut
off from the world for a long time and, socially speaking, is very
backward and feudal. Changes are bound to come there to the
disadvantage of the small ruling class and the big monasteries... I
can very well understand these feudal chiefs being annoyed with the
new order. We can hardly stand up as defenders of
feudalism.’”{AS/100}
Crazy, perplexing and inexplicable! What does Nehru’s logic lead to? It
is all right for a country that is backward and feudal to be taken over by
another country if that would help it progress! By that logic, the USA could
have colonised most of Asia and Africa that was backward and feudal—
including India, which also fell in that category—and Nehru would have
been fine with that! And, how was the brutal communism of China superior
to Buddhist feudalism!!
Further Examples of Nehru’s Non-Policy on Tibet
Apart from the many instances of Nehru’s weird non-policy on Tibet,
numerous examples of which are quoted in preceding sub-chapters, here are
a few more.
Nehru on sponsoring Tibet’s appeal to the UN: “I think that in no event
should we sponsor Tibet’s appeal. I would personally think it would be a
good thing if that appeal is not heard in the Security Council or the General
Assembly. If it is considered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter
speaking and accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet,
as well as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in the least.
It must be remembered that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A., nor indeed any
other power, is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country.
What they are interested in is embarrassing China. Out interest, on the other
hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest, we fail. Therefore, it will
be better not to discuss Tibet’s appeal in the U.N. Suppose, however, that it
comes up for discussions, in spite of our not wishing this, what then? I
would suggest that our representative should state our case as moderately as
possible and ask the Security Council or the Assembly to give expression to
their desire that the Indo-Tibetan question should be settled peacefully and
that Tibet’s autonomy should be respected and maintained.”{JNSW/Vol-15-II/346-7}
And what was China’s attitude? New China News Agency had been
commenting to the effect that the Anglo-American imperialists and their
running dog, Pandit Nehru, were plotting a coup in Lhasa for the
annexation of Tibet.
{ 4 }
HIMALAYAN MISADVENTURE
BORDER HISTORY TILL INDEPENDENCE
India had borders with Tibet, but not with China. However, after the
forcible annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 and its mute acceptance by
India, what were Indo-Tibetan borders became Indo-China borders.
While covering Tibet, we had discussed about the Great Game of
Britain of check-mating Russia which was expanding south into Asia.
Britain made adjustments to the northern boundaries of India—some with
the consent of the other party and some without—to keep northern India
safe from Russia and China. Britain was adept at cartographic aggression,
unilateral cartographic changes and cartographic flip-flops, adjusting the
boundaries to suit its strategic requirements, that varied with times. That left
free India a bad legacy of unclear and disputed borders.
India-Tibet Border Segments
The Indo-Tibet border, or the Indo-China border after 1950, is a huge
3325km long border broadly comprises four segments.
One. Northwest segment: Ladakh-Tibet border.
Two. Northeast segment: Arunachal Pradesh [formerly, NEFA]-Tibet
border, known as the McMahon Line, which is to the east of Bhutan.
Three. Mid-segment: Himachal Pradesh-Tibet and Uttarakhand-Tibet
border between the east of J&K and west of Nepal.
Four. Sikkim-Tibet border.
Ladakh-Tibet Border & Aksai Chin
The main bone of contention between India and China in this region is
Aksai Chin, which is in the physical possession of China. For China, Aksai
Chin is important as they have built a highway there which joins Tibet with
Xinjiang [Sinkiang], there being no other land-route to connect the two.
Aksai Chin is uninhabited, barren and of no strategic or economic
importance to India.
The history of this boundary region is as under:
1842 . As per the peace treaty signed in 1842 between the
representatives of Gulab Singh, the then Maharaja of J&K, and Dalai Lama,
the old, established frontiers—traditional boundaries—between Tibet and
Ladakh were to be respected. It was a peace treaty rather than a boundary
agreement, for it merely talked of respecting the traditional boundaries—
but, where exactly those traditional boundaries lay, it did not specify. That
is why in the subsequent decades Britain endeavoured to have a boundary
demarcated and mutually agreed, but with no success.
1847 . A Boundary Commission set up by Britain was tasked to
determine the eastern border of J&K. Ladakh’s traditional boundaries
seemed adequate to the Commission—the Karakorum ranges forming the
natural eastern boundary. But, they pointed out the possible disputed
position of Demchok.
Britain later set up a second Boundary Commission comprising
Alexander Cunningham, Thomas Thomson and Henry Strachey. They
invited China too for boundary demarcation between J&K and China.
However, China didn’t respond, being suspicious of British intentions,
having in earlier years been arm-twisted by the British into ceding Hong
Kong, and to open ports for foreign trade by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842.
1865 . Consequent to a survey by WH Johnson in 1865, the eastern
boundary was extended to include the Kuen Lun ranges beyond the
Karakoram ranges, thus including Shahidulla and Aksai Chin within it.
Aksai Chin (‘The Desert of White Stones’) is to the north of Ladakh. It is
located at a height of between 17,000 to 19,000 feet. Its eastern border
touches Tibet, and the northern border touches Xinjiang province of China.
The new map on this basis was published in 1868.
However, Johnson’s published maps and survey-results were disowned
by the British administration. Maharaja of J&K too had withdrawn his
troops from Shahidulla.
1889 . British-India Viceroy Lord Lansdowne suggested Britain should
encourage China to fill-out, beyond the British frontier, the no-man’s-land
between Karakoram and Kuen Lun ranges—which included Aksai Chin—
to keep it safe from Russia. In those days Britain, playing the ‘Great Game’,
was more bothered about Russia, which was trying to expand south into
Asia, than about China, which was a weak nation, whom Britain had
browbeaten often.
1892 . China erected a boundary marker at the Karakoram Pass with an
inscription that the Chinese territory began there, and laid claim to the
Karakoram Pass, Shahidulla and the tract between the Kuen Lun ranges
and the Karakoram ranges, that included Aksai Chin. Britain didn’t mind.
All they wanted was that the area should be out of reach of the Russians. If
China were to take care of those places, so much the better, for it would
save Britain the resources. Britain wanted China on their side and against
Russia, and they were not keen to administer all those border areas and
Tibet themselves, if China was willing to take the trouble to defend them.
Accordingly, the British Foreign Department noted: “…We had always
hoped that they [Chinese] would assert effectively their rights to Shahidulla
and the tract between Kuen Lun and Karakoram range [which included
Aksai Chin]… We see no occasion to remonstrate with China on account of
erection of the boundary pillar… We favour the idea of getting ‘no mans’
land filled up by the Chinese, subject to future delimitation of
boundaries.”{DW/54-55}
1897 . Post the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95,
Britain had second thoughts. It felt China would not be able to secure
Karakoram Pass and other areas from the Russians, and therefore Britain
ought to extend its boundary north and east to include the areas it was
earlier willing to leave for China—as if they belonged to Britain!
1899 . Macartney-MacDonald Ladakh-Tibet line was proposed by
Britain to the Chinese Government, which had left Aksai Chin to Tibet .
The Karakoram Mountains formed a natural boundary for this border. This
Line was presented to the Chinese by the British Minister in Peking, Sir
Claude MacDonald. The Chinese did not respond to the note, and the
British took that as Chinese acquiescence. This Line is approximately the
same as the current Line of Actual Control in Ladakh. Britain never
attempted to make a physical presence in Aksai Chin or exert authority
there in any form. Post-independence Indian government also took no steps
to actually extend their control beyond the Karakoram range into the Aksai
Chin plains.
That the British Government continued to hold to the above proposal
(which included Aksai Chin as part of Tibet) was confirmed in the map
accompanying the Shimla Convention (please see details further down) of
1914.{Max/35}
The bone of contention in this area is Aksai Chin, which is in the
physical possession of China. For China, Aksai Chin is important as they
have built a highway there which joins Tibet with Xinjiang [Sinkiang],
there being no other land-route to connect the two. Aksai Chin is
uninhabited, barren and of no strategic or economic importance to India.
There are no historical agreements or maps signed between India and
China or between India and Tibet that specify the border. The borders
shown by either China or India in their maps is unilateral—without the
concurrence of the other party.
Till 1954 the Indian maps showed the Ladakh-Tibet borders as
“Boundary Undefined”. However, after July 1954, as per Nehru’s directive
(please see details later below), the Indian maps were changed unilaterally,
and started showing clear borders that included Aksai Chin.
However, the 1954-map-changes were restricted only to paper, and were
not implemented on the ground—the most advanced Indian post in Ladakh
remained Chushul, which was far short of Aksai Chin.
The McMahon Line
1913-1914. Shimla Convention. This topic was covered earlier under
the chapter on Tibet. Incidentally, the McMahon Line was not the main, but
the subsidiary issue of the Convention, the main issue being Inner/Outer
Tibet.
The Indo-Tibet border in the northeast—the McMahon Line—was
discussed and finalised between British-India and Tibet, as it concerned the
border of the Outer Tibet which was to be under the Dalai Lama. China was
not involved in it—perhaps it was not invited—although when Ivan Chen of
China initialled the draft Convention on 27 April 2014, he also initialled the
annexed map showing the boundaries of the Inner and the Outer Tibet, that
included the southern boundary of the Outer Tibet that came to be known as
the McMahon Line. However, two days later, on 29 April 2014, on account
of differences with Tibet on the dividing line between the Outer and the
Inner Tibet, China repudiated Ivan Chen’s action and refused to proceed
with full signature—which alone would have made it binding upon them.
At that time, China did not bother about the McMahon Line at all or
raised objections on it, perhaps because the Convention was actually about
Outer and Inner Tibet, and not about the boundary between India and Outer
Tibet, which was anyway to be under the Dalai Lama. Even if China did not
sign the Convention, can the fact that China did not object to the McMahon
Line then be construed to mean it was later estopped from raising
objections to it? Perhaps—it depends upon the interpretation.
Incidentally, the text of the draft Convention or that of the final
Convention did not specifically and explicitly talk about the Indo-Tibetan
border or the McMahon Line at all, the Line was shown only in the annexed
map. Article IX of the Convention simply and briefly stated: “For the
purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary
between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be shown in red and blue respectively
on the map attached hereto.”
Britain and Tibet signed the Convention on July 3, 1914. China did not
sign it.
Through the McMahon Line, McMahon had effectively advanced the
borders of British-India further north and added 50,000 odd square miles of
territory that was till then administered by Tibet, including Tawang, that had
the famous Tibetan-Buddhist monastery. Tawang was on the trade-route and
British desired control over it. Though reluctant, Tibet agreed to the give-
away as a bargain for its rights on the Outer Tibet, which was the main
subject of the Convention.
The McMahon Line was a thick red-line drawn on a double-page map.
As proper follow-up protocols that should have used cartographic
techniques to identify the location of the agreed line on the ground through
a joint survey were not taken up, the line remained inexact, leaving scope
for controversial claims.
The new Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulation, giving considerable rights to
Britain, was also signed on 3 July 1914, and it remained in force—
independent India inherited the rights—till it was replaced by the
Panchsheel in 1954.
Later, the Tibetans claimed they had most reluctantly agreed for Tawang
and other areas, which till then were theirs, as part of British-India—that is,
their depiction to the south of the McMahon Line—as a quid pro quo for
Britain keeping its part of the bargain: getting China to agree to Outer/Inner
Tibet and sign the Convention. Since China had refused to sign the
Convention, not only the Tibetans had a right to both the Outer and Inner
Tibet, they also had claims on Tawang and such other areas relinquished by
them then.
Incidentally, soon after independence, when the Indian government
wrote to the Tibetan government informing them that as the successor
government to the British, the British rights and obligations under their
treaties with Tibet would rest with the independent Indian government,
Tibetan government responded by asking for return of the territories on its
boundary acquired by the British, including Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim,
Darjeeling and so on!
But, of course, with India having agreed to Tibet being a part of China,
and not an independent nation, a doubt was implicitly cast upon the validity
of such treaties, which were agreed to by Tibet, but not by China. India
effectively did a self-goal through its Tibet policy. Dalai Lama in fact made
a statement to the effect that to deny the independent sovereign status of
Tibet at the time of the Shimla Convention of 1914 when the McMahon
Line was agreed to was to deny the validity of the McMahon Line itself.
To summarise, the McMahon Line is based on a valid legal agreement
between British-India and Tibet of 1914. However, China was not a party to
it. That is, there was no agreement on it between British-India and China.
By endorsing Tibet as part of China, and not an independent nation, through
the India-China Panchsheel agreement of 1954, India itself put a question-
mark on the validity of the 1914-Convention in which the McMahon Line
was agreed to. However, considering that China had not protested against
the McMahon Line in 1914, even though aware of it, there is an opinion
that China was later estopped from raising objections to it.
The McMahon Line was marked on a map by a pen, but was not
surveyed and demarcated on the ground. Hence it is inaccurate and
susceptible to alternate interpretations and disputes. The Indian maps
showed it as a dashed/broken-line till 1954 to indicate it was roughly
defined but not yet demarcated, that is, marked on the ground consequent to
a ground survey. However, after July 1954, the Indian maps began showing
it as a solid line indicating it was well-demarcated—at the instance of
Nehru!
Mid-Segment
Mid-segment refers to the borders of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand
with Tibet. Himachal-Tibet border is about 260 kilometres long, while
Uttarakhand-Tibet border is about 350 kilometres.
These borders are also not well-demarcated and incidents have been
reported from there, though they are not as controversial as Aksai Chin and
the McMahon Line.
Sikkim-Tibet Border
Sikkim segment is sandwiched between Nepal to its west and Bhutan to
its east.
1890 . The salient points of the Convention between Great Britain and
China relating to Sikkim and Tibet signed at Calcutta on 17 March 1890 and
ratified at London on 27 August 1890, were:
“The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain
range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its
effluents...
“It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the
Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the
internal administration and foreign relations of that State...”
The “Regulations Regarding Trade, Communications and Pasturage
Appended to...[the above] signed at Darjeeling, India, 5 December 1893”
stipulated:
“A trade mart shall be established at Yatung on the Tibetan side of the
frontier, and shall be open to all British subjects for purposes of trade from
the first day of May, 1894. The Government of India shall be free to send
officers to reside at Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade at that
mart...”
Interestingly, the British did not involve the Tibetans in the above
agreements as they would have opposed them—they therefore entered into
an arrangement with China. Tibetan authorities refused to recognise the
legitimacy of these treaties; and, in protest, tore out the border-markers
between Sikkim and Tibet put up under the agreement.
1904 . British expeditionary force under Colonel Younghusband invaded
Tibet and entered Lhasa in August 1904 to force a trading agreement and to
prevent Tibetans from establishing a relationship with the Russians, which
they were trying to do to save them from the British-China designs. 1904
Anglo-Tibetan Treaty was forced upon the Tibetans by the British which
required Tibet to respect Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, recognise
Sikkim-Tibet border, allow British and Indian traders to travel freely, not to
impose customs duties on trade with India, to pay 2.5 million rupees as
indemnity to the British and not to enter into relations with any foreign
power without British approval.
Incidentally, China has since recognised Sikkim, which was annexed by
India in 1975, as a state of India. There is no dispute on Sikkim now, nor on
its border with Tibet-China.
To summarise, the Sikkim-Tibet border is demarcated. The claim is
accepted by China. There is no dispute.
POST-INDEPENDENCE SCENARIO
What should have been done post-Independence
India should not have allowed Tibet, which was a buffer with China, to
disappear as an independent nation. The seeds of the conflict were sown
when China annexed the de-facto independent Tibet, and India meekly
acquiesced.
That blunder having been done, however, looking to the dispute on the
Ladakh-Tibet border and the questions on the McMahon line in the
northeast, the following sensible steps should have been taken in the fifties:
Step-1: Both India and China should have taken stock of the fact of
unsettled borders, and let the public in both the countries know of the same,
lest there be any wrong impression, false propaganda, and unwarranted
politics.
Step-2: A team comprising experts from both the countries should have
done ground survey and should have tried to define the boundaries.
Step-3: Those areas that the expert-team failed to resolve could be left
for further discussions at a higher level, where they could have been
resolved in a spirit of give and take.
But, were these sensible steps taken? Unfortunately, no! Contrary to
expectations, one is shocked to learn that while China was agreeable for
these sensible steps, India was not! Nehru had other ideas!! What? Why?
We would take up, as we proceed further.
China’s Stand
Historically, China had not agreed to any border with India and signed
any boundary agreement, except for the borders with Sikkim. On Ladakh
border, despite initiatives from British India, China had refused to respond,
being weak and wary of the British designs. They had not signed the Simla
Convention of 1914 and had thus not agreed to the McMahon Line.
Even as late as 1947, China, under the Nationalists, had conveyed to the
then Indian government they didn’t recognise the McMahon Line.
Soon after Indian independence and before China invaded Tibet, Tibet
had asked India for return of the territories on its boundary acquired by the
British, including Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and so on! Further,
Tibet had claimed it had agreed to the McMahon Line as a quid pro quo for
the promised Britain-China-Tibet agreement on Outer Tibet in the Simla
Convention of 1914; but as the latter had not come through, they were not
agreeable with the McMahon Line.
The stand of the Peoples Republic of China from 1949 onwards was that
they wanted to remove the blot of the British/imperialist humiliation China
had suffered with regard to the borders and on other matters, and rather than
accepting the unjust and illegal British-drawn borders, they desired
discussions, negotiations and a joint ground survey to settle the borders in a
just and mutually acceptable manner in the spirit of give and take, and not
with a view to grab area they were not entitled to. They also wanted to
dispense with the British-given names, and give the boundaries new
Indian/Chinese names.
That this was so was proved by the agreement they finalised with
Myanmar/Burma in 1960—the new Burma-China border is roughly along
the McMahon Line, with certain adjustments acceptable to both the sides.
Subsequently, China signed boundary agreements with Nepal and Pakistan
too. That is, China settled its boundaries with all the three countries—
Burma, Nepal and Pakistan—amicably through negotiations; and India
remained the only exception.
It has also been stated in several books and articles that Chinese
communists, having just ascended the power in 1949, desired a settled
border, especially because they already had several severe headaches—
internal troubles, Korea, Taiwan, Tibet and a belligerent US—and didn’t
want to add to them.
China did try on several occasions to settle India-China borders through
negotiations and took initiatives in that direction, but what should have
happened—peaceful, negotiated settlement through talks—did not happen,
for India and Nehru had their own ideas that we would see.
There is one point worth noting. Till the Panchsheel was signed in 1954,
China was circumspect in not spoiling what they were getting through it by
raising the thorny issue of border. Their major concern then was acceptance
of Tibet as their territory. This they achieved through Panchsheel—India
gave away all its rights in Tibet and recognised Tibet as a part of China,
without getting anything in return. Girija Shankar Bajpai, who had earlier
served in the External Affairs Ministry, had advised settlement of borders
prior to the signing of the Panchsheel pointing out that China had never
acknowledged the McMahon Line. But he was overruled by Nehru.
However, within three months of signing of the Panchsheel, China
objected to the presence of Indian troops in certain disputed areas. Chinese
were diplomatic, prudent and practical. Tackle issues one by one. First, get
the major Tibetan issue out of the way through the Panchsheel, then only
take up the remaining issues.
Nothing prevented India also from being as diplomatic, prudent and
practical. India was not forced to sign Panchsheel. No country with a
mature and prudent foreign policy wedded to its self-interest would engage
in a massive give-away without getting anything in return.
India’s Stand
Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary and that is
our boundary, map or no map.
—Nehru in Lok Sabha, 1950{Max/65}
The first and almost instinctive reaction of every new government
was to hold fast to the territory bequeathed to it. What the colonial
power had ruled, the new state must rule.
—Gunnar Myrdal{Max/65}
In July 1952, China proposed settlement through peaceful negotiations
of India’s inherited rights and assets in Tibet, and the related issues, that
obviously included the borders. However, Nehru & Co decided in their
wisdom not to raise border issues. Why? It might open the Pandora’s box
and open up the whole border for negotiations. What was the way out?
Claim borders were already settled, and therefore there was nothing to
negotiate.
The Indian Ambassador to China KM Panikkar had advised: “[If] China
raises the issue [of the McMahon Line], we can plainly refuse to reopen the
question and take our stand that the Prime minister took [in his public
statement], that the territory on this side of the McMahon Line is ours, and
that there is nothing to discuss about it.”{Max/77}
It was this self-deluding approach that led Nehru & Co not to discuss
and settle the boundary issue when they signed the only-give-and-no-take
Panchsheel Agreement with China later in 1954.
However, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai who had been the Secretary-General
in the Ministry of External Affairs did not agree with the above stand, and
pointed out that China had asked for settlement of pending problems, and
that the Chinese “never having accepted the McMahon Line as the frontier
between Tibet and us, can hardly regard this frontier as settled. Naturally,
they have no intention of raising it until it suits their convenience.”{Max/77}
Nehru had advised the Secretary General of the Ministry of External
Affairs on 3 December 1953: “I agree about the attitude we should take up
in regard to the frontier, we should not raise this question [of boundaries].
If the Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise and point out that
this [boundaries] is a settled issue...”{JNSW/Vol-24/598}
India avoided raising the border issue with China following Nehru’s
decision—even when the Panchsheel was signed in April 1954, or
subsequently when Zhou Enlai had overlong five rounds of discussions
with Nehru between 25 and 27 June 1954{JNSW/Vol-26/365-406}. For over a decade
since the independence, Nehru talked with Zhou Enlai on everything under
the Sun except the boundary issues. Records quoted in various books on the
subject show that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai did raise the boundary matter
with Nehru several times, but India soft-peddled the issue. China was also
not insistent. No objections or protests from the Chinese were taken to
mean their acquiescence to our position. So, as a “strategy”, India
maintained silence, kept mum on the issue.
India Unilaterally Changed Maps, July-1954
In his memo of 1 July 1954 to the Secretary General of the Ministry of
External Affairs and the Foreign Secretary, Nehru’s directives were
[comments in square brackets and italics are author’s remarks]:{JNSW/Vol-26/481-
2}
“6. In future, we should give up references, except in some
historical context, to the McMahon Line or any other frontier line
by date or otherwise. We should simply refer to our frontier. Indeed,
the use of the name McMahon is unfortunate and takes us back to
the British days of expansion. [But, then, Nehru was not talking of a
new, proper, just line/boundary mutually negotiated between
independent India and China after junking the colonial McMahon
Line of the imperialist/expansionist Britain. He was all for sticking
to the colonially laid down lines like McMahon Line—only he didn’t
want the legacy of the British names, which lent a negative,
expansionist flavour.]
7. All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully
examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be
printed showing our Northern and North Eastern frontier without
any reference to any ‘line’. These new maps should also not state
there is any undemarcated territory. The new maps should be
sent to our Embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public
generally and be used in our schools, colleges, etc.
“8. Both as flowing from our policy and as consequence of our
Agreement with China [which agreement?], this frontier should be
considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion
with anybody. There may be very minor points of discussions. Even
these should not be raised by us. It is necessary that the system of
check-posts should be spread along the entire frontier. More
especially, we should have check-posts in such places as might
be considered disputed areas.
“9. …Check-posts are necessary not only to control traffic, prevent
unauthorised infiltration but as a symbol of India’s frontier. As
Demchok is considered by the Chinese as a disputed territory,
we should locate a check-post there. So also at Tsang
Chokla…”{JNSW/Vol-26/481-2}
What was the effect of Nehru’s above decision on new maps?
This decision of Nehru was fraught with risks because the new maps of
1954 publicly committed India to a cartographic position that was known to
have been of ambiguous provenance.
The maps of the Survey of India were showing the northern borders till
1954 like the British had been showing: dashed/broken-line for the
McMahon Line to indicate it was roughly defined but not yet demarcated
(that is, marked on the ground consequent to a ground survey); and other
portions of the northern borders as ‘Boundary Undefined’.
In his book, ‘India-China Boundary Problem’, 1846-1947, A.G.
Noorani, a leading Constitutional expert and an advocate at the Supreme
Court of India, mentions that a map annexed to the Mountbatten’s Report
on his Viceroyalty labelled these boundaries as ‘Boundary Undefined’.
{Noor/210} Map annexed to a White Paper on Indian States released in July
1948 by the Ministry of States under Sardar Patel also did not show these
borders as clearly defined, unlike the McMahon Line which was clearly
shown{Noor/221}. The controversial area in this part was Aksai Chin.
However, the maps were unilaterally altered after July 1954 at the
instance of Nehru, and began to show a clear, demarcated border—that
included Aksai Chin—as unilaterally decided by India.
Nehru aligned himself with the maximalist position of the British on the
northern borders, whether or not agreed to by China or Tibet in the past,
declared them as well-demarcated Indian borders, even where the British
had themselves shown the border as undefined. Nehru also formulated a
policy where no talks or discussions or negotiations were to be encouraged
on them.
Even in new maps, we made blunders. Kuldip Nayar states in ‘Beyond
the Lines’:
“...To India’s dismay our maps showed some of our territory as part
of China. The home ministry wrote to the states asking them to burn
the maps or at least smudge the border with China on the Assam
side because they did not exactly delineate the Indian border. The
Chinese exploited our confusion and used our maps to question our
claim.”{KN}
Even if one assumes, for the sake of argument, that the new Indian maps
were drawn with due care after ascertaining the historical facts and the
traditional boundaries, and India had sufficient justification for what it
claimed as its boundary; the critical question is: Were the borders agreed to
by the other party? Were their agreements and maps to prove what you
claimed were accepted by China? If not, should you not have discussed
with them and tried to convince them of your position? You could have
taken the maximalist position to start with in the negotiations. But,
negotiations you should have done. There was no reasonable ground to
claim your unilateral position as correct, and shut the door on negotiations
on them.
A unilaterally-drawn map is a mere cartographic claim, it is not a title to
land. It settles nothing, it can have no legal or international acceptance,
unless concurred with by the other party. Simply said, it takes two to settle a
boundary.
This is what Nehru himself admitted in the Parliament later in 1959:
“Seven or eight years ago I saw no reason to discuss the frontier with the
Chinese Government because, foolishly if you like, I thought there was
nothing to discuss.”{AS/154}
ONWARDS TO DISASTER: 1950–61
Oct-1950: China Invades Tibet
China invaded Tibet, and occupied it. India under Nehru meekly
acquiesced to the aggression, and refused to even lodge a protest in the UN,
or condemn it in world forums. Even if India did not wish to get involved
militarily, it could at least have lent moral support to Tibet, and taken the
stand that Tibet was an independent nation. Please check details in the
earlier chapter on Tibet. With Tibet becoming part of China, and India
unwisely consenting to the same, what were peaceful and uncontested
Tibet-India borders became disputed China-India borders. India paid for its
lack of foresight, and its wishy-washy external security and foreign affairs
non-policy (please see details under the chapter->subchapter ‘External
Policies->Foreign to Foreign Policy’).
July-1952: China Proposes Peaceful Border Settlement
In July 1952, China proposed settlement through peaceful negotiations
of India’s inherited rights and assets in Tibet, and the related issues, that
obviously included the borders. However, Nehru & Co decided in their
wisdom not to raise border issues. Why? It might open the Pandora’s box
and open up the whole border for negotiations. What was the way out?
Claim borders were already settled, and therefore there was nothing to
negotiate. Please see the subchapter ‘India’s Stand’ above.
April-1954: Panchsheel
India signed the worst-possible ‘give-give-and-no-take’ Panchsheel
Agreement (please see details under the chapter on Tibet) with China,
without first settling the border issues permanently, ignoring the sane advice
of Girija Shankar Bajpai. Why? For India under Nehru & Co borders were
already settled, and there was nothing to settle further! How? Nehru & Co,
in their wisdom, had unilaterally decided on the borders!
June-1954: Zhao Enlai–Nehru Talks
For over a decade since the independence, Nehru talked with Zhou Enlai
on everything under the Sun except the boundary issues. Zhou Enlai had
overlong five rounds of discussions with Nehru between 25 and 27 June
1954{JNSW/Vol-26/365-406}. Records show that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai did
raise the boundary matter with Nehru several times, but India side-tracked
and soft-peddled the issue.
July-1954: India Unilaterally Changes Border Maps at Nehru’s Instance
At Nehru’s instance, India unilaterally changed the maps showing Aksai
Chin as part of India, and showing all India-China/Tibet borders, most of
which in the earlier Indian maps were shown as undefined or undemarcated,
as fully demarcated. Please see details above under the subchapter ‘India
Unilaterally Changes Maps, July-1954’. These unilateral changes to the
maps, without consultation/negotiation with China, were bound to lead to
trouble later, besides being challengeable under international law.
Oct-1954: Nehru’s China Visit
Nehru visited China in October 1954. Bold by a good reception, the
impressionable Nehru went ga-ga, and thereafter, rather than exercising
caution and understanding China’s strategy, started advocating China’s case
even more vigorously. Nehru had similarly gone effusive after visiting the
USSR in the 1920s, and had, after independence, in a copycat act,
condemned India to poverty-perpetuating socialism.
Nehru remarked after his visit:
“I am convinced that China, entirely for its own sake, wants peace,
wants time to develop its country and thinks in terms of at least
three or four five years plans… So all this question of aggression,
internal or external, has to be seen in that context of their not
desiring to get entangled…”{AS/109-10}
One wonders what kind of intelligence-gathering system India had, and
what was the Indian embassy doing in Peking that Nehru remained so
innocent on the Chinese games. Or, was it that Nehru was so unrealistic, so
removed from the ground reality, and had so self-deluded himself that he
only wanted to believe what was his wishful thinking; and those close to
him, in order to continue to remain close to him, only fed him with what he
wanted to listen.
1958: Chinese Maps
In 1958, an official Chinese magazine published maps showing parts of
India within its territory. Nehru wrote to Zhou in December 1958 objecting
to the Chinese map and requested corrections as per the Indian map that he
enclosed.
Jan-Mar-1959: Zhou Enlai–Nehru Letter Exchange
Through a letter dated 23 January 1959, Zhou Enlai (or Chou En-Lai)
clarified the status to Nehru to the effect that Sino-Indian borders were
never formally delimited [author’s comments: so, where was the
justification of India showing firm, demarcated borders in its 1954 maps];
Sinkiang-Tibet highway built by China in 1956 (in Aksai Chin) was within
the Chinese borders; McMahon Line was a product of the British cunning
of imperialist cartographic aggression, and could not be considered legal;
and China would make changes to its maps after ground survey and
negotiations with the countries concerned, including India. Here are extracts
from that letter:{URL20}
“First of all, I wish to point cut that the Sino-Indian boundary has
never been formally delimitated. Historically no treaty or agreement
on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the
Chinese central government and the Indian Government. So far as
the actual situation is concerned, there are certain differences
between the two sides over the border question. In the past few
years, questions as to which side certain areas on the Sino-Indian
border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the
Chinese and the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. The
latest case concerns an area in the southern part of China's Sinkiang
Uighur Autonomous Region, which has always been under Chinese
jurisdiction. Patrol duties have continually been carried out in that
area by the border guards of the Chinese Government. And the
Sink1ang-Tibet highway built by our country in 1956 runs through
that area. Yet recently the Indian Government claimed that that area
was Indian territory. All this shows that border disputes do exist
between China and India.
“It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when
negotiations were being held between the Chinese and Indian sides
for the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet
Region of China and India. This was because conditions were not
yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had
no time t0 study the question. The Chinese Government has always
held that the existence of the border question absolutely should not
affect the development of Sino-Indian friendly relations. We believe
that, following proper preparations, this question which has been
carried over from the past can certainly be settled reasonably on the
basis of the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence through
friendly talks. To this end, the Chinese Government has now
proceeded to take certain steps in making preparations.
“An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the
question of the so-called MacMahon Line. I discussed this with
Your Excellency as well as with Prime Minister U Nu [of Burma]. I
would now like to explain again the Chinese Government's attitude.
As you are aware, the "MacMahon Line" was a product of the
British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China and
aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically, too,
it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been
recognized by the Chinese central government. Although related
documents were signed by a representative of the local authorities
of the Tibet Region of China, the Tibet local authorities were in fact
dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn line. And I have also told
you formally about their dissatisfaction. On the other hand, one
cannot, of course, fail to take cognizance of the great and
encouraging changes: India and Burma, which are concerned in this
line, have attained independence successively and become states
friendly with China. In view of the various complex factors
mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand finds it
necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the
MacMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with
prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have
mentioned to you on more than one occasion. However, we believe
that, on account of the friendly relations between China and India, a
friendly settlement can eventually be found for this section of the
boundary line.
“Precisely because the boundary between the two countries is not
yet formally delimitated and some differences exist, it is
unavoidable that there should be discrepancies between the
boundary lines drawn on the respective maps of the two sides...
With the settlement of the boundary question, which, as our
government has repeatedly pointed out, requires surveys and mutual
consultations, the problem of drawing the boundary on the maps
will also be solved.
“In recent years, there occurred between China and India some
minor border incidents which are probably difficult to avoid
pending the formal delimitation of the boundary. In order to avoid
such incidents so far as possible before the boundary is formally
delimitated, our government would like to propose to the Indian
Government that, as a provisional measure, the two sides
temporarily maintain the status quo, that is to say, each side keep for
the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction
and not go beyond them... The Chinese Government hopes that the
above proposal about temporary maintenance of the present state of
the boundary between the two sides will be approved by the Indian
Government…”{URL20}
In his reply of 22 March 1959, Nehru justified India’s claims in all
sectors. Here are partial extracts from that letter: “7. I do hope that a study
of the foregoing paragraphs will convince you that not only is the
delineation of our frontier, as published in our maps, based on natural and
geographical features but that it also coincides with tradition and over a
large part is confirmed by international agreements... We thought that our
position was clearly understood and accepted by your Government...”
April-1959: Dalai Lama Escapes to India
Dalai Lama escaped to India with his group and got asylum, making
China suspicious of India’s intentions.
Aug-1959: Road in Aksai Chin
The fact of Xinjiang-Tibet road passing through Aksai Chin became
public leading to an uproar in India. Although the reports on the road were
available to India since long, the government had kept it under wraps.
25-Aug-1959: Longju Incident
There was an incident at Longju in NEFA on 25 August 1959. An armed
Chinese patrol had pushed back a contingent of Assam Rifles claiming the
border was at the bridge and it was Chinese territory. Later India established
a post at Moja, six miles south of Longju. In the wake of the incident Chou
En-Lai wrote to Nehru on 8 September 1959 stating China’s position on the
boundaries, and pointing out what China saw as India’s aggressive assertion
of its unilaterally determined boundaries.
Sep–Dec-1959: Zhou Enlai–Nehru Letter Exchange
Zhou responded to Nehru’s letter of March 1959 contesting his
justifications on India’s border claims and accusing India of illegal
occupation of certain Chinese territories and even intrusions beyond the
McMahon Line, as in the case of Longju.
In response to a very long letter of Nehru of 26 September 1959, wrote
Chou En-Lai on 7 November 1959:{URL21}
“…As the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited and it is
very long and very far or comparatively far from the political
centres of the two countries, I am afraid that, if no fully appropriate
solution is worked out by the two Governments, border clashes
which both sides do not want to see may again occur in the future.
And once such a dash takes place, even though a minor one, it will
be made use of by people who are hostile to the friendship of our
two countries to attain their ulterior objectives…
“Your Excellency's letter of September 26 contains many
viewpoints to which the Chinese Government cannot agree…
“In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border
between the two countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border
regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly
settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government
proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20
kilometres at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east,
and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in
the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from again
sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones
from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still
maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for
the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of
order… In a word, both before and after the formal delimitation of
the boundary between our two countries through negotiations, the
Chinese Government is willing to do its utmost to create the most
peaceful and most secure border zones between our two countries,
so that our two countries will never again have apprehensions or
come to a clash on account of border issues. If this proposal of the
Chinese Government is acceptable to the Indian Government,
concrete measures for its implementation can be discussed and
decided upon at once by the two Governments through diplomatic
channels…
“The Chinese Government proposes that in order to further discuss
the boundary question and other questions in the relations between
the two countries, the Prime Ministers of the two countries hold
talks in the immediate future…”{URL21}
After several incidents and exchanges of letters between the two
countries to diffuse the situation, China wrote in December 1959 repeating
its stand on the border but suggesting maintenance of the status quo
pending formal delimitation of the border and withdrawal of the armed
forces of the two sides by 20km or so on either side, and stoppage of
patrolling by the armed forces.
April-1960: Major Initiative by China to Resolve Border Dispute
China commenced an exercise to resolve its border disputes with its
neighbours. Chinese team went to Yangon (Rangoon) and settled its
boundary with Myanmar (Burma) roughly along the McMahon Line. As a
follow up, China and Burma signed a treaty in October 1960—peacefully
settling their borders.
Zhou Enlai, Marshal Chen Yi, Foreign Minister, and a big official
Chinese delegation also visited Delhi to settle the border dispute. The
Chinese position was the same as what Zhou had earlier conveyed in
writing to India on several occasions. However, China was reportedly
willing to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary in the east—with
possibly some adjustments and a new name—like they had done with
Myanmar (Burma) provided, in return, India dropped its claims over Aksai
Chin. Once this broad framework was agreed to, the officials from the two
countries could do a survey and determine the exact alignments of the
borders.
Unfortunately, adhering to his stated position, Nehru declined.
Finding the deadlock, Zhou then suggested steps similar to his letter of
December 1959 to diffuse the situation till an amicable settlement was
reached. Nothing came of these.
Here are extracts from Chou En-Lai’s written statement towards the end
of his 7-day visit:{Arpi7}
“At the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru, I have paid a friendly
visit in India from April 19 to 25, 1960... For this [hospitality],
Vice-Premier Chen Yi and I, as well as my other colleagues, wish to
express our hearty thanks...
“...There is no basic conflict of interests between our two countries.
Our two countries have every reason to remain friendly to each
other for thousands and tens of thousands of years to come. During
the past one year or two, although disputes have arisen between the
two countries on the boundary question left over by history, our two
peoples have nonetheless consistently cherished the desire to be
friendly to each other...
“...After seven days of talks, although, unlike what we expected, no
agreement has been reached for the settlement of the boundary
question...
“...it is not impossible for the two sides to find common points or
points of proximity, which, in my view, can be broadly summarized
into the following six points:
There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between
the two sides,
There exists between the two countries a line of actual
control up to which each side exercises administrative
jurisdiction.
In determining the boundary between the two countries,
certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river
valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to
all sectors of the boundary.
A settlement of the boundary question between the two
countries should take into account the national feelings of
the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram
Mountains.
Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the
two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to
the line of actual control and should not put forward
territorial claims as pre-conditions, but individual
adjustments may be made.
In order to ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate
the discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from
patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.
“There is now still a certain distance between us and the Indian
Government with regard to the above six points. However, I am of
the opinion that as long as both sides continue consultations, it will
not be difficult to narrow down and eliminate this distance… On the
eve of departure, I would like to state once again that the Chinese
Government has unshakable confidence in a settlement of the Sino-
Indian boundary question and the strengthening of the friendship
between the two countries, and that it will exert unremitting efforts
to this end.”{Arpi7}
Chou had come with high hopes after having settled the borders with
Burma, but left disappointed—he articulated Chinese position in a press-
conference at Delhi before leaving and expressed his disappointment. Their
delegation next went to Nepal and settled the borders with them too
amicably. Reportedly, Zhou found Nehru’s adamant stand on Aksai Chin
inexplicable and unexpected for several reasons: (a)India had never
occupied or ruled or set its foot in Aksai Chin; (b)in the opinion of China,
India had no valid and legal ground to lay claim on it; (c)it was barren and
nothing grew there; and (d)it was of no strategic importance for India—
reportedly, General Thimayya had himself stated in 1959 that Aksai Chin
was of no strategic significance for India, nor was it of any economic
significance; and there had been doubts if the area belonged to India.
On the other hand, Aksai Chin did have importance for China on
account of the connecting road between Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and Tibet.
Chou tried to impress upon Nehru the importance of the Xinjiang–Tibet for
China, it being the only all-weather land-route. However, Nehru’s
intransigence in the matter made China suspect India was trying to
undermine China in Tibet.
This is from ‘Beyond the Lines’ by Kuldip Nayar:
“...I was only the home ministry’s information officer and had no
official locus standi, but it was obvious that the Polish ambassador
was on a mission. He invited me for a chat at his chancery and
expected me to convey what he had said to [Gobind Ballabh] Pant
[Nehru’s Home Minister]. At the beginning of the conversation he
said that the proposal he would make had the support of all
Communist countries, and specifically mentioning the Soviet Union.
His proposal was that India should accept a package political deal,
getting recognition for the McMahon Line in exchange for handing
over control of some areas in Ladakh [Aksai Chin] to China. He
said that the areas demanded had never been charted, and nobody
could say to whom they belonged. What was being claimed to be
India’s was what had been forcibly occupied by the UK. No power
could honour ‘the imperialist line’, nor should India insist upon it.
Whatever the odds, China would never part with the control of the
road it had built. That was lifeline between Sinkiang and other parts
of China, he argued. I conveyed the proposal to Pant who gave me
no reaction, his or that of the government.”{KN}
As per Neville Maxwell’s “India’s China War”:
“India reiterated that her boundaries with China could not be a
matter of negotiation, claiming that they stood defined ‘without the
necessity of further or formal delimitation’. China replied that ‘this
attitude…of refusing to negotiate and trying to impose a unilaterally
claimed alignment on China is in actuality refusal to settle the
boundary question’; and she warned that while India maintained that
position and kept up her ‘unreasonable tangling’, China would
‘absolutely not retreat an inch’ from her own stand. That China was
equably and equitably settling her boundaries with her neighbours
tended to throw an adverse light on India’s position. Peking prodded
at that sore point: ‘Since the Burmese and Nepalese Governments
can settle their boundary questions with China in a friendly way
through negotiations and since the Government of Pakistan has also
agreed…to negotiate a boundary settlement, why is it that the
Indian Government cannot negotiate and settle its boundary
question…’”{Max/214}
Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:
“At all events, by 1956-57 Chinese were highly suspicious of India.
By the time the Indian Forward Policy was launched they were
convinced of trickery and bad faith… There is evidence that after
his talks with Nehru in 1954 and in 1955, increasingly in 1956, and
again in 1960, Chou En-lai came to feel that he had got little
understanding with Nehru, and that Nehru was not straight. Nehru’s
manner and indirectness had over the years caused more than one
interlocutor to feel like that… According to a foreign minister of a
certain Asian country, Chou En-lai, speaking about the Sino-Indian
boundary dispute, told him that Nehru was impossible to negotiate
with, being both unreliable and impenetrable…”{Croc/85}
Apparently, the ‘wise’ and the ‘self-proclaimed-expert-in-international-
affairs’ Nehru thought that by being assertive about what India had
unilaterally decided were its boundaries, the ‘not-so-wise’ China would
ultimately buckle and agree to India’s unilateral claims! It didn’t matter that
India had no undisputed maps and mutually-agreed documents to back up
its assertiveness.
TOWARDS DISASTER: DEC-1961 ONWARDS
Dec-1961: Panchsheel Renewal & Aksai Chin
Trade agreement under the Panchsheel was to expire on 2 June 1962,
and China sent a note suggesting discussions for a new, renewed treaty.
India insisted for vacation of Aksai Chin by China as a pre-condition, which
China considered at its territory. This would have resulted in the closure of
their essential all-weather supply line: Xinjiang-Tibet road passing through
Aksai Chin. This increased China’s suspicions on India’s intentions in
Aksai Chin and Tibet.
Note the reversal in Nehru/India’s attitude. In 1954, Girija Shankar
Bajpai and others had advised for settlement of the boundary issues with
China prior to signing of the Panchsheel; but, Nehru had had declined
(please see details under the earlier chapter on Tibet). However, in 1961, for
Panchsheel renewal, India made boundary settlement, and Chinese
concurrence on India’s claim to Aksai Chin, a pre-condition! India should
have rather asked for simultaneous discussions on border issues and
renewal of Panchsheel, with no pre-conditions.
1960-62: From ‘Quiet’ to ‘Disquiet’
Thanks to the joint decision of China and India of November 1959 to
stop active forward patrolling, the eastern sector (NEFA) went quiet in
1960-61. However, this ‘quiet’ gradually turned into ‘disquiet’ as
Nehru&Co’s hare-brained ‘Forward Policy’ began to be implemented
December 1961 onwards, as described below.
While China had never accepted the McMahon Line as legal (and it was
anyway undemarcated), still it didn’t take any action when India tried to
fill-up (set-up posts) till (that is, to the south of) the McMahon Line, which
could be argued as India’s territory . However, when India tried to or did
set-up post in areas which China considered to be beyond (to the north of)
the McMahon Line, that is, into the Chinese territory, it raised objections,
lodged protests, and took minor action. Unfortunately, rather than doing
course-correction (re-thinking on the risky ‘Forward Policy’), India
persisted? Why? China had not taken any major action, so, thought India,
the ‘Forward Policy’ chess-game could continue. India’s earlier intrusions
into Longju and Khinzamane were both, as per the Chinese, to the north of
the McMahon Line, and therefore into the Chinese territory.
Dec-1961 Onwards: Ill-conceived Forward Policy
With Nehru–Krishna Menon deciding to unilaterally fix India’s border
with China, India went ahead with its plan of physical presence on the
frontiers. It began building forward check-posts under its hare-brained
Forward Policy—which was actually a “bluff” masquerading as a military
strategy. Their locations were as per the border unilaterally determined by
India, and not as per any mutual discussions or agreement with China.
There was, therefore, a possibility of China's objection, and even Chinese
action to demolish the posts. The fact was that the boundaries were not
settled, so what was say within Indian boundary for India, may have been
within Chinese boundary for China. If you had not settled the boundaries,
controversies were bound to arise. But, rather than negotiating a boundary
with China and reaching a peaceful settlement, Nehru-Menon & Co in their
wisdom—their Forward Policy—convinced themselves that it is they who
would determine the boundary, and in token thereof, establish their posts,
like markers. That China could object, and then attack and demolish those
posts, and even move forward into India did not seem to them a possibility.
Why? Because, reasoned Nehru: any such "reckless" action by China would
lead to world war, and China would not precipitate such a thing! That what
they were themselves doing was also "reckless" did not apparently strike
the wise men.
The decision on the ‘Forward Policy’ was reportedly taken at the PMO
on 2 November 1961 in a meeting attended by Nehru, Krishna Menon,
General PN Thapar (COAS), Lieutenant General BM Kaul (CoGS), BN
Mullik (Director–IB), Brig. DK Palit, and the then Foreign Secretary.{KNR/205-
6}
Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’:
“...Nehru ordered that police check-posts be established to register
India’s presence in the Ladakh area. As many as 64 posts were built,
but they were not tenable. Home Secretary Jha told me that it was
the ‘bright idea’ of B.N. Malik, the director of intelligence, to set up
police posts ‘wherever we could’, even behind the Chinese lines, in
order to ‘sustain our claim’ on the territory. This was Nehru’s
‘Forward policy’, but then Jha said, ‘Malik does not realise that
these isolated posts with no support from the rear would fall like
ninepins if there was a push from the Chinese side. We have
unnecessarily exposed the policemen [Assam Rifles were posted] to
death.’ He went on to say: ‘Frankly, this is the job of the army, but
as it has refused to man the posts until full logistical support is
provided, New Delhi has pushed the police.’”{KN}
Arun Shourie quotes Nehru in ‘Are we deceiving ourselves again?’:
“It is completely impracticable for the Chinese Government to think
of anything in the nature of invasion of India. Therefore I rule it
out...
“It is necessary that the system of check-posts should be spread
along this entire frontier. More especially, we should have check-
posts in such places as might be considered disputed areas... As
Demchok is considered by the Chinese as a disputed territory, we
should locate a check-post there. So also at Tsang Chokla...”{Noor/223-
4}, {AS/103}
China seemed to have viewed India's Forward Policy as a deliberate
attempt to usurp Chinese territory, and provoke war. As things stood, China
was suspicious of India’s intentions.
Wrote Rustamji: “His [Nehru’s] mistake was that he did not accept or
realise how our ‘forward policy’ was being received in China.”{Rust/215}
Several analysts, including Neville Maxwell{Max}, are of the opinion that
Nehru’s ill-conceived Forward Policy that was rolled-out December 1961
onwards was at the root of the 1962 India-China War, the final trigger being
the Dhola Post, as described below.
Even though there were clashes with the Chinese in September 1962,
both Nehru and Krishna Menon felt the same were not serious enough, and
both went ahead on their respective foreign tours!
July-1962: Galwan Valley Post by India
July 1962 . India had set up a post in the Galwan valley in the western
sector which outflanked a Chinese post further down. Although some
Indian officials had advised against setting up of such a post, they were
overruled. When Chinese diplomatic protests were not heeded, they
surrounded the post on 10 July 1962 but did not fire. They left after a
warning. This led Nehru and group to conclude what they wanted to
conclude—that China would not attack, and India could carry on with its
forward policy chess-game!
The fact that these ill-armed, and indefensible forward-posts served no
real military purpose, and served only to fly the national flag as supposed
markers of the Indian boundary in disputed territory might have alarmed the
professionals in the Indian army, but the higher-ups in the army had been so
brow-beaten by Nehru&Co and the babus (bureaucrats) in the defence and
the external affairs ministry that, perhaps to retain their positions, they
chose compliance with the disastrous policy rather than professional
protest, and resignation, if required.
On 21 July 1962 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed a note
to the Indian Embassy in China that read, inter alia: “The Chinese
Government has repeatedly stated that China is not willing to fight with
India and the Sino-Indian boundary question can be settled only through
routine negotiations. It has all along exercised the greatest forbearance and
self-restraint towards Indian armed intrusions and provocations on many
occasions. However the Chinese Government can by no means sit idle while
its frontier guards are being encircled and annihilated by
aggressors.”{Arpi/473}
Aug-Sept-1962: China Warns
Quoting Nehru’s speech of 22 August 1962, China commented: “Prime
Minister Nehru stated outright that on the Sino-Indian boundary question
the Indian government is following a ‘dual policy’ and intends to gain from
China what it seeks to gain by political pressure, military pressure or other
pressures. To adopt one policy or other is India’s own business. But the
Chinese government wishes to point out that China will welcome
negotiations, if seriously intended, but will resist, whenever attacked, and
that it will bring India no good to pursue a policy of sham negotiations and
real fighting.”{Arpi/476-7}
Quoting an incident in the Ladakh sector where India had, as per the
Chinese, trespassed into the Chinese territory, Beijing sent a note to the
Indian government on 13 September 1962: “The Indian Government should
be aware that shooting and shelling are no child’s play; and he who plays
with fire will eventually be consumed by fire. If the Indian side should
insist on threatening by armed force the Chinese border defence forces who
are duty-bound to defend their territory and thereby arouse their resistance,
it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising
therefrom.”{Arpi/476}
Mao had reportedly commented that India had been pressing the
Chinese along the border for three years; and if they continued to do so,
China would strike back.{Arpi/477}
The information that the Indian forces were reportedly being mobilised
to attack Thagla Ridge (Dhola Post: please see later below) on 10 October
1962{Arpi/493} was gathered by the Chinese military intelligence; and China
began planning strong counter-measures.
3-Oct-1962: Chinese Note for Negotiations
China wrote to India on 3 October 1962: “The Chinese Government
regrets that the Indian Government has once again refused its proposal for
speedily and unconditionally holding discussions on the Sino-Indian
boundary question on the basis of the report of the officials of the two
countries. The Indian Government has also refused the Chinese
Government’s reiterated proposal that the armed forces of each side
withdraw 20 kilometres along the entire border…”{Arpi/482}
Among the reasons India did not agree to ‘unconditional’ negotiations
was that it wanted its occupied territories, particularly Aksai Chin, to be
vacated first—it is another matter that what India considered occupied
territories China considered its own: perhaps neither had a firm legal basis
to claim the territories as theirs, there having been no mutually agreed well-
demarcated and properly documented boundaries.
Mutual accusations between India and China continued without
resulting in talks and negotiations.
Apr to 10-Oct-1962: Dhola Post
Dhola is 60 km from Tawang and 200 km from the railhead of
Misamari. The Nyamjang river flows through from Tibet, enters India at
Khinzemane, and meets Namka Chu 2.5km south of Khinzemane. There
were seven improvised bridges—numbered I to V from east to west, with
Log bridge and Temporary bridge between IV and V—across the Namka
Chu river used by local graziers to take their cattle across. Dhola Post was
opposite Bridge III to the south of the river. Close to Tsangle was Bridge V.
When the river was in spate, the bridges served no purpose; while in
October one could walk across the river bed. The Thagla ridge, to the north
of the river, sprawls from east to west and overlooks Namka Chu. It has
four prominent passes—Dum Dum La at 17,000 feet, Karpola II at 16,000
feet, Yamatso La at 16,000 feet and Thag La at 14,000 feet.
The Chinese claimed the Thagla ridge area was on the Tibetan side
while India claimed it was on the Indian side of the McMahon line. When
in 1959 an Assam Rifles post was established at Khinzemane, the Chinese
had disputed it and pushed Indians back; but, after the Chinese withdrew,
India had re-occupied the post. China had protested and diplomatic
exchanges had commenced.
Apr-Aug 1962 . Writes Brigadier Dalvi, who fought the 1962-war in the
area, in ‘Himalayan Blunder’ about the April-1962 episode of the Operation
Onkar, meant to implement the Forward Policy:
“From the outset it should have been appreciated that a move into
the Dhola area would attract Chinese attention, if not a severe
reaction. The area of the Tri-junction [of Tibet, Bhutan and India]
was extremely sensitive, as the exact alignment of the McMahon
Line had been made the subject of open dispute by China. Apart
from the incident of August 1959, which brought the army into
NEFA, we knew (or should have known) that Chinese officials in
the 1960 discussions had not conceded our version of the Line in
this particular area. I was naturally doubtful about activating a
sensitive area, especially after I had seen for myself the difficulties
of moving and maintaining a force there. The Thagla Ridge had a
tactical significance for the Chinese as it overlooked their forward
base at Le... When these awkward questions were raised, I was told
categorically to ‘lay off’ as this was a ‘matter of national policy’ and
was being implemented by the Assam Rifles... The persons who set
up Dhola without the necessary military might to slug it out with the
Chinese are guilty of providing the Chinese with the excuse they
wanted; and of placing the Indian army in a shameful and invidious
position... I studied the ground and realised that Dhola was
militarily useless, indefensible and dominated by Chinese positions
and located in a trap.”{JPD/133}
Recorded Major General Niranjan Prasad in his memoirs: “I told the
Director of Military Operations that the establishment of Dhola Post could
lead to very serious consequences if in fact it lay north of our claim line. I
asked for a clear cut definition of our claim line and emphasised that our
posts should be shed in relation to that line.”{Arpi/500}
Sep-1962: Much happened, but business as usual . Major border events
took place in September 1962, but for the higher-ups concerned, it was
business as usual. Nehru left for London in early September 1962 to attend
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference; and was expected to return
only by the end of the month after a tour of some nations in Africa. Defence
Minister Krishna Menon was to be away to the UN. Finance Minister
Morarji Desai had gone to London along with Nehru, after which he was to
proceed to Washington. Lt General BM Kaul (CoGS) tasked with the
implementation of the ‘Forward Policy’ in NEFA was on a 2-month leave.
And, so on.
September 1962 . Under the renewed rigour in the implementation of
the forward policy under BM Kaul in NEFA, a post was set up south of
Thagla ridge at Dhola, on the southern bank of the Namka Chu river.
Chinese protested saying its location was beyond the McMahon Line into
their territory. It appears that the local Indian army commanders in NEFA
did not have a clear idea on borders—the maps were not detailed and
accurate enough—and might have erred in setting up some posts in
disputed areas or areas beyond the border. This possibility was perhaps
examined in the Henderson-Brooks report that remains classified till date.
The Chinese team headed by Zhou that had visited India in 1960 to settle
the border issue had, in their discussions, raised questions on the alignment
of McMahon Line in the Thagla Ridge area.
Wrote Claud Arpi in an article:
“Major General Niranjan Prasad, the GOC of 4 Infantry Division in
his book ‘The Fall of Towang’ (Tawang) describes the setting of the
operations thus: ‘The McMahon Line from just north of
Khinzemane, as drawn by Sir Henry McMahon in 1914 with a thick
blue (in fact, red) pencil on an unsurveyed map, was not an accurate
projection of the Himalayan watershed line… In this process the
position of Thagla ridge was, to say the least, left ambiguous…’…If
one follows the watershed principle as well as the ownership of
customary pastures' rights, the Thagla ridge was the border, but the
fact remains that the old map which was the reference for India's
position on the 'genuine' location of the McMahon Line, showed the
Thagla ridge and the Namkha Chu, north of the Red Line [that is, in
Chinese territory]. Further surveys were unfortunately not
conducted after India's Independence…”{Arpi6}
8-Sep-1962 . On 8 September 1962 Chinese troops surrounded the
Dhola post as a warning.
15-Sep-1962 . On 15 September 1962 a Chinese civilian official
accompanying their troops announced over a loudspeaker to the Indian
forces in Hindi that the area belonged to them and that the Indians must
send their civilian official to discuss the location for an amicable settlement.
Reportedly, the matter was referred all the way up to Nehru and, sticking to
its position, India did not take up the offer for a meeting. Instead the
decision was taken to reinforce the position, send additional forces and
evict the Chinese from the area.
However, Brigadier Dalvi and others on the spot considered it to be
impossible and suicidal to attempt to evict the Chinese from the area given
the overwhelming odds: the Chinese were strategically located on heights
while the Indians were within their view as sitting ducks; the Chinese were
vastly greater in numbers and far better armed; unlike India, the Chinese
had logistics in place; the Indians were ill-clothed, ill-armed and ill-fed.
20-Sep-1962 . An incident of exchange of fire took place at Namka Chu
on 20 September 1962. This happened after a clash long back in October
1959 at Kongka Pass. This should have alerted the ‘Forward Policy’
theorists on the Indian side that their policy was not just a game of chess,
where China would not retaliate, but, that if India intruded into disputed
territories, China would definitely use force too, if required.
22-Sep-1962 . In a high-level meeting to review the situation on 22
September 1962, General PN Thapar, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), advised
against action to evict the Chinese, pointing to their much superior strength.
However, Thapar was overruled by the other members; and MJ Desai, the
Foreign Secretary, wanted the Chinese to be evicted from Dhola. His
advice ignored, Thapar asked for written orders, which were duly given!
{KNR/254-5} Civilians sitting in New Delhi deciding what the army should do in
the high Himalayan heights in NEFA!!
30-Sep-1962 . “After the Chinese surrounded the small Indian Army
post at Tsenjang, north of the disputed Thagla Ridge, on September 8, the
then defence minister VK Krishna Menon overruled the advice of the Army
chief, General PN Thapar, and ordered the army forward. The Indian Army
still balked and stayed put. On September 30, Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, just returned from a foreign trip, became furious that the
government's orders were not implemented. He overruled Thapar's advice
again and shouted, ‘I don't care if the Chinese came as far as Delhi, they
have to be thrown out of Thagla!’” {URL22}
8-10-Oct-1962 . Under pressure from Nehru and Menon to evict the
Chinese from the area, both General BN Kaul and General Prasad visited
Dhola on 8 October 1962 and noted our weaknesses first-hand. Yet, to be
able to please Nehru with some action in the area under his watch, Kaul
took the disastrous adventurist step of sending a battalion on 10 October
1962 to capture Yumtsola, which was unoccupied and was to the west of the
Thagla peak—thinking like Nehru that Chinese would not react. However,
the Chinese reaction was so severe and so many jawans were killed in the
action that Kaul was aghast. It has been rightly said that unless you have a
reasonable chance of success, sending your men to attack is just murdering
them—and that’s what Kaul did. Kaul left the place on 10 October 1962
with a promise to appraise Nehru of the reality. Yet Dalvi’s suggestion of
abandoning Dhola and taking up defensive position further south was not
heeded. The orders came to hold on to Dhola and defend it. It was bizarre—
the civilians, the non-professionals were telling the professionals, the army,
what to do.
BN Kaul had replaced General Umrao Singh, an able, upright
professional, who had been removed for not falling in line with what the
political leadership (Nehru and Menon) wanted. Having undertaken to do
what Umrao Singh had hang-ups about, Kaul could not very well turn
around and express difficulties about Dhola. Someone who would play the
politicians’ game was urgently needed and Kaul had willingly stepped into
that role.
Please see further down on the Dhola Post.
12-Oct-1962: Orders to Throw Out the Chinese!
In response to a reporter’s query, Nehru grandly declared at the airport
on 12 October 1962 on his way to Ceylon[Sri Lanka] that he had already
“ordered the armed forces to clear the Chinese from the NEFA”.{URL23}
{MB2/137}
“Confirming this [the above], on October 14, Indian Defence Minister
V.K. Krishna Menon told a meeting of Congress workers at Bangalore that
the Government had come to a final decision to “drive out the Chinese”. He
declared that the Indian Army was determined to fight the Chinese to the
last man.{URL23}
In its jingoism, the press lapped up the comment. Wrote the Statesman:
“Mr Nehru…has told the country…that the armed forces have been ordered
to throw the Chinese aggressors out of NEFA and that until Indian territory
in that area is cleared of them there can be no talks with China.”
Even foreign newspapers reported it, some headlining the news to the
effect that Nehru had declared war on China. The ‘New York Herald
Tribune’ headed its editorial ‘Nehru declared war on China’.
The Chinese People’s Daily also reported it, advising Nehru to “pull
back from the brink of the precipice, and don’t use the lives of Indian troops
as stakes in your gamble.”{Max/345}
The question is: Does one give operational orders publicly? It amounted
to declaring war, and giving Chinese the excuse to retaliate. Apparently,
Nehru did not realise the calamitous consequences of his totally
unwarranted and certainly immature utterance.
With the AHQ dumbfounded at Nehru’s surprise “throw out” orders,
General Thapar rushed to the Defence Minister Krishna Menon and pointed
out the orders were contrary to what was mutually agreed: not to attack or
engage the Chinese! Responded Menon, unconcerned: “This is a political
statement. It means action can be taken in ten days or a hundred days or a
thousand days.”{DD/363}
It appears from what followed that Nehru’s “throw out” orders did
contribute to provoking the Chinese to attack; or, at least, providing them
with an excuse to attack.
And, to issue such “Throw out” orders without any preparation! Later,
when China struck on 20 October 1962, both in Ladakh and across the
McMahon Line, and ran through India’s forward positions, all were
stunned.
Commented Mao: “Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us
fighting him, for us not to fight with him would not be proper. Courtesy
emphasises reciprocity.” Responded Zhou Enlai: “We don’t want a war with
India. We have always strove in the direction of avoiding war. We wanted
India to be like Nepal, Burma or Mongolia, i.e. solve border problems with
them in a friendly fashion. But Nehru has closed all roads. This leaves us
only with war. As I see it, to fight a bit would have advantages. It would
cause some people to understand things more clearly.” Mao agreed: “Right!
If someone does not attack me, I won’t attack him. If someone attacks me, I
will certainly attack him.”{Arpi/479}
Mao directed: “First, the PLA had to secure a victory and knock Nehru
to the negotiating table; and second, Chinese forces had to be restrained and
principled.”{Arpi/481}
20-Oct-1962: Chinese Attack Begins with Dhola
Alarmed by the Indian massing of troops in Dhola and the Indian
attempts at Yumtsola on 10 October 1962 thanks to BN Kaul, or, taking that
as an excuse, Chinese overran Dhola on 20 October 1962 heralding the
1962-war. BN Kaul has to be blamed for it. Having seen the situation first-
hand, Kaul, as a responsible professional, should have put his foot down on
India’s forward policy misadventure to save the Indian army from the sure
debacle it was staring at. If Nehru-Menon did not agree with him, he should
have resigned. But, instead, like several other seniors in the army, he bent
over backwards to please Nehru-Menon overriding sound military
considerations.
India’s persistence with its forward policy despite protests from China
may have had the effect of exasperating China into thinking that only an
infliction of military defeat would check India.
Wrote BG Verghese later, recounting the sad saga: “Following Nehru’s
‘throw them out’ order, and against saner military advice and an
assessment of ground realities, a brigade under John Dalvi was positioned
on the Namka Chu River below the Thagla Ridge that the Chinese claimed
lay even beyond the McMahon Line. It was a self-made trap: ‘It was but to
do or die’. The brigade retreated in disorder after a gallant action, while
the Chinese rolled down to Tawang where they reached on 25 October.”
This is from the book, ‘Himalayan Blunder’, by Brigadier JP Dalvi, an
eyewitness, and an actual participant in the war:
“At 5 on the morning of 20th October 1962 massed Chinese artillery
opened up a heavy concentration on the weak Indian garrison, in a
narrow sector of the Namka Chu Valley... Massive infantry assaults
followed, and within three hours the unequal contest was over. The
route to the plains of Assam lay wide open. The Chinese exploited
their initial successes and advanced 160 miles into Indian territory...
reaching the Brahmaputra Valley by 20th November. They swept
aside the so-called impregnable defences of Sela Pass; Bomdilla
was literally overrun; the monastery town of Towang fell without a
fight. India’s panicky reaction included the scrambling of ill-
equipped, ill-trained for mountain warfare and unacclimatised
military formations... The Chinese were amazed at this...”{JPD/1}
Contrast the above with what Nehru & Co had been maintaining as
brought forth by Neville Maxwell in “India’s China War”: “How was it,
then, that until the very last Nehru and his officials in the Ministry of
External Affairs believed that the advantage in NEFA lay with their army,
and that with these the Chinese could be given a salutary beating. Kaul and
the Army Chief, General Thapar, had been to Tawang by road in the
previous November and so should themselves have appreciated the
enormous logistic difficulties that would face them if it came to operations
on the McMahon Line. But as late as October 1962 Nehru was still telling
journalists that in NEFA the advantage lay with India. Plainly, there was
deception somewhere…”{Max/302}
24-Oct-1962: Chinese Offer for Peaceful Settlement
China issued a statement and Zhou also wrote to Nehru setting out the
terms of peaceful settlement of the border dispute: both parties withdraw
20km from the line of actual control and disengage; the PMs of the two
countries engage in friendly settlement of the dispute. India questioned
what China meant by the line of actual control and wanted it to be the
position as on 8 September 1962, while China, in its response of
4 November 1962, clarified it to be the position as on 7 November 1959,
that is, the McMahon Line in the eastern sector—even though China had
not accepted that line—and the traditional line in the other sectors,
emphasising what China offered met the India conditions of “decency,
dignity and self-respect” and would not prejudice claims of either parties,
which would be settled through negotiations. This also meant that China
was not taking advantage of the territories it had gained meanwhile after the
hostilities of 20 October 1962.
India did not agree reiterating that the line of actual control should be
the position as on 8 September 1962. However, those were precisely the
unacceptable Indian positions as on 8 September 1962 in what China
considered to be its territory that led to the conflict on 20 October 1962 in
the first place, and agreeing to the same would have meant China did
something wrong in demolishing those positions it considered illegal. India
remained adamant. China considered India’s stand to be highly
unreasonable.
24-Oct to 13-Nov-1962: Lull in Fighting
There was a lull in fighting. That is, the fighting that began on
20 October 1962 lasted mere 4 days. During the lull period, Indian forces
were strengthened on the borders and a new strategy was put in place. India
felt that what had happened between 20–23 October 1962 was a temporary
setback, and that they would teach a fitting lesson to China on the next
occasion. Nehru and his group actually believed that the advantage in
NEFA lay with the Indian army and that it could give a befitting response to
China. A general optimism was created that the worst was over, and
henceforth it would be win-win for India! There was an appalling lack of
self-assessment and realism both within the government and without.
This is how General LP Sen, heading the Eastern Command, had
boasted to the Political Officer, Nari Rustomji, during the lull between the
two phases of the war: “We’ve got those bastards where we want them now.
Just let them move one step forward, and they’ll get such a thrashing they’ll
never forget. Our boys are now in positions where they can fight and show
what they’re worth. They’re just itching for a chance to have a real good
crack at the Chinks.”
14-Nov-1962: India Launches Offensive
BM Kaul—the favourite of Nehru and Menon—under whom the
debacle of 20-23 October had occurred, and who had since taken ill and
recovered, was back—to the dismay of most in the army: they suspected his
return would make things worse. India launched an offensive at the Walong
sector in NEFA. Was the date chosen by the sycophant Kaul to give Nehru
the win as a gift—14th November being his birthday?
15-17-Nov-1962: China Counter-attacks
The consequence, however, was disastrous. China counter-attacked and
overran the India forward positions the next day. Chinese kept pushing and
moving from two directions from Tawang, with withdrawing Indian troops
leaving behind artillery, vehicles and tanks.
18-20-Nov-1962: India’s Terrible Defeat
18 November 1962 . GOC AS Pathania panicked, and accompanied by
his Staff Officers and Brigade Commander suddenly evacuated the Division
and Brigade HQrs at Dirang on the morning of 18 November, and left in
their vehicles, without issuing any directions to the Battalions about the
manner of withdrawal—it was a shameful act, and amounted to running
away from the scene of battle. What is more, nothing was done to secure,
retrieve and take along tanks, pounder guns, artillery, heavy mortar
batteries, and other weapons received from the US—they were all left off to
be captured by the Chinese! However, China returned them after ceasefire.
19 November 1962 . Indian army had specially formed 4 Corps to drive
the Chinese away from NEFA. 4 Corps under BM Kaul stood decimated
and shifted its headquarters from Tezpur to Gauhati on 19 November 1962.
The reverses so demoralised BM Kaul that he advised Army HQ to
advise Delhi to get foreign armed forces to help stem the tide of the superior
Chinese forces, adding it was not a counsel of fear, but of facing stark
realities.
20 November 1962 . Whole of NEFA was under the Chinese control,
and they were at the gates of Assam. All this within mere 7 days of the
renewed fighting on 14 November 1962.
The brave Indian troops were badly let down by their army-leaders like
Thapar, Kaul, Sen, and Pathania, and by the politicians.
President Dr Radhakrishnan was so aghast that when someone told him
of a rumour that General BM Kaul had been taken prisoner by the Chinese,
he commented, “It is, unfortunately, untrue.”{Max/410}
The Indian show in the war was so poor, thanks to collapse of command
and control at the higher level, lack of preparation and neglect on the
military and armament matters, that India became a laughing stock. There
was a joke circulating among the aid-givers: "Don't provide India precious
arms. Their soldiers would abandon them in the battle field and run away,
and China would ultimately get all our arms!" This is how our soldiers, who
fought bravely, got humiliated, for no fault of theirs!!
In the face of reverses, rather than rising up, Churchill-like, to boost the
morale of the armed forces and the people, the leaders simply lost their
nerves. Nehru even went on radio to announce his sympathy for the people
of Assam, indicating as if India had given up on that frontier!
21-Nov-1962: China Declares Unilateral Ceasefire
China declared unilateral ceasefire. All nations, including of course
India, were stunned by this sudden and unexpected turn. The terms were the
same as what China had offered earlier on 24 October 1962 after the first
round of fighting for 4 days since 20 October 1962. However, the main
difference was that this was unilateral—China announced it would carry out
its part of the obligation whether or not India agreed, that is, it would
withdraw its forces 20km away from the line of actual control as on
7 November 1959. However, it reserved the right to strike back should India
attack or try to cross the line of actual control to reoccupy the positions that
were never in its territory.
Sticking to its old stand, India did not agree, nor did it make an effort to
finally resolve the border-dispute once and for all through talks and
negotiations, for which China was ready. Though India ceased fire knowing
it could not fight on.
Incidentally, even such an important announcement of China became
known to the government belatedly. Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the
Lines’: “...A cavalcade of cars moved to the prime minister’s residence.
Nehru had just woken up and was totally unaware of the Chinese offer. This
was typical of our intelligence agencies and of the functioning of the
government. Though the statement on the ceasefire had reached newspaper
offices just before midnight, the government was unaware of it. Even the
official spokesman whom the pressman awoke for a reaction expressed
ignorance. What a way to fight a war, I thought.”{KN}
BG Verghese writes in “The War We Lost” in Tehelka Magazine of
13 Oct 2012:
“Around midnight, a transistor with one of our colleagues crackled
to life as Peking Radio announced a unilateral ceasefire and pull
back to the pre-October ‘line of actual control’...Next morning, all
the world carried the news, but AIR still had brave jawans gamely
fighting the enemy as none had had the gumption to awaken Nehru
and take his orders as the news was too big to handle otherwise!
Indeed, during the preceding days, everyone from general to jawan
to officials and the media was tuned into Radio Peking to find out
what was going on in our own country.”{URL19}
The India-China war of 1962 was indeed independent India’s most
traumatic and worst-ever external security failure. Wrote S Gopal, Nehru's
official biographer: “Things went so wrong that had they not happened it
would have been difficult to believe them.”
Complacency
Nehru’s government approach rested on the presumption that ‘China
would not attack’ India. Wrote Durga Das:
“If [Krishna] Menon was guilty of hugging the illusion [that ‘China
would not attack’], so was Nehru, perhaps to a greater degree. He
openly ticked off General Thimmaya, Chief of Army Staff, at a
Governor’s Conference months earlier for even suggesting the
possibility of an attack by China. Many others in the cabinet were
not innocent. Either through ignorance or fear of going contrary to
the Prime Minister [that was Nehruvian democracy, FoE, and
quality of Cabinet System of Government for you!], they endorsed
his complacent attitude.”{DD/361}
General Thapar, the Chief of Army Staff, had requested for urgent
additional funding to make good the gross deficiencies in armaments in July
1962, that happened to be about three months before the actual war. When
the request was referred to Nehru, he shot it down saying China would not
resort to force.{DD/362}
The army had made it sufficiently clear to the politicians that being out-
gunned, out-tanked, and out-manned by the Chinese, they wouldn’t be able
to hold against them. The Army Commander in Ladakh had warned: “If
China attacks massively, we shall be annihilated.” The head of the Eastern
Command (NEFA) had similarly warned.{DD/362} Their clear implication was
that being in the (pathetic) position that the Indian army was, India ought
not to do anything that might provide China with an excuse to attack. Yet,
this is what the wise politicians (Nehru and Krishna Menon) did through
their ‘Forward Policy’ detailed below.
STAND OF OTHER COUNTRIES: FAILURE OF NEHRU’S FOREIGN POLICY
China executed the whole process—exchange of letters, offer for
discussions and negotiations through the years before the war; publicity on
how reasonable its stand was; adequate signals and warnings and offers of
talks before attacks; offer of ceasefire and negotiation after the first round
of fighting between 20-23 October 1962; actual conduct of war; unilateral
ceasefire, withdrawal and offer of settlement through talks on 21 November
1962; keeping other nations informed of the position; voluntary giving up
of all the territory gained by them in the war—with such finesse, maturity,
competence, responsibility, transparency and timing that the whole world,
including China’s enemies, were highly impressed. China had managed to
outsmart and outmanoeuvre the laid-back, wishful-thinking-driven sloppy
Indian leadership. Nehru&Co were shell-shocked at the full-scale attack on
both the fronts—something they had totally discounted in their self-
deluding calculations. India, in fact, paid the price of letting the civilians
(Nehru&Co and babus) direct the professionals (the army) on the war
strategy and tactics, ignoring the sane advice and even protests of the
professionals (the army).
In sharp contrast, India cut a sorry figure on all counts: poor diplomacy;
apparent lack of willingness and reasonableness in finding a negotiated
solution; and, of course, woeful performance in the war.
Hardly any nation came out in support of India. Nehru considered
himself the leader of non-aligned movement and of newly independent
Asian and African countries whose cause he had been espousing. But, none
gave unqualified support and most remained neutral.
There was a quid pro quo between China and the USSR: China was to
be supportive of USSR’s attempt to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba—the
Cuba crisis almost coincided with the India-China war—and USSR was to
be supportive of China in India-China war. In fact, Mao cunningly and
carefully chose the timing of the attack to coincide with the Cuban missile
crisis, so that the world attention and the involvement of the two
superpowers remained focussed on Cuba, and no country interfered with the
Chinese action.
Nehru and Krishna Menon had been traditional critics of USA.
However, India's position became so desperate, not being able to resist the
advancing Chinese army, that Nehru sent SOS to the US—the country he
had always been criticising—requesting arms and air-support. What was
more, Nehru wanted the US air-force to be deployed and to fight for India!
The two letters written by Nehru on 15 November 1962 and 20
November 1962 to the US President, John F Kennedy, show the
desperation. This is from an article of Inder Malhotra which contains
extracts from the letter of Nehru to JFK{URL24}:
“[In] the second letter...Nehru informed Kennedy that during the
short interval, ‘the situation in NEFA...Command has deteriorated
still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela
have been trapped between the Sela Ridge and Bomdila. A serious
threat has developed to our Digboi oilfields in Assam. With the
advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra
Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done
immediately to stem the tide, the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur
and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.’ After pointing
out that hitherto he had ‘restricted our requests to essential
equipment’ and thanking the US for the assistance ‘so readily
given’, Nehru went on: ‘We did not ask for more comprehensive
assistance, particularly air assistance...The situation that has
developed is, however, desperate. We have to have more
comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from
taking over the whole of Eastern India. Any delay in this assistance
reaching us will result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our
country’. In this context his [Nehru’s] specific demands are for: ‘[A]
minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters’ and a
‘modern radar cover (which) we don’t have.’ Nehru added that US
air force personnel ‘will have to man these fighters and radar
installations while our personnel are being trained.’”{URL24}
However, the help of the US air-force was eventually not required, as
China declared unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962. President
Kennedy’s statement that came two days earlier that they [Chinese] would
be forcing the hand of the President of the US if they advanced any further
might also have been one of the factors in China’s decision to ceasefire.
Both the US and the UK had begun providing armaments. Even Israel,
whom Nehru had shunned, provided equipments.
CHINA’S STRATEGY, ATTITUDE & RESPONSE
India-China war was not something sudden. India did not care either to
resolve the border issue or to prepare for the war—even though it had a
decade to do so.
On may ask: Shouldn’t China have been accommodating given India’s
generosity on Tibet? Well, China may not have thought it was generous on
the part of India to have accepted Tibet as part of China and surrendered its
rights derived from the British. China had anyway occupied Tibet in 1950.
They had not sought India’s “yes” before doing that. They considered Tibet
to be theirs, whether or not India or the world agreed. Even if India had not
signed Panchsheel China would not have bothered.
Of course, one can say that just because India put up some forward posts
that were supposedly in the disputed territory, China should not have
attacked. It could have warned India, or talked to India, before doing so.
Hence, the fault was of China. But, there were several warnings from China
—even as late as 14 October 1962—which India did not heed. And, maybe,
China was looking for an opportunity to humiliate India, and India gave
China that opportunity on a platter! China also wanted to cement its hold on
Aksai Chin and meet its political objectives, which were several:
One. Establish itself as the only big power of Asia that mattered.
Two. Establish superiority of its totalitarian, communist system over the
democratic and pluralistic model represented by India for the developing
countries.
Three. Humiliate Nehru and India, and demolish India’s standing in the
Third World.
Four. Ensure all cultural and religious links between Tibet and India are
severed—something that could have come in the way of Tibet’s total
integration with China.
Five. Teach India a lesson for giving shelter to Dalai Lama. China also
suspected Indo-American role in Tibetan uprising.
Six. Pressurise India to settle the boundaries on China’s terms.
Seven. Exploit the global distraction of the Cuban Missile Crisis to
achieve China’s strategic goals.
Eight. Mao had his own internal political compulsions arising out of
famines, economic calamities and power struggle within. His “Great Leap
Forward” started in 1958 was a disaster, and led to the largest man-made
famine in human history resulting in the starvation-deaths of between 40 to
50 million over the three year period of 1959-61. The decisive war served
to strengthen and enhance his position at home and internationally.
However, that is not the issue. All countries have their own selfish
motives. Are we saying that if others happen to be rogues, we would fall
prey to them? Should India’s security be dependent upon the good
behaviour of its neighbours? The question is why was India not smart
enough to protect its own interests. Why did India provide China with an
excuse? Why did India act foolish?
China was as suspicious about India’s intentions, as India was about
China’s. Each side felt that the other was encroaching upon its territory.
Henry Kissinger in his book ‘On China’ writes:
“Mao commented on Nehru’s Forward Policy with one of his
epigrams: ‘A person sleeping in a comfortable bed is not easily
aroused by someone else’s snoring.’ In other words, Chinese forces
in the Himalayas had been too passive in responding to India’s
Forward Policy—which, in the Chinese perception, was taking
place on Chinese soil. (That, of course was the essence of the
dispute: each side argued that its adversary had ventured on its own
soil.)”{HK/L-3012}
It appears that China, on its part, felt that it was being forced into war.
Henry Kissinger further quotes Mao:
“Since Nehru sticks his head out and insists on us fighting him, for
us not to fight with him would not be friendly enough. Courtesy
emphasizes reciprocity.”{HK/L-3045}
Once China sensed that armed confrontation might be unavoidable,
writes Kissinger further “...it triggered the familiar Chinese style of dealing
with strategic decisions: thorough analysis; careful preparation; attention
to psychological and political factors; quest for surprise; and rapid
conclusion.”{HK/L-3010}
Contrast this with India’s preparation!
China had invested heavily in building up its armed forces for possible
armed conflicts on four fronts: anticipated attack by Taiwan, backed by US;
South Korea; Tibet and lastly India. By 1962, China had a first-class army
well prepared for any eventuality.
Besides, they had excellent intelligence set up. They practically knew all
the moves of the Indian army. Indian intelligence, on the other hand, was
blissfully ignorant on almost all aspects of the Chinese political and military
strategy, behaved ostrich-like in the manner of their masters, Nehru-Menon,
and even believed in the Nehru-Menon gospel: China won’t attack, even if
we play our forward policy chess games and associated pranks.
ANALYSIS OF & ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE DISASTER
The Guilty Men
Nehru was, without doubt, the principal person responsible for the major
failures that proved very costly for India:
(1)Nehru allowed Tibet to be erased as a nation—without registering
protest.
(2)Nehru did not ensure a peaceful, negotiated border settlement with
China despite
(a)an overlong comfortable timeline of over a decade to settle it,
(b)a spate of golden opportunities that presented themselves like the
occasion of signing of the Panchsheel or his visit to China or the numerous
visits of Zhou Enlai to India,
(c)the willingness of China to reach a negotiated settlement, and
(d)even initiatives by China in that direction—ignored or soft-pedalled
by India.
(3)Nehru neglected military requirements and external security, and
engaged in the politicisation (jointly with Krishna Menon) of the army.
(4)India under Nehru implemented a hare-brained Forward Policy
without appreciating what it could lead to.
(5)Nehru, by being undemocratic and dictatorial,
(a)did not involve others in the decision making process;
(b)did not let the parliament and the public know the truth on the border
issues; and
(c)mislead the parliament, the media and the public at large on many
vital aspects.
(6)Nehru was mainly responsible for India’s the pathetic debacle in the
war.
(7)Nehru did not ensure the boundary question was settled during his
lifetime, even after the war, when China was willing to discuss it.
It was interesting what Nehru had commented on the Chinese
communism: “The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and
war, or, to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably
an expansion towards India, is rather naïve.”{Arpi/440}
One of Nehru’s favourite way of putting down the views of others was
to label them as “naïve”, as above. Little did he realise that many of his own
notions were grossly naïve!
Yet another of his pet cliché was “from larger view” or “from larger
point of view” or “from larger world view” to counter or dis others. In the
context of Tibet, he said: “We have to judge these matters from larger world
point of view which probably our Tibetan friends have no means of
appreciating.”{Arpi/444} So, India’s non-policy on Tibet, or “Hindi-Chini
Bhai-Bhai” policy at all costs was driven by “larger world point of view”.
Wrote Arun Shourie:
“Now, this is a favourite phrase of Panditji [Nehru]—‘the long-term
view’—as is ‘the larger considerations’. Whenever he deploys the
former [‘the long-term view’], you can be sure that he is preparing
the case for ceding ground. Whenever he deploys the latter [‘the
larger considerations’], you can be sure that he is preparing the case
for ceding specifically the country’s interest.”{AS/46}
Next to Nehru, but much below him, the person most responsible for the
rout was the conceited crypto-communist Krishna Menon. Of course, if, for
the blame, Nehru was at number 1, Krishna Menon came at number 11,
there being none in-between. Krishna Menon was only a protégé of Nehru,
with no standing of his own, and he could not have done anything that
Nehru didn’t want. Writes Kuldip Nayar in Beyond the Lines{KN}: “I once
asked why he [Krishna Menon] didn’t tell his side of the story. He said:
‘My story must die with me because I would have to lay the blame on
Nehru, and I do not want to do so because of my loyalty to him.’”
BN Mullik, Director of Intelligence Bureau, was no less accountable.
The main persons responsible for the rout from the army included General
PN Thapar, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General LP Sen, the then Head of
the Eastern Command, Lieutenant-General BM Kaul and Major-General
MS Pathania.
Ill-Treating Thimayya & Others, Promoting ‘Yes-Men’
BM Kaul, in-charge of the eastern sector and heading the 4 Corps
specially constituted for NEFA, was the blue-eyed boy of Nehru. Menon,
Kaul and others had started such politics within the army that officers got
divided into groups, and promotions and postings became dependent on
sycophancy and the faction one belonged to. Knowing the kind of things
Menon and Nehru wanted to listen, sycophants cut-off passing of genuine
information to them. Fault, of course, lay with Menon and Nehru who ill-
treated those who spoke otherwise.
General Thimayya, the Chief of Army Staff, had resigned, miffed by
Krishna Menon’s discourteous behaviour, and his refusal to heed
Thimayya’s advice for better army preparation. Nehru had, however,
managed to persuade Thimayya to withdraw his resignation on the promise
that he would suitably look into his grievances. But, after Thimayya had
withdrawn his resignation, rather than reprimanding Menon, and looking
into the issues raised by Thimayya, Nehru went dismissive telling the
Parliament that Thimayya had resigned on ‘issues trivial and of no
consequence, which had arisen from temperamental conflict’. That could
not have been the reason, as Thimayya was a thorough, seasoned
professional, a disciplined soldier, and a great patriot—no wonder, even
today, the contents of Thimayya’s resignation letter remain a highly guarded
secret{SKV/L-707}. At that insult and double humiliation, Thimayya should have
re-submitted his resignation to teach Nehru and Menon a lesson—
unfortunately he didn’t do so.
“...Publicly Nehru was seen to be fond of Timmy; however, behind his
back, the prime minister adopted tactics that clearly indicated that he
viewed Thimayya as a rival who could challenge his position as the
undisputed head of the Indian Union. Given the general’s track record in
World War II—Thimayya had been the first and only Indian officer to
command a fighting brigade in the Arakan where he had been awarded the
Distinguished Service Order (DSO)—and the role played by him in the
Jammu and Kashmir Operations, Nehru knew he could not browbeat
him...”{SKV/L-670} “The prime minister’s attitude towards Thimayya was
damaging to the chief as well as the army.”{SKV/L-712}
Given such a fate of the senior-most military man like Thimayya, and a
highly accomplished army-man (One of his many accomplishments: As a
Major-General in the J&K war of the late 1940s, Thimayya had taken his
tanks to a height of about 12000 feet on the snow-capped Zojila Pass—
something unique in history, as nobody had taken tanks to such heights and
in such hazardous conditions before—and routed the enemy, destroying all
their bunkers.), no self-respecting senior army-officer would have attempted
to caution Nehru or Menon on matters relating to the Indian army—it didn’t
pay to be professional, frank and honest. In other words, it didn’t pay to
raise professional objections to the civilian handling of military matters!
You couldn’t tell the truth without the fear of tongue-lashing and
victimisation.
Wrote MKK Nair:
“Krishna Menon did not respect military traditions. The Army Chief
General Thimayya was an able and multifaceted person. He had
become the general after meritorious service in Kashmir and South
Korea. The close bonding in Army is achieved by strict
enforcement of discipline. Orders flow from the General and are
carried out by hierarchical tiers. No one broke rank improperly.
Thimayya’s dignified nature brought him into conflict with the
dictatorial Krishna Menon. Differences between them worsened
when Krishna Menon, disregarding military discipline, began to
deal directly with his favoured officers. Finally Thimayya went off
to Europe to head the United Nation’s Peacekeeping Force and
General Thapar, who Krishna Menon believed would always be
obedient to him, was made the General. To do this, Menon ignored
the seniority of the brilliant General Thorat, who resigned in
protest.”{MKN}
After the retirement of Thimayya, Thapar was made the Chief of Army
Staff (COAS) at the instance of Menon and Kaul—junior, but whom Nehru
and Menon listened to—rather than Thorat, whom Thimayya had
recommended, and who had a relatively much more distinguished career.
Later, Thapar returned Kaul’s favour by making him CGS—Chief of
General Staff—ignoring the much more capable officers. In the army
hierarchy, CGS was considered next to COAS.
The debacle was a result of the complete collapse of the army command
and control. Political interference alone was not the reason, though it
became the alibi, but then, why none of the top-brass of the army stood up
to the political leadership of the day. If they were real professionals they
should have resigned if sane advice was persistently ignored. Thimayya had
resigned once. But, that was not enough. When he found there was no
follow up action from the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister, he
should have again resigned to send the right message.
But, of course, there were persons like General Varma and General
Umrao Singh who were fearless in telling the truth and refused to go along
with what the political leadership desired and paid for it: they were
summarily removed.
India’s Faulty Approach
Neville Maxwell's book ‘India's China War’ must be read, even though
it is relatively partisan to China and biased against India. Allowing for this,
here are some select extracts from Maxwell's article{Max2}:
“From the first days of India's Independence, it was appreciated that the
Sino-Indian borders had been left undefined by the departing British and
that territorial disputes with China were part of India's inheritance. China's
other neighbours faced similar problems and, over the succeeding decades
of the century, almost all of those were to settle their borders satisfactorily
through the normal process of diplomatic negotiation with Beijing...
“The Nehru government decided upon the opposite approach. India
would, through its own research, determine the appropriate alignments of
the Sino-Indian borders, extend its administration to make those good on
the ground and then refuse to negotiate the result. Barring the inconceivable
—that Beijing would allow India to impose China's borders unilaterally and
annex territory at will—Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without
foreseeing it...
“By 1958 Beijing was urgently calling for a standstill agreement to
prevent patrol clashes and negotiations to agree on boundary alignments.
India refused any standstill agreement, since it would be an impediment to
intended advances and insisted that there was nothing to negotiate, the
Sino-Indian borders being already settled on the alignments claimed by
India, through blind historical process. Then it began accusing China of
committing ‘aggression’ by refusing to surrender to Indian claims... On
October 12, 1962, Nehru proclaimed India's intention to drive the Chinese
out of areas India claimed...If Nehru had declared his intention to attack,
then the Chinese were not going to wait to be attacked...
“On October 20, the Chinese launched a pre-emptive offensive all along
the borders, overwhelming the feeble—but, in this first instance,
determined—resistance of the Indian troops and advancing some distance in
the eastern sector. On October 24, Beijing offered a ceasefire and Chinese
withdrawal on the condition that India agree to open negotiations: Nehru
refused the offer even before the text was officially received. Both sides
built up over the next three weeks, and the Indians launched a local
counterattack on November 15, arousing in India fresh expectations of total
victory...
“The Chinese then renewed their offensive. Now many units of the once
crack Indian 4th Division dissolved into rout without giving battle and, by
November 20, there was no organised Indian resistance anywhere in the
disputed territories. On that day, Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire
and intention to withdraw its forces: Nehru, this time, tacitly accepted.”
Why Fix the Borders Unilaterally?
Nehru did not take the fair and reasonable steps that India should have
taken after independence, as were stated earlier when we discussed “What
should have been done post-Independence”. Instead, Nehru aligned himself
with the maximalist position of the British on the northern borders, whether
or not agreed to by the other party or backed up by some incontrovertible
historical agreements, declared them as Indian borders, and formulated a
policy where no talks or discussions or negotiations were to be encouraged.
Quite inexplicably, the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist Nehru stepped into the
shoes of the colonialists and accepted their position on borders lock, stock
and barrel.
Arnold Toynbee, the reputed British historian, had this to remark—as
quoted by Neville Maxwell:
“It is queer that lines drawn by British officials should have been
consecrated as precious national assets of British Indian Empire’s
non-British successor states. At the time when those lines were
drawn the transaction produced no stir among the... India...
subjects... If any of them paid any attention to what Durand and
McMahon were doing, they will have written it off as just another
move in the immoral game of power politics that the British
Imperialists were playing in at the Indian tax-payers’ expense. The
present consecration of these British-made lines as heirlooms in the
successor states’ national heritages is an unexpected and unfortunate
turn of History’s wheel.”{Max/65}
Strangely and effectively, Nehru acted even more British than the
British, for he later directed that India make its physical presence felt even
in the areas the British had left alone, knowing they had manipulated the
maps!
Hadn’t Nehru once remarked, “I am the last Englishman to rule
India!”{Wolp2/23} So, he had to do something English-like! But, of course,
although Nehru might have deluded himself, that was least English-like.
British played those games and bullied others backed by their massive
military might. Besides, the sufferers on both the sides were to be foreign
nations—not their own country, the UK, which was thousands of miles
away. India didn’t have the military muscle to play British. Besides, the
potential consequences of Nehru’s stand affected India itself, not some
distant foreign country. The British were cunning, not foolish.
Also, it is a historical fact that the British did take initiatives on many
occasions with China and Tibet to firm up the borders and reach written
agreements. Even if they unilaterally claimed certain territories, they
showed keenness to get it agreed to by the other party. They didn’t just keep
silent on the issue and deluded themselves that if the other party does not
raise objections, whatever they had claimed could be assumed to have been
implicitly agreed to. In sharp contrast, and quite un-English-like, what did
that “last Englishman who ruled India” do? He counselled silence despite
GS Bajpai’s advice. He took no initiative to have the borders settled, nor did
he respond to the initiatives taken by the other party—China. Wise and
mature diplomacy indeed!
What was the main motivation of Nehru in so fixing the borders?
Nehru and his colleagues thought they were very wise and clever: if
they presented clear borders to China, as unilaterally determined by them, it
would work as a fait accompli, and China would acquiesce to them; and in
case China suggested some minor corrections, they might consider the
same. Unfortunately for them, the new China under Mao-Zhou was too
smart and too strong and ambitious and self-respecting to be brow-beaten
by mere cartographic claims.
Nehru and group had also tried to claim that with the signing of the
Panchsheel, which contained the clause of respecting each other’s territory,
China had implicitly agreed to the borders that India had shown in its maps.
But, there was a catch there. Panchsheel was signed in April 1954 when the
Indian maps brought out after independence were in vogue—that showed
the Ladakh and certain other boundaries as undefined—the new, revised
maps having been brought out only after July 1954!
Why the Intransigence?
What would beat anyone is this: Even if India had fixed the borders
unilaterally, why was Nehru so adamant on that position? Why couldn’t he
have been reasonably flexible and negotiated it in a spirit of give and take?
There might have been several reasons for it.
Reason One. If we remained firm, China would finally come round to
accepting our position.
Reason Two. Once we physically occupy the positions as per our map,
China would have no choice.
Reason Three. There may be minor skirmishes here and there, but China
would not attack.
But, how reasonable were these assumptions?
If wishful thinking substitutes hard reality, and if one wishes to make
convenient assumptions that would fit-in with one’s pipedream-like
strategy, anything is possible.
Nehru, the historian and an international-affairs expert, should have
known that with the ascendency of Peoples Republic of China (PRC ) in
1949, which in the very next year annexed Tibet despite the global uproar,
the power balance across the Himalayas had reversed—the powerful British
to the south of the Himalayas were replaced the newly independent
fledgling India, while the weak China to the north of the Himalayas was
replaced by the ambitious and determined PRC. Further, when even a very
weak China during its lean period in history refused to be bullied into
acceptance of unilaterally-drawn borders by the then super-power Britain,
why would a strong, determined China meekly accept unilaterally-fixed
borders by a weak India!
Reason Four. Nehru felt he couldn’t go back on the maps, altered at his
instance. It would mean retracting from repeatedly stated position and
published maps, resulting in loss of face. So, a single, special individual
could not lose face even if ultimately the country and crores of Indians lost
face!
The original sin was changing the maps unilaterally in 1954. Once the
new maps were published and made public, the government bound itself to
those positions, undermining its own flexibility in border negotiations.
Legally also, no territory could then have been ceded through negotiations
by a government without going through the complex constitutional and
legal process. Nehru would have undermined his own position if he had
later stated that the borders were actually not well-defined in certain
sectors, even though the new Indian maps published during his time showed
them as clear and well-demarcated.
If I go back on our position, I may even have to give up power and
resign—thought Nehru. That’s the problem with many self-proclaimed
democrats. They do not wish to give up power. Nehru had ruled for long.
Why keep sticking to one’s post. Give others a chance if you are a genuine
democrat. But, no. Not only do you yourself wish to continue, you want to
relinquish power only to your descendents. You couldn’t risk your power by
stating the honest position publicly. Nation can take risks, but not the
individual.
India’s Military “Preparation”
If you theorise that China would never attack India, where is the
question of military preparation to meet that possibility. Theorised Nehru:
“…It is inconceivable that it [China] should divert its forces and its
strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild
adventure across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will greatly
weaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus I
rule out any major attack on India by China.”{AS/48}
It was not as if the other ministers in Nehru’s cabinet and opposition
leaders had not pointed out the gross flaws in Nehru’s policy, but those
were the non-TV and non-SocialMedia days when Nehru could arrogantly
brush aside all dissenting voices; while the print-media was generally
compliant. Minister KM Munshi had pointed out to Nehru that in the
seventh century Tibetans had crossed the Himalayas, and had invaded
Kanauj.{KMM/Vol-1/175}
MR Masani had warned that the Himalayas may turn out to be no
stronger a defence than the Maginot Line turned out for France.
Wrote RNP Singh in ‘Nehru: A Troubled Legacy’: “Nehru took the
matter of defence so lightly that in an answer to a question on Indian
defence against a potential aggressor, he asserted that the nation had the
spirit to defend itself by lathis (sticks) and stones if need be; ‘Therefore, I
am not afraid of anybody invading India from any quarter.’ While
delivering a speech in Parliament, Nehru once advised in an idealistic
manner, ‘If you better your morale and determine not to surrender, nothing
can conquer you.’ Nehru… told a press conference: ‘I think the proper way
to consider defence is to begin to forget the military aspect.’”{RNPS/120}
Nehru never took the Defence portfolio seriously, and never chose a
proper, competent, full-time minister for it.
On another occasion, said Nehru:
“I think these considerations should be borne in mind, because there
is far too much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning
India. If we lose our sense of perspective and world strategy and
give way to unreasonable fears, then any policy that we might have
is likely to fail.”{AS/48}
Sadly, it was Nehru’s policy that utterly failed, and millions of Indians
paid for it.
Anyway, as markers or otherwise, once the forward posts were
established, they should at least have been adequately manned and armed,
with logistics in place, to repulse any Chinese attempt to demolish them.
But, this was not done, under the false belief that China would not attack!
Many posts remained just like markers, flying the Indian flag.
Contrast this with Sardar Patel’s action in Kashmir in 1947. Writes
Rajmohan Gandhi: “In the judgement of Sheikh Abdullah, scarcely an
uncritical Patel fan, ‘events took a decisive turn’ after Vallabhbhai’s
Srinagar visit. ‘The Sardar did not lose even one minute. He studied the
situation and said that the enemy must be driven back.’{RG/445}
Major General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown
to Srinagar the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed
Baramula on November 8.
“‘In the last week of October 1947,’ N.V. Gadgil has recalled, Patel
‘took out a map and pointing to the Jammu-Pathankot area said that
the 65-mile road between the two towns had to be made capable of
carrying heavy army traffic within eight months.’ He had seen at
once that the battle would be long. When Gadgil, the Minister for
Works, pointed out that ‘rivers, rivulets, hills and mountains’ were
not so obvious on the map, Vallabhbhai said simply, ‘You have to do
it.’ Around 10,000 workers were brought from Rajasthan in special
trains. Floodlights enabled night work. Labour camps, dispensaries,
mobile cinemas and markets supported the drive. The 65 miles were
completed on time.”{BK/369-70}
Coming back to India-China War, none of the nine deployed divisions
had full troop strength, and all were short of artillery, tanks, and other
equipment. Nehru and Krishna Menon did unconscionably little to
strengthen the military. Indian troops did not even have proper tents or
winter clothing or shoes required for high altitudes, and had not been
properly acclimatized to fighting at high altitudes. Necessary logistics and
infrastructure were not in place. General BM Kaul had himself admitted:
“One Battalion was short of 400 pairs of footwear and went into battle in
PT shoes.”
Politicisation of the army high command was also one of the reasons
India lost. Instead of heeding sound military advice, Nehru and Menon had
put in place submissive officers at the top in the military, who would carry
out their orders. Krishna Menon ill-treated people. He was offensive to the
top-brass of the military. He antagonised many through his acerbic
comments, sarcasm and supercilious behaviour. He had publicly humiliated
top brass of the army. Eventually, some of their chosen submissive officers
contributed to the humiliation of India.
General Verma had dared to put down in writing the facts of poor
operational readiness and had sent it to the higher authorities. He was asked
to withdraw his letter. He refused and wanted the letter to be put on record.
That honest, forthright and very capable officer was victimised—ultimately
he resigned. Similarly, General Umrao Singh was removed for objecting to
the reckless putting up of forward posts.
Wrote GS Bhargava in ‘The Battle of NEFA’:
“...a new class of Army Officer who could collude with politicians
to land the country in straights in which it found itself in September-
October 1962. Since qualities of heart and head ceased to be a
passport to promotion for military officers...the more ambitious
among them started currying favour with the politicians.”
Whichever domain, department, sector the bureaucrats, the babus, the
IAS stepped in that area went to dogs. Came the defence secretary and his
babudom between the army and the Defence Minister after independence,
and the results are for anyone to check. Babus, who knew next to nothing
on the defence matters, started dictating terms and making money,
politicisation and favouritism became the order of the day, and
professionalism went for a toss. Instead of exercising ‘political control’
over the military, what is exercised in practice is ‘bureaucratic control’.
Defence Secretary is the boss and the Service Chiefs have a subservient
role, with the military isolated from real decision-making! For example, the
inputs of the Indian army on the military and strategic implications of
Nehru’s forward policy were ignored.
Further, both the ruling party politicians and the opposition lacked
vision and a mature understanding of what a nation of the size of India
required, and took little interest in India’s external security. Defence
Ministry had a low priority and importance, and becoming a Defence
Minister was considered a demotion!
India’s army chief KS Thimayya had repeatedly raised the issue of
army’s gross weaknesses in defending itself from China, and had this to
comment to his fellow army-men in his farewell speech upon retirement in
1961, “I hope I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese. God
bless you all.”
General Thimayya had earlier commented:
“I cannot, even as a soldier, envisage India taking on China in an
open conflict on its own. China’s present strength in man-power,
equipment and aircraft exceeds our resources a hundredfold with the
full support of the USSR and we could never hope to match China
in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and
diplomats to ensure our security.”{Arpi/473-4}
Unfortunately, thanks to Nehru, rather than trying its best for a
negotiated settlement of borders, India persisted with its Forward Policy on
the self-deluding presumption that China would never attack: a Nehruvian
presumption, which, of all people, was backed up by the Indian Intelligence
Chief BN Mullik—such were the persons, including Krishna Menon and
Lieutenant-General BM Kaul, that Nehru had placed in critical positions.
General Thapar had submitted a note to the government in 1960
pointing out that the equipment that the Indian army had and their poor
condition was no match to that of China and even Pakistan. Prior to the
operations against China to get certain territories vacated, Thapar had
impressed upon Nehru that the Indian army was unprepared and ill-
equipped for the task it was being asked to undertake. He even got Nehru to
cross-check these stark realities from some of his senior staff. Yet, Nehru
persisted, saying China would not retaliate! General Thapar told Kuldip
Nayar on 29 July 1970, as stated by Nayar in his book: “Looking back, I
think I should have submitted my resignation at that time. I might have
saved my country from the humiliation of defeat.”{KN}
Commented Brig. Dalvi:{JPD/2}
“There was no overall political objective; no National Policy; no
grand strategy and total unreadiness for military operations in the
awesome Himalayan mountains, against a first-class land power...
“We did not study the pattern of weapons and communications
equipments that we may require. Army Schools of Instruction were
oriented towards open warfare. There was little emphasis on
mountain warfare despite the Army’s deployment in Kashmir from
1947...
“The Army was forgotten; its equipment allowed to become
obsolete, certainly obsolescent; and its training academic and
outdated. We merely tried to maintain what we had inherited in
1947...The political assumptions of our defence policies were
invalid and dangerous...”
“In October 1962 Indians were shocked beyond words to discover
that we had no modern rifle, although we were supposed to be ready
to ‘manufacture’ an aircraft; and had the know-how to make an
atom-bomb...
“Assam Rifles posts [under the forward policy] were deployed non-
tactically and they were ill-armed and even worse equipped that the
Regular Army. At best, they could only function as border check-
posts and yet their task was ‘to fight to the last man and the last
round’...There were no inter-communication facilities between
Assam Rifles’ posts and the nearest Army sub-unit...The standard
explanation was that there was a general shortage of wireless sets in
the country. The Assam Rifles was a separate private army of the
External Affairs Ministry. And who would dare bell the cat about
the extraordinary command system?”
Reportedly, at a meeting of the Defence Council in September 1962 [a
month before the Chinese attack], while the Army Commander in Ladakh
had stated, “If China attacks massively, we shall be annihilated,” the head
of the Eastern Command had said, “If China decides to come down in a big
way, we are in no position to hold it anywhere in NEFA.”
Although, despite severe handicaps, Indian soldiers did their very best,
the fact remains that it was a pathetically ill-prepared, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-
supplied, and ill-armed Indian Army—exposed to the elements, cold and
hungry—that was forced into the misadventure, and it had to pay a very
heavy price.
Despite these facts and what the senior army men had themselves
advised Nehru and Menon, Nehru stated in the Parliament: “I can tell this
House that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were
our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle...than they are today. I
am not boasting about them or comparing them with any other country’s,
but I am quite confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking
after our country.”{Max/132} How could Nehru make such wild claims? He
clearly mislead both the parliament and the people of India.
Alfred Vagts commented in ‘The History of Militarism’:
“Again and again, military men have seen themselves hurled into
war by the ambition, passions and blunders of civilian governments,
almost wholly uninformed as to the limits of their military potential
and almost recklessly indifferent to the military requirements of the
war they let loose.”{Max/289}
No Planning and No Intelligence
Like we had discussed before, despite the fact of unsettled borders,
skirmishes as far back as 1959 and the real possibility of war, there was
grossly inadequate defence preparation and no contingency plan in place.
Even assuming there had actually been no war, common sense dictated that
allowing for its possibility, alternate plans, accounting for all contingencies,
should have been in place.
That also required intelligence inputs on the Chinese preparedness, their
strategy and their weaknesses and strengths. While it seems China had
sufficient knowledge on India on all aspects relevant to winning war against
it through its network of agents; India’s intelligence was woefully poor.
Sweep Under the Carpet
People feel shocked when they learn of the background and the details
of the India-China War because under the cover of “national security
interests” things have been hidden away from the public, despite such a
long lapse of time.
Writes Brigadier JP Dalvi: “The people of India want to know the truth
but have been denied it on the dubious ground of national security. The
result has been an unhealthy amalgam of innuendo, mythology, conjecture,
outright calumny and sustained efforts to confuse and conceal the truth.
Even the truncated NEFA Enquiry [Henderson-Brooks Report] has been
withheld except for a few paraphrased extracts read out to the Lok Sabha on
2nd September 1963. For some undisclosed reason, I was not asked to give
evidence [despite being on the frontline during the war] before this body
nor (to the best of my knowledge) were my repatriated Commanding
Officers [Dalvi and others were taken prisoner by the Chinese and released
in 1963].”{JPD/xv}
No democratic country remains so secretive. Both the UK and the USA,
as also other democratic countries, make all official documents available
after a lapse of certain years, as per their law, so that historians, academics,
researchers, experts, leaders and others can study them. This helps writing
of correct history, drawing proper conclusions, and learning lessons for the
future. It helps countries learn and improve themselves. But, in India, the
leaders and the bureaucrats are ever afraid of their incompetence and
dishonesty being exposed. They are bothered about their present and their
survival, the future of the country is not their business.
You ignore history and its lessons at your own peril and hence, to draw
useful lessons for future from the debacle, it is necessary to raise
uncomfortable questions.
Any democratic country, worth its salt, would have instituted a detailed
enquiry into all aspects of the debacle: “What was the nature of the border
dispute? Why the issue was not resolved through talks? Why didn’t India
settle it in 1954 itself at the time of signing the Panchsheel? Was Indian
position justified? Did Chinese arguments have substance? Why did India
change its maps in 1954—on what grounds? Were there solid grounds for
India to be so adamant on its stand? Why was the Chinese offer of a swap-
deal on McMahon Line and Aksai Chin not accepted? Why was the forward
policy adopted? Why the Indian defence preparedness was so poor? Had
there been politicisation of the army? Why was the Indian performance in
the war so pathetic? What should be India’s stand going forward? How to
resolve the dispute? How to strengthen India’s defence?...”. Accountability
should have been established and those responsible should have got their
just desserts. The findings of the enquiry should have been made public,
along with a road-map for the future. That’s democracy!
But, what happened in practice? Nothing! The government was brazen
enough not to set up a comprehensive enquiry. Why let their own mistakes
be found? Why punish themselves? Why be made to resign? Why vacate
your positions? People don’t deserve to know! It was an autocratic
democracy. Don’t disclose—cite “national interest”. Although, it was not
national interest, but pure self-interest, that drove the decision. Sweep under
carpet whatever is unpalatable. Just put all the blame on the Chinese and on
a few scapegoats.
The above would be obvious from the following. During the lull in the
war—24 October to 13 November 1962—this is what Nehru said in the
Rajya Sabha on 9 November 1962: “People have been shocked, all of us
have been shocked, by the events that occurred from October 20 onwards,
especially of the first few days, and the reverses we suffered. So I hope
there will be an inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were
committed and who were responsible for them.” During the lull period
India was making its preparations and those in power in Delhi were sure
India would give a befitting reply to the Chinese. However, the subsequent
war of 14-20 November 1962 proved even more disastrous. Sensing its
consequence upon him, Nehru conveniently forgot about the enquiry.
Although no enquiry was set up by the Indian Cabinet or the
Government, the new Chief of Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, did set up
an Operations Review Committee headed by Lieutenant-General TB
Henderson-Brooks, aka HB, of the Indian army—an Australian-born,
second-generation English expatriate who had opted to be an Indian, rather
than a British, citizen in the 1930s—with Brigadier Premendra
Singh Bhagat, Victoria Cross, then commandant of the Indian Military
Academy, as a member. However, the terms of reference of the Committee
were never published; it had no power to examine witnesses or call for
documents; and it had no proper legal authority. The purpose was to ensure
it didn’t morph into a comprehensive fact-finding mission that could
embarrass the government. Reportedly, its terms of reference were very
restrictive confined perhaps to only the 4 Corps’ operations. However,
going by the fact that the report, referred to as the Henderson-Brooks
Report or Henderson-Brooks/Bhagat Report or HB/B Report—submitted in
April 1963—of even such a handicapped Committee has been kept
classified and top secret even till today signifies that the Committee went
beyond its limited terms of reference, did some very good work and
managed to nail the root causes, which the powers that be wanted to remain
hidden. Perhaps, had the HB report been made public, Nehru would have
had to resign.
Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’{KN}: “...in September 1970,
[General] Thapar [who headed the army at the time of the war] approached
Indira Gandhi...to allow him to see the [HB] report... She did not however
concede the request...When I was a Rajya Sabha member from 1996, I
wanted the report to be made public. The government refused to do so ‘in
public interest’. My hunch was that the report had so severely criticized
Nehru that the government, even headed by the BJP, did not want to face
the public anger that would have been generated... I used the RTI facilities
in 2008 when I wanted access to the Henderson Brooks inquiry report...[but
didn’t succeed]...”
As per the Hindustan Times report titled 'Incorrect maps given to China
led to 1962 war' of 22 October 2012: “...India presented contradictory maps
on the McMahon Line to China in the fifties and in 1960-61, which
ultimately led to the war with China in 1962. This revelation was made by
Wajahat Habibullah, former chief information commissioner (CIC), perhaps
the only civilian besides defence secretaries to have officially accessed the
top secret Henderson Brookes-Bhagat report. ‘We had given maps with
serious contradictions on the layout of the McMahon Line to China. This
led the Chinese to believe that one of the pickets being controlled by our
forces in the Northeast was theirs—according to one of the maps given to
them by us,’ said Habibullah, declining to name the picket along the
Arunachal Pradesh border with China...Accordingly, on October 20, 1962,
the Chinese army crossed over to occupy the border picket, leading to open
hostilities...Habibullah got the go-ahead to access to the report after
journalist Kuldip Nayar's appeal under the RTI Act in 2005 [or, was it
2008?] to get a copy of the report.”
Writes Claude Arpi: “Unfortunately, historians and researchers have
never been allowed access to original materials to write about Nehru's
leadership during the troubled years after Independence. It is tragic that the
famous 'Nehru Papers' are jealously locked away in the Nehru Memorial
Library. They are, in fact, the property of his family! I find it even more
regrettable that during its six years in power, the NDA government, often
accused of trying to rewrite history, did not take any action to rectify this
anomaly. Possibly they were not interested in recent history! ...As a result,
today history lovers and serious researchers have only the 31 volumes
published so far of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (covering the
period 1946 to 1955) to fall back on. This could be considered a partial
declassification of the Nehru Papers, except for the fact that the editing has
always been undertaken by Nehruvian historians, making at times the
selection tainted. The other problem is that these volumes cover only the
writings (or sayings) of Nehru; notes or letters of other officials or
dignitaries which triggered Nehru's answers are only briefly and
unsatisfactorily resumed in footnotes.”{Arpi2}
Neglecting to Use Air-Force
Had a proper plan been in place, surely the usage of air-force in case of
inability to resist China on land would have been factored in. But, that was
not done. Also, because India had inadequate inputs on the Chinese air-
force strength. Why weren’t the various war-scenarios discussed threadbare
well in advance of the actual commencement of the war, as part of the
planning? Why were we so wanting in the very basics of war?
Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne said in October 2012 that had the IAF
been allowed in an offensive role, the outcome of the 1962 war would have
been different. However, IAF’s role was confined only to providing
transportation to the Army. Even former Air Vice Marshal AK Tewary had
opined that India could have defeated China in the 1962 war had its air
force been used. He mentioned that the then political–bureaucratic combine
—we shall later take up Nehru’s SOS to the US—sought the help of the US
Air Force without even consulting the IAF leadership. As per the official
history, no notings or documents are available to explain the decision to
forego the use of offensive air support.
It is worth noting that the British, during the pre-independence period,
had planned for the use of air-force in the region if warranted. Wrote
Claude Arpi in ‘1962 and the McMahon Line Saga’: “…also look into the
British policy towards Tibet and even the possibility for India to militarily
defend the Roof of the World. A detailed plan was prepared by the War
Office for the purpose… Interestingly, the operations were planned with 7
squadrons of the RAF. Unfortunately 15 years later the Government of
India had forgotten that the Air Force could be used in the Himalayan
region.”{Arpi/17-18}
Israel’s Example
Here is an example—in glaring contrast. Israel successfully repelled the
combined attack from Egypt and Syria in 1973—what has come to be
known as the Yom Kipper War. After its decisive victories against the Arabs
in 1967, Israel was a little laid back and unprepared, thinking there
wouldn’t be any further wars. The attack of 1973 therefore came as a
surprise to it. Still, after the initial setbacks and panic, it rose to the
challenge. Golda Meir was the president then. Even though Israel’s
ultimate victory was spectacular and decisive, they immediately instituted
an enquiry to fix responsibility for the initial setbacks and the panic
reaction, and the lapses that led to the attack coming as a surprise. The
preliminary report took just a few months and was released on
April 2, 1974—it actually named names of those responsible. Several top-
ranking staff were asked to resign. Golda Meir was not named, but taking
overall responsibility, she resigned on April 10, 1974—after mere eight
days of release of the report, which was only a preliminary report!
This, even though Israel, under Golda Meir, had actually won the war
and turned the tables on the Arab countries that had attacked them! But
here, even though India lost pathetically, Nehru government instituted no
enquiry, Nehru did not even make a gesture of an offer to resign, and the
report of the Committee set up by the army was kept under wraps on the
specious pretext of “national interest”—Israeli government could have also
pleaded “national interest” to suppress its report. So much for our
democracy!!
Not Taking Responsibility
Such was the economy practised in sharing information with the public,
the media, and even the parliament, and such was the economy with truth in
Nehru’s democratic India that the blame came not on Nehru, the principal
person responsible, but on Menon. Such was the ignorance of the
opposition that Kripalani and others asked Nehru to take over the defence
portfolio from Menon! The poor fellows had no idea that the disaster both
in the foreign policy and in the defence was actually thanks to Nehru.
Menon became Defence Minister only in 1957.
Krishna Menon was reluctantly made the scapegoat. COAS Thapar
resigned. BM Kaul resigned. But, not Nehru.
Writes JP Dalvi: “When the inevitable disaster came Nehru did not even
have grace or courage to admit his errors or seek a fresh mandate from the
people. He did not even go through the motion of resigning; he merely
presented his trusted colleagues and military appointees as sacrificial
offerings...{JPD/249}
“Instead of gracefully accepting responsibility for erroneous policies,
the guilty men sought alibis and scapegoats. In any developed democracy
the Government would have been replaced, instead of being allowed to
continue in office and sit in judgement on their subordinates...{JPD/161}
“We must also learn that a democracy has no room for proven failures.
This is not a matter of sentiment. Mr Chamberlain was removed after Hitler
invaded France in May 1940 with Cromwell’s classic plea, ‘For God’s sake,
go’. Mr Anthony Eden was forced out of office after the disastrous Suez
adventure of 1956...”{JPD/161}
Nehru initially fended off pressure from a section of the Congress and
the opposition for removal of Menon. He told Yashwant Rao Chavan who
had come to Delhi to attend a meeting of the Chief Ministers: “You see,
they want Menon’s blood. If I agree, tomorrow they will ask for my
blood.”{DD/364}
Finding it difficult to resist pressure, Nehru played his old game of a
threat of his own resignation. Nehru had threatened to resign on several
earlier occasions to have his way safe in the knowledge that people would
back off. But, not this time. When he found that the trick won’t work and he
himself would have to go, he quickly backed off and asked Menon to
resign. Meanwhile Indira Gandhi had approached Vice-President Zakir
Hussain to persuade her father to drop Menon, as that was the only way to
appease the enraged public and the media.
Nehru actually remonstrated with those who criticised him, and later
even took revenge against some!
What was the alibi offered to the gullible public? The nation was told
that the borders were well-settled, and that the unprovoked attack from
China was what the innocent India got for doing all the good to China. Even
Rajaji, otherwise in opposition to Nehru by then, blamed it on the treachery
of the Chinese. Perhaps, at that time Rajaji did not know all the details.
You do a Himalayan blunder, but you receive sympathy—Nehru, the
poor chap, was stabbed in the back by the Chinese! How publicised
misinformation can turn the scales. Everyone remembers a popular song of
those times penned by poet Pradeep and sung by Lata Mangeshkar. It went
like this: "Aai mere watan ke logo, jara aankh me bhar lo paani, jo shaheed
hue hai unki, jara yaad karo kurbani..." The song is invariably played on
August 15 every year. Lata told in an interview when she had sung that
song in Nehru's presence, Nehru had wept! So sensitive was he!! Again,
additional praise. But, who was responsible for his own tears and tears in
the eyes of crores of Indians, in the first place? Had sensible policies been
followed, this huge tragedy that befell the nation, and the consequent tears,
could have been avoided.
Reactions of the Media and the Public
Apart from what has already been discussed, here are a few additional
aspects and the reactions of the media and the public.
Were the public and the media aware of the various dimensions of the
dispute?
No, certainly not.
The Cabinet, Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Parliament, the
media and the people at large should have been kept aware of the facts of
the northern borders soon after independence and should have been updated
from time to time, but it was not done, resulting in several negatives: wrong
impression among the public on the historical and the current status of the
boundaries; unilateral formulation of border-policies; no one to correct the
wrong course.
How could vital issues be kept hidden away from the public and the
Parliament in a democracy? Was it not imprudent, undemocratic and
irresponsible on the part of the opposition too and even other members of
the Congress itself to have allowed the policy-formulations to be hijacked
by an individual, to have permitted things to be kept under the wraps, and to
have allowed the nation to be misled? At the political level and at the
bureaucratic and the External Affairs Ministry level the convenient and
irresponsible adage was “Panditji knows best!”
For such an important national issue that cut across party lines, a
special, broad-based committee of senior politicians and parliamentarians
from both the ruling party and the opposition and knowledgeable
academics, bureaucrats and army-men should have been formed.
People only knew what had been told to them officially. And, the
official version was what Nehru desired people to know. That the borders
were what the Indians maps showed—after July 1954. People didn’t know
the maps had been changed unilaterally by India. People were told the
borders were well-demarcated.
Even on the developments leading up to the war, there was little clarity.
The Times of India of 15 August 1962 commented: “Anyone reading the
latest White Paper on Sino-Indian relations together with some of the
speeches by the prime minister and defence minister on the subject may be
forgiven for feeling that the government’s China policy, like chopsuey,
contains a bit of everything—firmness and conciliation, bravado and
caution, sweet reasonableness and defiance… We have been variously
informed… that the situation on the border is both serious and not-so-
serious; that we have got the better of the Chinese and they have got the
better of us; that the Chinese are retreating and that they are advancing…”
So what was the reaction of the media and the public?
Given the impression of clear borders, when news on border-skirmishes
broke out, the media, the opposition and the general public, and even
majority within the Congress not aware of the full facts, felt enraged at
China’s designs.
All patriotic Indians resented violation of our peace-loving country’s
borders. They were all dismayed by such action of China after all the
“Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” friendliness shown to them. There was a feeling
of betrayal.
Parliamentarians, the opposition and the majority within the Congress
heckled the government and pressed for action to get our territories vacated.
They wanted a befitting reply from India. There was jingoism all around.
And what was the reaction after the attack and the debacle?
China’s was an unprovoked aggression on the peace-loving, innocent
India. Nehru—the gentleman, the idealist, who was so nice with the
Chinese and trusted them—was stabbed in the back by them.
The defeat grievously hurt the Indian psyche—you were not only a poor,
condemned nation, begging the world for food, you were also a defenceless
nation, begging the world to save you. What was worse, the stigma of
cowardice got attached to you for your poor showing in the war! Did "long
years ago we made a tryst with destiny..." for this denouement—to be
humiliated in full view of the world!
But what about the military debacle?
Myth substituted facts: The debacle was because Chinese took us by
surprise, attacked suddenly and in vast numbers—it was a Himalayan Pearl
Harbour. What could our forces—much smaller in numbers—do? Chinese
came like locusts. They didn’t care if their soldiers died. If the one Chinese
soldier in front was killed, his weapon was grabbed by the one behind, who
took over, and so on. Our soldiers were brave, but how many would they
kill!
All such talks suited those in power in India, and they encouraged such
nonsense.
Why the opposition and the media didn’t try to get at the truth?
Things had been so well manipulated and the media had so raised the
stature of Nehru that he practically became a dictator in a democracy and
none dared find fault with his working.
The narrative of Chinese betrayal and its duplicity was so well played
out that none cast doubts on the legitimacy of the Indian claims and the
failure of Indian political leadership to reach a negotiated settlement.
All blame was laid at the door of the Chinese. Those in power, who
wanted to save themselves, took recourse to stoking popular jingoism and
ensured there was no scrutiny of official policies that contributed to the war
and the failure. Questioning official policy, raising uncomfortable questions
was dubbed unpatriotic.
Brigadier JP Dalvi writes: “1962 was a national failure of which every
Indian is guilty. It was a failure in higher directions of war, a failure of the
opposition, a failure of the general staff (myself included): it was a failure
of responsible public opinion and the press. For the Government of India, it
was a Himalayan blunder at all levels.”{JPD/xv}
Summarising Himalayan Blunders
Let’s summarise what India got out of Nehru’s China policy. Loss of
territory. Unsettled borders. Friendly neighbour turning foe. State of
conflict with China. Huge financial burden. International ignominy.
Humiliation of Indians before the world. India being accused of having
actually provoked the war. India being dubbed a bully.
Incidentally, Nehru himself had this to admit, “We were getting out of
touch with reality in the modern world and we were living in an artificial
atmosphere of our creation.”{Zak/149} The then president, Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan, indicted the government for its “credulity and negligence”.
India-China war was not on account of one blunder or mistake. It was
thanks to a series of blunders by Nehru and the many missed opportunities
to settle the matter peacefully, which we have already discussed in detail.
Let us summarise them briefly.
Blunder-1. Allowing Tibet to be annexed by China, and recognising
China’s claim over Tibet. This allowed Tibet-India borders to become
China-India borders, bringing with it all the associated problems.
Blunder-2. Adopting a unilateral maximalist border alignment as per the
British legacy ignoring the absence of a legal bilateral agreement. Being
inflexible about it.
Blunder-3. Signing Panchsheel agreement with China in 1954 without
first settling the borders.
Blunder-4. Changing of Indian maps unilaterally after July 1954 without
mutual discussions with the other party—China.
Blunder-5. Nehru’s refusal to consider the proposal of the Chinese
delegation in 1960 of East-West give-and-take swap on the McMahon Line
and Aksai Chin.
Blunder-6. Non-forward-looking forward policy of establishing
indefensible border posts in disputed areas, provoking China or giving
excuse to China to attack.
Blunder-7. Absurd assumption on the part of Nehru and his close group
that China would not attack even if India established certain posts in the
disputed areas.
Nehru & Co had forgotten or were unaware of the wise words of Sun
Tzu (545-470 BCE: a Chinese general, military strategist, and a
philosopher): “The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the
enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the
chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our
position unassailable.”
Blunder-8. Once the forward posts were established, they should at least
have been adequately manned and armed, with logistics in place, to repulse
any Chinese attempt to demolish them.
Blunder-9. Politicisation of the army high command. Favouritism.
Putting in place sycophants and submissive officers at top positions who
would kowtow to political bosses. Eventually, some of these chosen
submissive officers contributed to the humiliation of India.
Blunder-10. Gross neglect of defence and external security.
Blunder-11. Appointment by Nehru of insufferably arrogant and
incompetent protégé Krishna Menon as Defence Minister.
Blunder-12. Nehru’s indiscretion of publicly declaring on
12 October 1962, barely 8 days before the war started, that he had
instructed the Army to "evict the Chinese"! Does one give operational
orders publicly? Wars are meant to be waged silently and anonymously.
Mature nations and mature leaders are not expected to indulge in empty
bluffs! There was no worth-while plan to either evict the Chinese, or to
resist them if they attacked!!
Blunder-13. After mere 4 days of fighting, during which the damage had
not been too much, China offered a ceasefire on 24 October 1962
suggesting withdrawal by 20km by both the sides from the line of actual
control, followed by talks and negotiated settlement on the border-dispute.
Nehru didn’t agree! India’s major humiliation in the war happened later
after 14 November 1962—that could have been avoided, had India taken up
the Chinese offer.
Blunder-14. On 21 November 1962 China declared unilateral ceasefire
and offered the same terms it offered on 24 October 1962 and again
suggested talks, discussions, joint ground survey and negotiated settlement.
India agreed for ceasefire, but did not take up the offer for talks. It was
worth resolving the dispute.
Blunder-15. Nehru should have done whatever it took to amicably settle
the border-dispute with China, and should not have left it open for the
generations to follow, like he did for Kashmir, because with the passage of
time, as China became stronger and stronger, settlement became difficult.
Blunder-16. Nehru should have set up a fully-empowered Commission
for a comprehensive enquiry into all aspects of the debacle with a mandate
to recommend action against the negligent and the guilty and suggestions
for the steps to be taken going forward. The findings should have been
made public. That was the minimum expected of a democratic country.
However, nothing of the sort was done.
Blunder-17. Nehru should have resigned in the aftermath of the rout.
Not just offered to resign—the offer he didn’t make anyway—he should
have actually resigned or should have been made to resign. Democratic
norms demanded it. It would have been a good lesson for the future politics
of India—you can’t do such a major blunder, yet continue in power. Not
just as a lesson, but also on account of its beneficial effects. Had he
resigned another competent person—and there were many, “After Nehru
who?” being just a self-serving charade—who would not have carried
Nehru’s baggage, would have looked at the issue afresh and reached a
permanent settlement on the borders with China.
Nehru’s Insufferably Arrogant Protégé
Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, was Nehru’s insufferably
arrogant protégé. He brought discredit to India and dishonour to the Indian
army. He was one of the main persons responsible for the humiliation of
crores of Indians in the disastrous India-China war.
Soon after Independence, Krishna Menon was appointed high
commissioner to the UK, and remained in that post till 1952. He joined the
Union Cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio in 1956, and became the
Defence Minister in 1957.
All through, he owed his positions to Nehru—and to Nehru alone, for
hardly anyone else, whether in the Congress Party or in the Opposition,
whether in the bureaucracy or in the military, ever liked him or respected
him. In fact, they all hated him. He had no worthwhile achievement in his
long career that he could be proud of, yet his ego—obviously, an empty one
—was unbearable. He was insufferably arrogant, incurably intolerant, and
had an acid tongue. He was the person, as someone described him, who
believed that “hatred is stronger than love”. He wore a lean and hungry look
—with his nose resembling a vulture’s beak.
While being in various positions, he also dabbled in foreign affairs—
thanks to Nehru’s backing. Among his foreign affairs indulgences was
ranting against the US. Reportedly, Nehru wanted to take Krishna Menon in
the Cabinet, after Independence, but this was firmly opposed by Gandhi. He
was then made High Commissioner in London.
Khushwant Singh had worked in the Indian High Commission in
London under Krishna Menon, and this is what he had to say about Krishna
Menon in his autobiography ‘Truth, Love and a Little Malice’:{KS}
“I had briefly met Krishna Menon in my college days and had not
detected any signs of genius [as claimed by some] in him. He was a
sour-tempered barrister without briefs and spent his energies
building up his India League and paying court to Pandit Nehru
whenever he was in England. His appointment as High
Commissioner was badly received in India and the Indian
community in England as gross favouritism.{KS/118}
“...he set up many sub-organisations of his India League and got
money from rich Indians and his English friends as donations to his
organisations; in return, he gave the latter contracts for supply of
arms to India. He had no scruples in business matters. He was also a
congenital liar and regarded truth as good enough for the simple-
minded and lying as the best exercise for the mind.{KS/143}
“...Why Menon got where he did under the patronage of Pandit
Nehru remains, and probably will remain, unexplained.{KS/152}
“...General Shiv Varma summed him up aptly when he said, 'Menon
was a bachelor, the same as his father.’”{KS/153}
Wrote MO Mathai:
“Criticism of Krishna Menon in parliament became fiercer and
fiercer. In the meantime, visitors returning from London, including
Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, reported the virtual breakdown of work at
India House…”{Mac/164}
“The first person I met [in London] was Dr Handoo, an old friend
and supporter of Krishna Menon. He told me that Krishna Menon
was an ill man and almost mad. He was taking luminol and other
powerful drugs on the sly. He added that he was surprised at the PM
keeping him on in office.”{Mac/165}
Krishna Menon had engaged in a number of shady deals for the
Government while in London as High Commissioner. Jeep Scandal Case of
1948 was only one of the scandals—it happened soon after independence.
While Indian High Commissioner to UK, he finalised a Defence deal
with a firm in London with capital assets of barely £605 and placed orders
in July 1948 for supply of 2000 rugged, all-terrain army jeeps urgently
required for Kashmir operations within five months, with deliveries to
commence within six weeks. Menon paid a large sum of £1,72,000 to the
supplier upfront, before even a single vehicle was delivered. The first batch,
which was to arrive in India within 6 weeks, arrived in March 1949, after 8
months, by when ceasefire in J&K had already been declared—on January
1, 1949. The initial batch of 155 jeeps that landed at Madras port were
found to be all unserviceable. Defence official, who inspected the jeeps,
rejected the entire shipment.
PAC—Public Accounts Committee—conducted an enquiry, passing
severe strictures, and recommended judicial enquiry to fix responsibility for
the scam. But, the Government did nothing. When there was a clamour in
the Parliament, the Government simply tabled its note to PAC to reconsider
its recommendation, and asked the House to treat the matter as closed! This
was in 1954. PAC, however, again revived the issue in its next report to the
Parliament in 1955. Thereupon, the Home Minister Pant, at the instance of
Nehru, simple announced in the Parliament that the Government had taken
a final decision to treat the matter as closed! How could government close a
clear case of gross corruption without taking any action, ignoring PAC’s
recommendations!! We are these days aghast at the government attitude
towards the CAG and how it manipulates the PAC and the JPC, but was the
Nehruvian past any better?
How could they be so brazen? Well, the House was dominated by the
Congress, the Opposition was miniscule, media was pliable, there was no
TV, and Nehru—the democrat(!)—could afford to be authoritarian. One
could ask: How could one ignore a clear case of corruption and
incompetence, especially when it concerned our security and territorial
integrity, and adversely affected our army operations in Kashmir? But, why
get agitated on this? Nehru later made this same person, Krishna Menon,
India’s Defence Minister.
But, of course, Nehru was not corrupt. He was honest. There! You have
a parallel with Manmohan Singh. Is it sufficient for a prime minister to be
personally financially honest? Is it ok for him to let others make money? Is
it not gross dereliction of duty on the part of PMs to allow loot under their
watch? And PMs who allow that—are they fit to be PMs? Manmohan
Singh is any way a weak PM, with no personal following or base. He is a
Babu who is happy being a PM—something he could never have been on
his own strength. But, that was not the case with Nehru. He was the most
powerful among the PMs so far in India, who could do as he wished.
Despite not having contributed anything worthwhile as the High
Commissioner in London, Menon rose to become a cabinet minister, again
thanks to Nehru. Being a “chamcha” is a very useful quality. People like
chamchagiri more than competence. And if you happen to propound similar
views—leftism, communism, anti-Americanism—so much the better.
This is from ‘Left out by history’ by Inder Malhotra in ‘The Indian
Express’ of 6 March 2007 about Krishna Menon:
“...The [top secret] file contained only two documents and their
originator, MI5, Britain's internal intelligence and counter-espionage
agency,...One was the transcript of a telephonic conversation between
Sudhir Ghosh, PRO at India House, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in New
Delhi. As Khushwant Singh, then Ghosh's deputy, has recorded more than
once, [Sardar] Patel, as home and information minister, had installed Ghosh
in London to ‘spy’ on [Krishna] Menon. The second document was a copy
of a brief but sensitive communication Menon had sent to V.M. Molotov,
the Soviet foreign minister. Describing the message as ‘sinister’, MI5 had
added that it had obtained the highly secret paper ‘through our usual
method’...The redoubtable Sardar [Patel] obviously shared MI5's view of
Menon. If he could have helped it, he would have prevented his
appointment as high commissioner. This, he knew, as an arch-realist, was
impossible, given [Krishna] Menon's proximity to and friendship with
Jawaharlal Nehru. So he did the next best thing, and planted a spook in the
high commission.
“...Nehru's decision, soon afterwards, to appoint Menon defence
minister was not a fortunate one...his bossiness, bullying and a proclivity to
create cliques led to trouble. He dragged the Officer Corps into the vortex
of politics and himself got mired in the politicking of the top brass. His
classic clash with General KS Thimayya, a fine professional with
unparalleled popularity among the troops, followed. Its consequences were
catastrophic... Menon lasted as long as he did entirely because of unstinted
support by Nehru...”
Incidentally, even Krishna Menon’s predecessor, Kailashnath Katju, had
done precious little as Defence Minister.
Truth is stranger than fiction: Krishna Menon had reportedly turned
several arms manufacturing facilities into production lines for pressure-
cookers, coffee-percolators and hairpins—and was proud of it! Repeated
warnings by the top army brass that the army was woefully ill-prepared to
face the Chinese threat, and their repeated requests for funds and arms, fell
on deaf ears.
Menon was reported to have insultingly remarked about General
Thapar: “That toothless old woman; he did not know how to fight a war.”
Parliamentarians from all parties demanded somebody’s head—Menon’s
or Nehru’s. Nehru realised that they may not stop with Menon. He told
Yashwantrao Chavan, who was then in New Delhi to attend the the meeting
of Chief Ministers: “You see, they want Menon’s blood. If I agree,
tomorrow they ask for my blood.”{DD/364}
In “How to make foes and alienate people” in ‘The Indian Express’ of 6
February 2012, Inder Malhotra writes: “Thus it was that even after the full-
blooded Chinese invasion, Nehru ignored the countrywide outcry for
Menon’s ouster. But the pressure of public opinion was too strong. Nehru
took 11 days to divest his protégé of the defence portfolio which he took
over himself but retained Menon as minister of defence production. This
arrangement could not have been sustained in any case but Menon made
this impossible. True to type, he thumbed his nose at his critics and
declared: ‘Nothing has changed. I am sitting in the same room and doing
the same work.’...This led to a virtual revolt within the Congress party.
Mahavir Tyagi, Nehru’s ‘comrade’ since the freedom struggle, told him at
an acrimonious conclave that if he did not sack Menon he might himself
have to go. On November 7, Nehru announced that he had accepted
Menon’s resignation. Over this there was as much glee in the United States
as in India.”{IM1}
Actually, Krishna Menon was no more than Nehru's minion. He had no
standing of his own. He was a nobody in the Congress Party. On his own,
he didn’t count for anything in the country at large. Yet, most people
blamed only Krishna Menon for the debacle—without accepting that the
real architect of the nation's tragedy was Nehru himself. Wrote Durga Das:
“The fact of the matter is that Nehru felt gnawing of conscience throughout
this episode [Menon’s resignation]. He knew that the blame for the [India-
China war] disaster was more his than that of his loyal friend.”{DD/366}
THE CURRENT STATUS
There has been no border settlement yet, although there have been a
number of Sino-Indian Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and
Agreements to maintain the border calm.
Both countries are supposed to respect the Line of Actual Control
(LAC) as on 7 November 1959, as was proposed by China when it declared
unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962. LAC is supposed to be the
McMahon Line in the east and the “traditional borders” in other areas—in
the Ladakh region it is approximately the same as the Macartney-
MacDonald Line. As none of them are well-demarcated, there are differing
interpretations by each side on the location of LAC in several sub-
segments, leading to periodic “incidents” or “incursions” or
“confrontations”—mostly minor—and consequent protests. An uneasy calm
prevails.
The current changed scenario on account of substantial economic
cooperation between the two countries—China is now India’s biggest
trading partner—ought to lead to resolution of this old border issue.
However, intransigence on both sides remains a factor in finding a solution.
The other major factor coming in the way is the dramatic enhancement of
China’s status as an economic and military power. As it grows stronger,
China seems to think it can afford to assert itself to get a better bargain.
Also, unlike in the past, it is in no hurry to settle the dispute.
What China was agreeable for in the fifties and the sixties, it is no
longer agreeable anymore. Now that Tibet is firmly merged within it, it is
claiming all those rights and areas that Tibet had been claiming, including
those to the south of the McMahon Line. For example, China has laid claim
to Tawang on the grounds that it is the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama and
is thus central to Tibetan Buddhism, as if China cares much either about
Tibet or about Buddhism! On such flimsy grounds, China can claim
Mongolia too—the 4th Dalai Lama was born in Mongolia!!
There is time for everything, and we missed the bus in the fifties and the
sixties. China was then willing for a package East-West give-and-take swap
on the McMahon Line and Aksai Chin. It was good for both. India should
have agreed.
It would now be reasonable for both the countries to make legal what is
already, by and large, in the possession of the two countries by agreeing on
a package deal whereby (a)the Tibet-Ladakh Macartney-MacDonald Line
of 1899 in the west, which would leave Aksai Chin to China, (b)the Tibet-
Arunachal Pradesh McMahon Line of 1914 in the east, which would firm
up Indian rights over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, and (c)the LAC or
the traditional boundary in the middle sector are accepted, with suitable
adjustments, in a spirit of give and take. The revised borders should be
given new Indian/Chinese names.
{ 5 }
FOREIGN POLICY &
EXTERNAL SECURITY
INNOCENT ON BRITISH INTENTIONS
The “foreign-affairs-expert and internationalist” Nehru, and Gandhi
were totally out of depth in assessing the actual vested interests of Britain
(and the West) that drove it to deliberately favour the Muslim leadership,
and partition India. Their (Britain and the West) interest was (a)to protect
their oil-interests in the middle-east, and (b)to have an ally against the
communist Russia in the cold war. That was possible if the area adjoining
the middle-east and Russia was under their influence. That is the area that
they ensured ultimately went as Pakistan and PoK, where the Muslim
League was willing to toe their line.
If they (Britain and the West) had the comfort that undivided India and
the Congress would be their ally, there would have been NO partition, and
no Kashmir problem.
Had Nehru and Gandhi been wise enough to understand the British
game, they could have easily played their own game. Either be genuinely
pro-West, and anti-communists, or at least keep up that pretence till well
after the British departure, and till you are strong enough militarily. But,
immature Nehru kept flaunting his socialistic, pro-communist, pro-Russia
bend. And, Gandhi made such a person India’s first PM. Had it been anti-
communist Patel as the first PM, things might have been different.
J&K : A FOREIGN POLICY FAILURE
Nehru’s policy and strategy in J&K—part of the Foreign Policy, in a
way, particularly after its reference to the UN—actually gave birth to the
Kashmir Problem. He failed to solve the problem he had himself created,
and actually made it more complicated.
Even after doing the initial few blunders on Kashmir, Nehru could have
retrieved the situation had he heeded the sane advice of Sardar Patel and
others, but he was too arrogant, and too sold out to Mountbatten to do any
course correction. Instead, he kept making the bad situation worse and
worse by committing more and more blunders.
For details, please refer to the separate chapter on Kashmir. The problem
still bedevils us, bleeds us tremendously in terms of men, money and
materials, and remains a nuclear flash-point.
LETTING GO OF GWADAR
Gwadar is a port-city on the Arabian Sea on the south-western coast of
Baluchistan province in Pakistan. It is located opposite Oman across the
sea, near the border with Iran, and to the east of the Persian Gulf. Gwadar is
a warm-water, deep-sea port, and it has a strategic location between South
Asia, Central Asia and West Asia at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, just
outside the Straits of Hormuz. The operations of Gwadar’s strategic sea port
were handed over by Pakistan to China in 2013. Now, thanks to the Chinese
money and expertise, Gwadar is all set to emerge as Pakistan's third largest
port. Gwadar will be the southern point and the sea terminal of the $46
billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will extend to
Kashgar in Xinjiang. The CPEC is part of China’s "One Belt, One Road"
(OBOR).
Gwadar was not owned by the British at the time of independence.
Gwadar was an overseas possession of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman
—it was given as a gift to Oman by the Khan of Kalat in 1783—until
Pakistan purchased the territory on 8 September 1958. Pakistan assumed its
control on 8 December 1958, and the territory was later integrated into
Baluchistan province on 1 July 1970 as Gwadar District.
Oman was on good terms with India, and Sultan of Oman had offered to
sell Gwadar to India for mere one million US dollars. However, India under
Nehru did not take the offer, and let go of such an excellent strategic
location. It was ultimately purchased by Pakistan on 8 September 1958 for
three million US dollars.
It had the great potential of a deep water port (which China is now
exploiting), but Nehru didn't have the foresight to appreciate its critical
benefit. Even if Nehru didn't see much use of the place then as a deep water
port, India should have acquired it, so that it could have been used as a
bargaining chip with Pakistan, vis-à-vis Kashmir and other matters.
In hindsight, not accepting the priceless gift from the Sultan of Oman
was a huge mistake at par with the long list of post-independence strategic
blunders by Nehru.
GIVING AWAY OF INDIAN TERRITORY.
An error in the Indian maps shows territory as large as Sikkim or Goa in
Arunachal Pradesh as belonging to China. The error has yet to be corrected.
Extracts below from an article{URL29} by Madhav Nalapat in ‘The Sunday
Guardian’ of 23 August 2014 are self-explanatory:
“Prime Minister Manmohan Singh rejected an August 2013 request
by senior officials in his government to correct a serious error,
dating back over 50 years, in India's official maps. In effect, this
oversight in official maps mistakenly gave China control of two
Arunachal Pradesh “fishtails”, a territory as large as Sikkim or Goa,
and continuously inhabited by Indian citizens...
“…The two ‘fishtail’ formations in Arunachal Pradesh were omitted
from maps prepared by the Survey of India during the 1960s,
although the area has always been under the control of India. No
public records exist as to why and how such a significant error was
made. In 1962, recognising the fact that this territory was Indian,
soldiers from the People's Liberation Army of China, who had
occupied the fishtails during November 1962, withdrew after the
unilateral ceasefire declared by Beijing that month.
“‘Since then and before, the area within the two fishtails has always
been occupied by our troops, as well as by the Mishmi tribe, all of
whom are citizens of India. Our claim on the territory is
incontestable and our maps ought to have been updated to reflect
this,’ a senior official stated.
“…Asked as to why official maps did not reflect the fact of the
‘fishtails’ being Indian territory, the reply was that ‘as the mistake
took place during Nehru's time, it was felt that correcting the maps
formally would draw attention to this mistake on the part of the then
Prime Minister and thereby tarnish his name’.
“A retired official claimed that ‘every government has protected
Nehru's reputation by refusing to make public facts dating from the
1940s that they saw as damaging to the image of Nehru’. He and a
former colleague saw Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 2013
refusal to formally change the map (a decision taken ‘after
consultations with the political authority’) as part of the effort to
protect the reputation of Jawaharlal Nehru by refusing to make
public any details of his failures, including the decision to keep
secret the Henderson-Brooks Report on the 1962 war, or to draw
attention to Nehru's failures even by the necessary step of rectifying
them.
“Interestingly, the fact that maps showed the two ‘fishtails’ as being
outside Indian territory was, according to a senior (and now retired) official,
‘brought to the attention of then Home Minister P. Chidambaram by the
(then) Director-General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in 2010,
along with reports of Chinese troops entering the area in 2011 and 2012, but
the response was to do nothing’...”{URL29}
NEHRU–LIAQUAT PACT 1950
With indescribable atrocities against Hindus in East Bengal going
unabated, the GoI made an appeal to Pakistan to call a halt on the same.
But, there was little response, till tit-for-tat brought Pakistan to the
negotiating table.
It is worth noting in this connection that Gandhian non-violent
principles yielded nothing, as this episode illustrates. In Rajlakshmi Debi’s
Bangla novel Kamal-lata, quoted by Tathagata Roy in his book ‘My People,
Uprooted: A Saga of the Hindus of Eastern Bengal’{TR} (Chapter 6), there is
a conversation described between a Hindu from Mymensingh town and a
Muslim from a Calcutta suburb sometime just after partition. In the process
of haggling the Muslim says “Excuse me, but your position and ours are not
the same. So long as Mahatma Gandhi is alive we have no fears. But you
won’t be able to live here [East Bengal] much longer.”
There was a marked difference between Punjab and Bengal in respect of
the partition. In Punjab, the carnage was on both sides, East Punjab and
West Punjab, although more in the Muslim-dominated West Punjab. In
Bengal, the mayhem was mostly in the Muslim-dominated East Bengal. In
Punjab, the migration was both ways. In a way, there was a population
transfer between West Punjab and East Punjab. In Bengal, the predominant
migration was that of Hindus from East Pakistan to West Bengal. There was
a reverse migration of Muslims too, but comparatively far less.
However, the continued violence against the Hindus in East Bengal had
begun provoking retaliation in West Bengal. For example, the anti-Muslim
riots in Howrah turned serious from 26 March 1950 onwards, leading to the
beginning of migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal by
March 1950. That is, the population transfer that had happened in Punjab in
1947-48 began to happen in Bengal belatedly by March 1950. It is this
which alarmed Pakistan and the Muslim League leaders, who had hitherto
been inciting the mobs in East Bengal, and were happy at Hindus being at
the receiving end.
It was only when the anti-Muslim riots in Howrah, in retaliation of the
on-going carnage in East Bengal, took a serious turn from 26 March 1950
onwards that the Pakistan PM Liaquat Ali made his first conciliatory
gesture in a speech at Karachi on 29 March 1950, and expressed his
intention to travel to New Delhi on 2 April 1950 to work out a solution with
Nehru.
Liaquat Ali hurried to New Delhi on 2 April 1950, and signed the
Nehru–Liaquat Pact, also called the Delhi Pact, on 8 April 1950. It provided
for safety of refugees when they returned to dispose of their property; return
of abducted women and looted property; derecognition of forced
conversions; complete and equal right of citizenship and security of life and
properties to minorities; and setting up of Minority Commission in each
country.
As expected, while India firmly implemented the Pact, not Pakistan.
While the anti-Muslim violence in West Bengal was put down with a firm
hand, and the migration of Muslims from West Bengal to East Bengal
ceased; the violence against the Hindus in East Bengal continued unabated,
so also the migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. That is,
the carnage became only one-sided: that of Hindus in East Bengal. Also, the
migration became only one way: Pakistan to India.
Looking to the track-record of the Muslim League leaders, who had
themselves been inciting the mobs, Nehru should have known what the
result of the pact would be. Sardar Patel was unhappy with the Pact, but
being in the cabinet, didn’t oppose it. However, Dr Shyama Prasad
Mukherjee and KC Niyogee, the two central ministers from West Bengal,
immediately resigned from the Union Cabinet in protest against the Pact.
Rather than facilitating transfer of population between West and East
Bengal, and removing forever the problem and the poison, Nehru extracted
the following “benefits” for India from the Nehru-Liaquat pact: (1)Checked
depletion of Muslim population from West Bengal and Assam by stopping
their migration to Pakistan. (2)Increased the population of Muslims in West
Bengal and Assam by allowing their reverse migration—allowing Muslims
to return who had migrated. (3)Allowed fresh migration of Muslims from
East Bengal. (5)Condemned the Hindus in East Bengal (a)to violence, (b)to
second-class status, and (c)to remain at the mercy of Muslims. (6)Forced
subsequent migration of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal (as the
atrocities did not subside in Pakistan).
NO TO INDIA'S UNSC MEMBERSHIP
India has been trying to become a permanent member of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a long time. But, it has still not
succeeded. When Obama came, we expected him to assure India on the US
backing for the UNSC seat for us, which he did. We were happy when
Sarkozy forcefully stated how a nation of over a billion could not be a
member of the UNSC. We were dismayed when WikiLeaks revealed
Hillary Clinton's remarks that “India was a self-appointed front-runner for
UNSC seat.” We have also been expecting China to support us in our quest
for the UNSC permanent membership. In short, we have been begging all
nations—big and small—to favour us with a permanent membership of the
UNSC.
But, over five decades ago we were getting the UNSC seat unasked—on
a platter! And, we—that is, Nehru—chose to rebuff the offer!! Why? Nehru
wanted the position to be given to the People’s Republic of China instead!
Being generous at India’s cost!!
First, the background. On account of the failure of the League of
Nations to prevent World War II, United Nations Organisation (UNO) was
formed in 1945 after World War II by the main allies in the War: US, UK,
USSR, France and China—ROC, Republic of China, headed by Chiang
Kai-shek. These five became the Permanent Members of the UNSC, with
veto powers. UNSC also has 10 rotating non-permanent members with a
term of two years. Indian media was thrilled when India became a non-
permanent member of the UNSC for a two-year term. Such is the extent of
Indian ambitions!
When UNO was formed, China was ROC—Republic of China—headed
by Chiang Kai-shek. In 1949, Communists took over China and founded
People's Republic of China (PRC ) under Mao. Chiang Kai-shek and his
ROC were driven away to Formosa—now called Taiwan. ROC continued to
be a member of the UN till 1971, and not PRC, as US and allies refused to
recognise it. They did not wish to have another communist country as a
member of the UNSC.
The move by the US to have India in the UNSC in lieu of China started
in 1950. In that context, in response to the letter of his sister Vijaya
Lakshmi Pandit, who was then the ambassador in the US, Nehru wrote:
“In your letter you mention that the State Department is trying to
unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to
put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going
to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It
would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a
break between us and China. I suppose the state department would
not like that, but we have no intention of following that course. We
shall go on pressing for China’s admission in the UN and the
Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come during the next
sessions of the General Assembly of the UN on this issue. The
people’s government of China is sending a full delegation there. If
they fail to get in there will be trouble which might even result in
the USSR and some other countries finally quitting the UN. That
may please the State Department, but it would mean the end of the
UN as we have known it. That would also mean a further drift
towards war. India because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a
permanent seat in the security council. But we are not going in at
the cost of China.”{URL37}
Was India under Nehru trying to take a high moral ground? But, why?
Why not look to your own country’s interest? Besides, even from the ethical
angle, was it moral? No. Why? Why support an aggressor of Tibet for
UNSC? Correct ethical and moral position for India should have dictated
trenchant opposition of China for the UNSC as long as it did not vacate
Tibet.
Later, both the US and the USSR were willing to accommodate India as
a Permanent Member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) in
1955, in lieu of Taiwan, or as a sixth member, after amending the UN
charter. This Nehru refused! Nehru wanted the seat to be given to PRC
(Peoples Republic of China), as Nehru did not want China to be
marginalised!
Shashi Tharoor states in his book ‘Nehru: The Invention of India’:
“Indian diplomats who have seen the files swear that at about the same time
Jawaharlal also declined a US offer to take the permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council then held, with scant credibility, by
Taiwan, urging that it be offered to Beijing instead... But it was one thing to
fulminate against Great Power machinations, another to run a national
foreign policy with little regard to the imperatives of power or the need of a
country to bargain from a position of strength.”{ST/183}
Reads a ‘Business Line’ article ‘UN reforms—a fading mirage?’ of 16
September 2009:{URL14}
“Ironically, around 1955, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was
offered the disputed Chinese Permanent Security Council seat by
the US to keep out the People’s Republic of China, and he also was
sounded out by the USSR Prime Minister, Nikolai Bulganin, to
allow China to take this seat while giving India a sixth permanent
seat in the Security Council. Nehru rejected this offer in deference
to China. History may have been different if this offer had been
subjected to serious negotiations. Through the decades since, we
have been struggling for this seat.”{URL14}
“S Gopal wrote in his book Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (volume
two): ‘He (Jawaharlal Nehru) rejected the Soviet offer to propose India as
the sixth permanent member of the Security Council and insisted that
priority be given to China's admission to the United Nations.’”{URL50}
When an MP JN Parekh raised a short notice question in the Lok Sabha
on 27 September on whether India had refused a UNSC seat informally
offered to her, Nehru’s reply was apparently less than honest: “There has
been no offer, formal or informal, of this kind. Some vague references have
appeared in the press about it which have no foundation in fact. The
composition of the Security Council is prescribed by the UN Charter,
according to which certain specified nations have permanent seats. No
change or addition can be made to this without an amendment of the
Charter. There is, therefore, no question of a seat being offered and India
declining it. Our declared policy is to support the admission of all nations
qualified for UN membership.”{URL50}
A Wilson Centre report of 11 March 2015 titled ‘Not at the Cost of
China: India and the United Nations Security Council, 1950’{URL37} states
that both the US and the USSR offered India permanent membership in the
UNSC but Nehru refused to accept it, and wanted it to be given to China
instead.
What was even more bizarre was that even after the 1962 India-China
war, India supported China in the UN. Declared Nehru’s sister Vijaya
Lakshmi Pandit, who was leading a delegation to the UN in 1963, that she
“doesn't understand that why a world-class organization such as the United
Nations has not included a big and powerful country like China.”{URL38}
This was yet another mega foreign policy and external security blunder
of Nehru as big as his Himalayan blunders in the same domain on Tibet,
Kashmir, Indus Water Treaty, Panchsheel, India-China Border Dispute, and
India-China War.
ADVOCATING UN/UNSC SEAT FOR CHINA
Even though never requested by China, India had been voluntarily and
vigorously advocating Peoples Republic of China (PRC) for the Permanent
Membership of the UNSC in lieu of Taiwan! India lobbied with all nations
for the UN membership and UNSC permanent seat, not for itself, but for
China!
Even though China had invaded Tibet, KM Panikkar, the Indian
Ambassador in Beijing, stated that to protest the Chinese invasion of Tibet
would be an interference to India's efforts on behalf of China in the UN!
That is, complaining against China on behalf of Tibet would show China in
bad light—as an aggressor—when it was more important for India to ensure
China's entry into the UN, for which India had been trying, and ensure that
this effort of India was not thwarted by taking up China's Tibet aggression!
What kind of crazy Nehruvian foreign policy was this? Our own national
security interests and the interests of Tibet were sought to be sacrificed to
help China enter the UN!!
Wrote Nehru in his note of 1 August 1955 on his tour of the Soviet
Union and other countries during June-July 1955:
“Informally, suggestions have been made by the United States that
China should be taken into the United Nations but not in the
Security Council and that India should take her place in the Security
Council. We cannot of course accept this as it means falling out with
China and it would be very unfair for a great country like China not
to be in the Security Council. We have, therefore, made it clear to
those who suggested this that we cannot agree to this suggestion.
We have even gone a little further and said that India is not anxious
to enter the Security Council at this stage, even though as a great
country she ought to be there. The first step to be taken is for China
to take her rightful place and then the question of India might be
considered separately.”{JNSW/Vol-29/303}
It was almost as if Nehru, for reasons one cannot fathom, totally ignored
India’s own strategic interests!
It is possible that the US and the USSR were more keen to show PRC its
place, than to really promote India. But, so what—if it also served India’s
interests. India should have been alive to its own self-interest. Why should
Nehru have been generous to China at the cost of India! Why should Nehru
have favoured a country for UNSC which attacked and annexed a peace-
loving country like Tibet,? What inexplicable foreign policy was that!!
But, note the contrast. In 2008, in a conclave of foreign ministers of
BRIC countries, when Russia proposed that the BRIC countries support
India's Permanent Membership of the UNSC, it was strongly opposed by
China!
Writes Arun Shourie in ‘Are we deceiving ourselves again?’:
“...The Communists seize power [in China]. Panditji [Nehru] is the
first to ensure that India recognizes the new Government. He also
urges countries like U.K. to hasten recognition. Although, it is
Chiang Kai-shek who has supported India’s struggle for
independence...Panditji immediately begins championing the cause
of the new Government [of China]. He urges the British, the
Americans, in fact everyone he can reach, that the Nationalist
Government [of Chiang Kai-shek] must be made to vacate its seat in
the United Nations, and that seat—which means necessarily the seat
both in the General Assembly and the Security Council—must be
given over to the Communist Government...”{AS/28-9}
Incidentally, there was another irony to India advocating the UN
membership of China in the fifties. As per ‘Mao: The Unknown Story’ by
Jung Chang and Jon Halliday{JC}, and other books, India thought it was
doing a great favour to China by advocating its membership of the UN, and
expecting it to feel obliged; however, China resented such overtures, for it
abhorred the patronizing attitude of Nehru—more so because China
considered itself to be the real leader of Asia, and abhorred India’s
pretensions to being a great power merely on rhetoric, with nothing to show
for it. Further, China did not really care then—in the fifties—of the UN
membership. In fact, it thought that becoming a member would oblige it to
abide by the UN charter, when it wanted to actually have a free hand in
dealing with Korea and Tibet.
If you analyse India's actions and moves then, we appear to be novices
and simpletons! Speaking to students of Lucknow University in November
1951, Ambedkar had said: “The government’s foreign policy failed to make
India stronger. Why should not India get a permanent seat in the UN
Security Council? Why has the prime minister not tried for it?"
NO INITIATIVE ON SRI LANKAN TAMIL PROBLEM
The Sri Lankan Tamil problem was allowed to fester and Nehru did
little to get the matter resolved in the fifties, when it could have been—and
it grew worse.
Both the ‘Sri Lankan Citizenship Act of 1948’ and the ‘Official
Language Act of 1956’ put the Tamils at a severe disadvantage. Sri Lanka
witnessed mayhem of Tamils in 1958, amounting almost to genocide. Tamils
everywhere were attacked mercilessly, and their properties were burnt or
looted. Sinhala mobs poured kerosene over many Tamils, and burn them
alive. Thousands were injured or killed. Many were internally displaced. It
was a case of state-sponsored terror.
Walter Crocker, who was then the Australian ambassador to India, says
in his book, ‘Nehru: A Contemporary’s Estimate’, that while India and
Nehru spoke against the treatment of Africans in the European colonies,
and justifiably so; in contrast, with regard to the ill treatment of Tamils in
Ceylon, they did precious little. Writes Crocker: “...and with little done to
save Indians in Ceylon from treatment which was worse than the treatment
meted out to Africans in European colonies in Africa.”
But, that was typical of Nehru. He railed against the discrimination and
savagery in distant lands—say, against blacks in South Africa—but
remained conspicuously silent about our own people next door: against the
Hindus in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), or against the Tamils in Sri
Lanka. Because, the former required only talking; while the latter required
action too!
If India had succeeded in doing the needful in the fifties, much of the
trouble that Sri Lanka and the Tamils and the Sinhalese faced subsequently
could have been avoided. It is in such cases that the statesmanship of a
leader is tested.
DELAYED LIBERATION OF GOA
Why should it have taken 14 long years after the Indian independence to
throw out the Portuguese in 1961? If the British could quit the huge Indian
mainland, couldn't Nehru get a small territory vacated? It was yet another
example of faulty thinking, inability to take decisions, failure of foreign
policy, lack of guts, and indifference to the defence and security of India.
During a long discussion on Goa in the Foreign Affairs Committee in
1950, Sardar Patel kept to himself listening to the various tame
alternatives, then suddenly said at the end, “Shall we go in? It is two hours’
work!” Patel was very keen to fulfil the assurance given to the Goa
Congress in his letter of 14 May 1946 promising freedom from foreign
domination. He was all for using force to settle the matter quickly. But,
Nehru was much too soft to take any effective steps. Patel felt exasperated.
{BK/521}
Wrote Durga Das{DD/250}: “Gandhi advised the people [Indians] of the
French and Portuguese possessions in India not to revolt against their
overlords on 15th August but to trust Nehru to do for his kith and kin what
he was doing to assist the Indonesians to become free. Indirectly, Gandhi
was voicing the fact that he differed from Patel’s view on Goa and
Pondicherry and other foreign enclaves and agreed with Nehru’s that the
question of their liberation could wait for some time.”{DD/250}
With Nehru and Gandhi desired action could always wait. Idle and
misleading talks substituted for decision and action. Both are responsible
for the never-ending Kashmir problem. Left to Gandhi and Nehru, and had
Patel not been on the scene, while Hyderabad and Junagadh would have
been another Kashmir or Pakistan; there would have been dozens of
independent Princely States sucking up to Britain or Pakistan, and
becoming permanent headaches like Kashmir and Pakistan!
NEHRU’S NO TO NUCLEAR ARMS
The then US president John F Kennedy was an admirer of Indian
democracy, and when he learnt that China was on its way to detonate a
nuclear device, he wanted that it ought to be a democratic country like
India, and not communist China, which should have nuclear capability. The
Kennedy administration was ready to help India out with nuclear
deterrence. But, Nehru rejected the offer.
Currently, India has been canvassing support from various countries to
become a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—in vain, so far.
Had Nehru gone along with Kennedy’s advice, India would have
detonated a nuclear device well before China. Had that happened, not only
would India have been a member of the NSG long, long ago, but China
would not have dared to attack India, nor would Pakistan have taken
liberties to attack India in 1965.
Former foreign secretary Maharajakrishna Rasgotra also made remarks
to the above effect at the time of release of his book ‘A Life in Diplomacy’
at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), as per the report in ‘The Hindu’ of
13 June 2016.{URL49}
‘The Hindu’ report further mentions:{URL49}
“…Kennedy’s hand-written letter was accompanied by a technical
note from the chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
setting out the assistance his organisation would provide to Indian
atomic scientists to detonate an American device from atop a tower
in Rajasthan desert, the release said... In the letter, Kennedy had said
he and the American establishment were aware of Nehru’s strong
views against nuclear tests and nuclear weapons, but emphasised the
political and security threat China’s test would spell for Nehru’s
government and India’s security, it said, adding the American
leader’s letter emphasised that “nothing is more important than
national security.”{URL49}
Gandhian unproven, and never proven earlier or later, principles of non-
violence had not only totally vitiated free India’s approach to retaining its
own freedom (that it got after a millennium) by strengthening its defence
and external security; but also gave excuse to weaklings like Nehru to not
fulfil their basic responsibility as prime minister of protecting India, under
the garb of the hypocrisy of high moral principles, and being flag-bearers of
world-peace.
Nehru failed to grasp the deterrence value of nuclear weapons. What is
surprising is what were his cabinet colleagues, and other leaders of the
ruling and the opposition parties doing? Were they mere mute and spineless
witnesses to whatever the dictator Nehru chose to do?
NO SETTLEMENT WITH PAKISTAN
Nehru failed to reach an accommodation with Pakistan during his life
time, making our western and north western borders sensitive, costing us
heavy to secure them. The crux of the Indo-Pak dispute was Kashmir; and
Pakistan was unwilling for settlement and for no-war pact till the Kashmir
issue was resolved. Kashmir would have been a non-issue had Nehru
allowed Sardar Patel to handle it; or had Gandhi not made Nehru the first
PM. It was Nehru’s responsibility to resolve the issues he had created.
Nehru unfortunately expired leaving both the issues—Kashmir and Indo-
Pak settlement—unsolved.
The India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 on sharing of
waters from the six Indus-system rivers was an unprecedented (by any
nation) generous “give away” (like the India-China Panchsheel agreement
later of 1954) by Nehru to Pakistan at the cost of J&K and Punjab (details
in ‘Blunder–50’), with no reciprocal “take”. It didn’t occur to Nehru to
make it conditional upon Pakistan settling on J&K and other matters to
ensure secure western and north western borders.
Intended to palliate India’s alarm at Pakistan’s entry into SEATO in
1958, General Ayub Khan proposed security alliance/pact with India to
Nehru. Nehru summarily and scornfully rejected the proposal remarking
security alliance “against whom?”
INDUS WATER TREATY (IWT):
NEHRU’S SECOND HIMALAYAN BLUNDER
Nehru’s First Himalayan Blunder: Tibet’s Erasure as a Nation.
Nehru’s Second Himalayan Blunder: Indus Water Treaty (IWT).
Nehru’s Third Himalayan Blunder: India-China War.
------
“No armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly
as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's
permanently shutting off the source of waters that keep the fields and people
of Pakistan green.”
—David Lilienthal, former Chief, Tennessee Valley Authority, US{Swa6}
“The ‘Aqua Bomb’ is truly India’s most powerful weapon against Pakistan.
As the upper riparian state, India can control the flow of the seven rivers
that flow into the Indus Basin. And yet, in the last 69 years, only once has it
exercised this great power—and not very well.”{Swa6}
------
In the India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 on sharing of
waters from the six Indus-system rivers, Nehru gave away far, far more than
what was adequate, miserably failing to envisage India’s future needs; and
did not even leverage it to have the J&K dispute settled—as the upper
riparian state, India could have called the shots, but Nehru, by unwisely
agreeing to the World Bank (manipulated by the US and the West)
mediation, surrendered all its advantages.{Swa6}
India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty of 1960 has parallel with India-China
Panchsheel agreement of 1954. Both had generous “give away” but no
reciprocal “take” and both were thanks to Nehru!
Brahma Chellaney writes in ‘The Economic Times’ of 10 May 2012:
{URL48}
“Jawaharlal Nehru ignored the interests of Jammu and Kashmir and,
to a lesser extent, Punjab when he signed the 1960 Indus Waters
Treaty, under which India bigheartedly agreed to the exclusive
reservation of the largest three of the six Indus-system rivers for
downstream Pakistan.
“In effect, India signed an extraordinary treaty indefinitely setting
aside 80.52% of the Indus-system waters for Pakistan—the most
generous water-sharing pact thus far in modern world history.
“In fact, the volume of waters earmarked for Pakistan from India
under the Indus treaty is more than 90 times greater than what the
US is required to release for Mexico under the 1944 US-Mexico
Water Treaty, which stipulates a minimum transboundary delivery
of 1.85 billion cubic metres of the Colorado River waters yearly.
“Despite Clinton’s advocacy of a Teesta treaty, the fact is that the
waters of the once-mighty Colorado River are siphoned by seven
American states, leaving only a trickle for Mexico.
“India and Nehru did not envisage—you may call it a lack of
foresight on their part—that water resources would come under
serious strain due to developmental and population pressures.
Today, as the bulk of the Indus system’s waters continue to flow to
an adversarial Pakistan waging a war by terror, India’s own Indus
basin, according to the 2030 Water Resources Group, is reeling
under a massive 52% deficit between water supply and demand...
“Worse still, the Indus treaty has deprived Jammu and Kashmir of
the only resource it has—water. The state’s three main rivers—the
Chenab, the Jhelum (which boast the largest crossborder discharge
of all the six Indus-system rivers) and the main Indus stream—have
been reserved for Pakistan’s use, thereby promoting alienation and
resentment in the Indian state.
“This led the Jammu and Kashmir state legislature to pass a
bipartisan resolution in 2002 calling for a review and annulment of
the Indus treaty. To help allay popular resentment in the state over
the major electricity shortages that is hampering its development,
the central government subsequently embarked on hydropower
projects like Baglihar and Kishenganga. But Pakistan—as if to
perpetuate the alienation in the Indian state—took the Baglihar
project to a World Bank-appointed international neutral expert and
Kishenganga to the International Court of Arbitration, which last
year stayed all further work on the project...”{URL48}
Perplexing thing is that Nehru could settle an international water issue
like Indus Water Treaty, for it involved only a generous give-away on the
part of India; but he failed to tackle India’s own internal river-water
disputes like those relating to the sharing of Narmada water, or the Krishna-
Kaveri dispute.
NEHRU & ISRAEL
On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted on
the modified UN Partition Plan of Palestine that effectively included
creation of Israel for Jews. Most (33) nations voted in favour: they included
the US, the European countries, the Soviet Union and the East-European
countries, and the Latin-American countries. 33 countries votes in favour of
the UN resolution, and 13 against. There were 10 abstentions and 1 absent.
Abstentions included Republic of China and Yugoslavia.
Those against included 10 Muslim nations, namely Afghanistan, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen, and
3 others, namely Cuba, Greece, and one more country. Guess which? Most
regretfully, it was India—that was thanks to the blighted Nehruvian era.
The above was despite Albert Einstein’s personal appeal to Nehru. Here
are extracts from the article "When Nehru Shunned Einstein’s Request To
Support The Jewish Cause" by Manish Maheswari in Swarajya of 13
January 2017:{Swa5}
“On 11 June 1947, Albert Einstein made an extraordinary
intervention in global geo-political affairs by writing to then prime
minister-designate of India, Jawaharlal Nehru. He implored India’s
leader to endorse the ‘Zionist effort to recreate a Jewish Homeland
in Palestine’. Appealing to Nehru’s moral sensibilities, he focused
on the ethical question of whether the Jews should be allowed to
have a homeland in the ‘soil of their fathers’. In his letter, Einstein
described the historical wrong done to the Jewish people, who had
been ‘victimized and hounded’ for centuries. He wrote that millions
of Jews had died not only because of the Nazi gas chambers but also
because ‘there was no spot on the globe where they could find
sanctuary’. Zionism was the means to end this anomaly of history,
he wrote, and a solution for this persecuted people to settle in a land
to which they had ‘historic ties’.{Swa5}
A nation which got independence only a few months earlier on 15
August 1947 after having suffered foreign domination, ignominy, insult to
its culture and religion and back-breaking exploitation for over 1000 years
and knew in a miserably hard way what it was like to be at the receiving
end should have valued independence or creation of another nation,
especially those for Jews, who richly-deserved it—from all possible angles.
Jews had suffered for centuries like the Hindus had suffered, though much
longer. We should have had empathy for them.
But, Nehru? What can one say of his convoluted thinking, defective
world-view and faulty approach! India could have at least abstained from
voting, rather than voting against.
India under Nehru was amongst the first nations to recognise PRC
(People's Republic of China) when Communists took over in 1949; but
when it came to Israel, Nehru did not recognise it as a nation till September
1950, even though it was established on 14 May 1948, and most nations of
the world had recognised it!
While Nehru campaigned for admission of China to the UN and even
into the UNSC, sacrificing its own chances; India not only voted against the
UN resolution of 1947 that had the effect of creating Israel, but also voted
against Israel's admission in the UN in 1949.
Nehru could recognise China’s sovereignty over Tibet, which had an
adverse impact on India, but not build relations with Israel, with which
India had much in common, and relations with whom would have been very
helpful in various fields.
Indira Gandhi, like her father, and Rajiv Gandhi, like her mother,
maintained their distance from Israel. It was left to the wise non-Dynasty
Prime Minister Narsimha Rao to establish formal relations with Israel in
1992.
It is worth noting that despite Nehru-Indira Dynasty's unjust treatment
of Israel, Israel helped India in whatever manner it could in India's multiple
wars with its neighbours. India sought and got arms from Israel both in the
1962 India-China war{Hin1} and in the 1971 Bangladesh war.
What Nehru-Indira Dynasty did was driven by their self-interest of vote-
bank politics at the cost of the nation.
Despite severe lack of natural resources, wars, and enemies on all sides,
the new nation of Israel created only in 1948 became a shining first-world
nation within a few decades, while India under the Nehru dynasty remained
a poor, miserable, third-rate, third-world country.
India’s relationship with Israel are getting better, and are likely to
improve further, under the current dispensation. Israel has been supplying
us critical military and security equipments. Its modern and innovative
agricultural practices are worth emulating by India. India must fully support
Israel in the UN.
For details on Israel, and India-Israel relationship, readers can refer to
my blog-series ‘Israel & the Jews (I-IV): FAQs, Truths & Interesting Facts’
at:
http://rajnikantp.blogspot.in/2014/10/israel-jews-i-faqs-truths-
fascinating.html
INTERNATIONAL RECORD IN INSECURE BORDERS
Nehru’s policies resulted in thousands of kilometres of all land
boundaries of India, whether in the north or east or west or northeast or
northwest, becoming sensitive and insecure, requiring massive investments
to protect them.
What is noteworthy is that there were enough opportunities to
peacefully settle the boundaries with China in the 1950s and early 1960s,
yet most irresponsibly Nehru failed to encash on them.
The issue of boundary with Pakistan is the product of the Kashmir
problem, which was actually created by Nehru.
Thanks to Gandhi and his choice for the first PM of India, perhaps India
is the only country of its size in the world with such a long unsettled border
with a giant neighbour, and disputes with another.
Rather than solving a plethora of severe problems crying for attention,
the Nehruvian era added new problems, and not just added them, made
them more difficult and almost insolvable, the most severe being securing
the long borders.
Thanks to the Himalayas, the north from time immemorial has been the
most secure natural boundary. Nehruvian policies managed to make them
insecure! Kashmir is a Nehru-created problem, and because of it Indo-Pak
border is also insecure.
Northeast has been made insecure thanks to gross misgovernance,
corruption, and insurgency, and to Nehru turning a blind eye to
proselytization, and to Muslim migrations from East Pakistan (Bangladesh).
NEGLECTING SOUTHEAST ASIA
Nehru gave little importance to the relations with Southeast Asian
countries, and was patronizing towards them, even though India had much
to learn from them looking to their far better economic growth rate. Here is
an example of Nehru’s snobbishness. Even as India was going around the
world with a begging bowl, Nehru didn’t flinch from being sarcastic on
Southeast Asian countries and their economy, which had actually been
doing far better. Writes Durga Das in ‘India from Curzon to Nehru &
After’{DD/342}:
“A talk with the Prime Minister of Thailand was very revealing. He
complained that Nehru had characterised the Thai Government as
corrupt [What about the financial scandals in the Nehru
government?] and said the country had a ‘Coca-Cola economy’…
Thailand, the Prime Minister explained to me, had a long tradition
of independence, and if she had taken shelter under the U.S.
umbrella it had done so to safeguard her independence. If Nehru
was willing to underwrite their security [it’s another matter India
could not secure itself!], the Thais would prefer to be with India
since Thai culture was predominantly Indian [He didn’t know that
India under Nehru didn’t care for its own culture!]… When I
suggested that a visit by the King and the Prime Minister to India
would improve matters, he replied that their very experienced
Ambassador in New Delhi had warned them against inviting an
insult by undertaking such a visit. They treated their ruler as a demi-
god, and he would not go to India unless assured of a cordial
welcome.”{DD/342}.
India had even rebuffed the fast-growing Japan. Krishna Menon, the
right-hand man of Nehru, had snubbed offers of the Japanese corporate
representatives for collaboration saying it was out of question on account of
the vast differences in the policies of the two countries.{DD/346}
Lee Kwan Yew took Singapore’s per capita income from $400 in 1959
to $55,000. Yet in the Nehru-Indira era, Indian socialists viewed Lee with
contempt as a neo-colonial puppet destined for humiliation and poverty.
{URL64}
INDIA VS. THE US, UK & THE WEST
India would have gained much had it aligned with the West, or had at
least been pro-West, or bent a little towards them, especially the US and the
UK.
Had that been so perhaps there would have been no Kashmir issue, and
neither China nor Pakistan would have dared to attack India. Besides, the
Indian economy, had we adopted the capitalist ways of the West, would
have been in a far, far better shape, and perhaps by 1980 India would have
been a first-world nation.
Instead, Nehru, although he talked non-alignment, showed his bend
towards the Communist bloc. That was because Nehru was basically and
sadly a socialist in outlook. Nehru’s non-aligned hypocrisy was exposed
when he failed to condemn the Soviet invasion of Hungary of 1956.
Surprisingly, during the 1962 India-China war, while the communist or
the non-aligned nations did not come to India’s help, it was the US, of
whom the Nehru&Co were very critical, that came to the rescue of India.
Please check on Kennedy’s advice to India on the nuclear arms in the
subchapter ‘Nehru’s NO to Nuclear Arms’ above.
With the US, a country vitally important to the India’s interests, Nehru’s
attitude was indifferent, as would be obvious from what follows. Wrote
Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Special Assistant to President Kennedy and a
distinguished historian, on Nehru’s visit to the US in 1961 in his book:
“His [Nehru’s] strength was failing, and he retained control more by
momentum of the past than by mastery of the present... Nehru
listened without expression… In conversation he displayed interest
and vivacity on with Jacqueline [Kennedy]… The private meetings
between the President and the Prime Minister were no better. Nehru
was terribly passive, and at limes Kennedy was hard put to keep the
conversation going... It was, the President said later, like trying to
grab something in your hand, only to have it turn out to be just fog...
The following spring, reminiscing about the meeting, Kennedy
described it to me as ‘a disaster; the worst Head of State visit I have
had’… It was certainly a disappointment, and Kennedy’s vision of
India had been much larger before the visit than it would ever be
again. Nehru was obviously on the decline; his country, the
President now decided, would be increasingly preoccupied with its
own problems and turn more and more into itself. Though Kennedy
retained his belief in the necessity of helping India achieve its
economic goals, he rather gave up hope, after seeing Nehru, that
India would be in the next years a great affirmative force in the
world or even in South Asia.{ASJ/524=6}
About Nehru’s visit to the US in 1961, wrote Stanley Wolpert: “The
long flight had wearied Nehru, but he perked up as soon as he saw Jackie
[Jacqueline Kennedy] and was most excited by the prospect of her
imminent visit to India with her lovely sister, both of whom he invited to
stay in his house, in the suite that Edwina had always occupied. But
Kennedy found Nehru so unresponsive in their talks—which for the most
part turned out to be Kennedy monologues—that he later rated his summit
with Nehru as ‘the worst State visit’ he had ever experienced. Nehru’s age
and reluctance to ‘open up’ in Washington proved most frustrating to his
young host, who also found infuriating Nehru’s focus on his wife and his
inability to keep his hands from touching her.”{Wolp2/480}
This is what Kuldip Nayar wrote on the same visit:
“Kennedy organised a breakfast meeting between Nehru and top US
economists and foreign policy experts. Nehru was late for the
meeting and generally monosyllabic in his responses. The breakfast
ended in 20 minutes. Some of them reported this to Kennedy who
remarked in the presence of his aides that Nehru had ‘lived too
long’.”{KN}
From the above it appears that Nehru’s actions and behaviour were
dictated more by his personal predilections, his arrogance, and his leftist,
pro-USSR, pro-communist bend, than by what was in the best interest of an
emerging nation like India.
Wrote MN Roy:
“For her economic development India requires foreign financial aid
which can come only from the United States. The latter had
repeatedly expressed readiness to extend the help as in the case of
Europe. But Nehru’s foreign policy has prevented India from
receiving the help she requires. From this point of view his visit to
the U.S.A. was an all-round failure. It yielded no concrete result,
and pleased nobody except himself. He disappointed American
statesmen by his refusal to take sides in cold war, and annoyed
businessmen by the morbid suspicion of political strings attached to
foreign capital. At home, realistic politicians and big business were
displeased with Nehru because he failed to bring home the bacon.
The all-round failure and disappointment were due to the Actor’s
[Nehru’s] desire to draw applause from the world leftist gallery, and
also to increase his popularity with the vocal middle class at home
by pandering to their national conceit.”{Roy/5-6}
The New York Times described Nehru as “one of the greatest
disappointments of the post-war era”.{Roy/7}
‘NON-ALIGNMENT’: NOT ALIGNED WITH NATIONAL INTERESTS
Rather than having strong allies on its side to deter others, India, thanks
to Nehru's self-defeating foreign policy of ‘Non-Alignment’, remained
non-aligned so that Pakistan (aligned with the West) and China (aligned
with the USSR) felt free to attack India, knowing it to be a non-risky
business as no country would come to the rescue of a non-aligned India in
its hours of distress. Common sense dictated that till you became strong
enough to defend yourself, have sensible pacts with some strong nations to
take care of your security.
Non-aligned policy fetched no gains for India.{Swa3} If India had aligned
itself with the US and the West, not only would India have been much
better off economically, China would not have dared to attack India, nor
would Pakistan have either attacked Kashmir or played mischief in J&K.
Further, the UK and the USA would not have favoured Pakistan over India
on Kashmir, and the Kashmir issue would have been solved in India’s
favour long ago. By being apparently loosely aligned with the Soviets, India
effectively chose to be on the losing side of the Cold War, with all its severe
political and economic disadvantages and handicaps.
Pakistan was much smarter. After its creation, its first PM Liaquat Ali
Khan accepted an invitation from Moscow—deliberately. The purpose was
to alarm the opposite side in the cold war: the US and the UK. Expectedly,
the US and the UK made a deal with Pakistan: in return for Pakistan joining
the Anglo-American Military bloc, they would support Pakistan on
Kashmir and other matters against India.
Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:
“As late as 1956, [John Foster] Dulles [the then US Secretary of
State], who distrusted Nehru as much as Nehru distrusted him—as
was not concealed when Dulles visited India in 1954—said that ‘the
conception of neutrality is obsolete, immoral, and short-sighted’.
For Dulles, neutrality in all forms, including non-alignment, was a
refusal to choose between evil and good; that is to say, between
communism and anti-communism.”{Croc/94}
All that non-alignment did was it helped project the image of Nehru on
the world stage. It helped grant Nehru rhetorical leadership in non-aligned
forums, but it did precious little for India. In fact India grievously suffered
from that stand. In short, Nehru’s policy of ‘Non-Alignment’ was not
aligned to the Indian national interests.
CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF DEFENCE & EXTERNAL SECURITY
The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and
death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry
which can on no account be neglected.
—Sun Tzu, ‘Art of War’
For a country that had been under the foreign domination for about a
millennium, first under the Muslim invaders and then under the British, it
was natural to expect that its own Indian rulers after independence in 1947
would give top priority to its external security and defence.
But, did that happen? No. Nehru and the Congress, brought up on the
lethal dose of non-violence, pacifism and Gandhism, substituted wishful
thinking for realpolitik, and irresponsibly put India’s external security
requirements on the back-burner.
From 1915 onwards, when Gandhi returned from South Africa, the top
Gandhian leaders had 32 long years till independence in 1947 to study,
discuss, argue, and thrash out all issues vital to independent India. When in
the British jails together for many years, they had long, uninterrupted and
undisturbed times to work out all details under the sun for free India.
In fact, all relevant policies on a variety of vital matters like external
security, internal security, foreign policy, industrial and agricultural policy,
education policy, and so on should have been formulated by mutual
consent, leaving no room for leaders like Nehru to plough their own furrow
after independence. But, no. It seems they pondered only on vital subjects
like Ahimsa, communalism, secularism, fasting, nutrition, and so on! For
external security, it appears they banked only on Ahimsa and their own
good conduct, and reciprocation of that conduct from their potential
enemies and adversaries—wishful thinking had no limits!
Wrote SK Verma in “1962: The War That Wasn't”: “With Bose’s exit
and Sardar Patel’s death in 1950, there was no one who could provide the
necessary inspiration for the reconstruction of an army (that had so far
served British interests) into an integrated military instrument that could
identify potential threats and tackle them militarily. Nehru, unlike Bose and
Patel, veered away from building military power.”{SKV/L-646}
Jaswant Singh wrote in ‘India at Risk: Misconceptions and
Misadventures of Security Policy’ that “independent India simply
abandoned the centrality of strategic culture as the first ingredient of
vigorous and bold national policies.”{JS2}
The seeds of India's disgraceful debacle in 1962 India-China War were
sown soon after Independence by none other than Nehru himself, as would
be shockingly obvious from the incident below.
Shortly after independence, the first Army Chief of independent India Lt
General Sir Robert Lockhart took a strategic defence plan for India to
Nehru, seeking a Government directive in the matter.
Reportedly, Lockhart returned shell-shocked at Nehru’s response: “The
PM took one look at my paper and blew his top. ‘Rubbish! Total rubbish!
We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa [non-violence]. We
foresee no military threats. Scrap the army! The police are good enough to
meet our security needs’, shouted Nehru.”{URL32}
Risking country’s defence on the altar of “Ahimsa”, and talking of
scrapping the army and making do with only the Police, Nehru actually
went ahead and reduced the army strength by about 50,000 troops after
independence despite the looming threat in Kashmir, and the Chinese entry
into Tibet.{URL33}
Noted MO Mathai in the context of Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India:
“Several times Khrushchev emphasised the need for a first-class aircraft
industry for a large country like India and volunteered to send some of
Soviet Union’s best experts in the field. Somehow it did not register with
Nehru and no follow-up action was taken. It was only after the Chinese
invasion that we woke up to the grim realities and secured Soviet
collaboration in the production of modern military aircraft.”{Mac2/L-4541}
Wrote RNP Singh in ‘Nehru: A Troubled Legacy’: “Nehru took the
matter of defence so lightly that in an answer to a question on Indian
defence against a potential aggressor, he asserted that the nation had the
spirit to defend itself by lathis (sticks) and stones if need be; ‘Therefore, I
am not afraid of anybody invading India from any quarter.’ While
delivering a speech in Parliament, Nehru once advised in an idealistic
manner, ‘If you better your morale and determine not to surrender, nothing
can conquer you.’ Nehru… told a press conference: ‘I think the proper way
to consider defence is to begin to forget the military aspect.’”{RNPS/120}
Given such a mind-set, only God could have saved India in times of
disaster. Unfortunately, God too abandoned India in the 1962 War. Perhaps
God was cheesed off by the “rational”, “scientific-minded”, atheist-agnostic
Nehru!
But, what did Nehru do? Despite the “Glimpses of World History” and
the “Discovery of India”, Nehru failed to discover that India suffered
slavery for well over a millennium on account of its weakness to defend
itself. No wonder, he neglected modernisation of the army, strengthening of
defence, and pacts with powerful nations to deter enemies and ensure
India’s security.
FOREIGN TO FOREIGN POLICY
The main reason Gandhi had made Nehru India’s first PM was his
notion that Nehru had good international exposure and expertise in foreign
affairs, and he would project India well on the international stage.
People eulogise Nehru for his expertise in international affairs, and
credit him as the founder of India’s foreign policy. Founder he was, but
were the foundations solid? Or, were they rickety? Or, were there no
foundations at all? Was it all airy ad-hocism, and one-man’s-pontifications?
Crucially, was it a foreign policy that benefited India? Or, was it merely a
device for Nehru for self-posturing and to project himself internationally?
If ours was a good foreign policy, how come all our major neighbours
became our enemies? And, a friendly neighbour, Tibet, disappeared as an
independent nation? How come all our borders turned insecure during the
Nehruvian era, costing us a fortune to defend them? How come no nation
came to India’s rescue (including Nehru’s non-aligned friends) in its war
with China, except the nation Nehru and Krishna Menon always panned—
the United States{Red1}; or the nation Nehru refused to recognise—Israel?
{Hin1} You evaluate a policy by its results, not by its verbosity and
pompousness.
Nehru, thanks to his inexplicably adamant and unreasonable approach,
ended up creating and complicating India-China border problem and
allowed it to drift into an unfortunate war.
Wrote Walter Crocker in ‘Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate’:
“He [Nehru] insisted on keeping the portfolio of external affairs for
himself. It was a disadvantage to him that he did so, because, as
head of the whole government of India, he had to deal with a range
of internal problems already too much for one mind. And it was a
disadvantage to the Indian foreign office and the Indian diplomatic
service. In effect he did damage to both, and at a formative and
impressionable stage of their growth...”{Croc/56}
“…it was not a good service [Foreign Services in Nehru’s day]—
nothing like good enough for a country of India’s importance. There
was not enough training or professional competence, not enough
esprit de corps, and too much eagerness to please the boss. Nehru
was too busy and preoccupied to get to know the necessary detail, or
to get to know the officers except for a handful of very senior ones
or a few favourites. This encouraged sycophancy, personal ad hoc
approaches, and a mixture of amateurishness and subjectivity.
Indian embassies were too often sending back to Delhi the kind of
reports which they thought would be congenial to their master. It
was scarcely improved by the ambiguous position allowed to
Krishna Menon, who in some fields was virtually the second foreign
minister for five years or so prior to his fall in 1962…”{Croc/57}
“Nehru rooted India’s foreign policy in abstract ideas rather than a
strategic conception of national interests. He disdained alliances, pacts,
and treaties, seeing them as part of the old rules of realpolitik, and was
uninterested in military matters... Nehru tended to put hope above
calculation. When he was warned that Communist China would probably
seek to annex Tibet, for example, he doubted it, arguing that it would be
foolish and impractical adventure. And even after Beijing did annex Tibet in
1951, Nehru would not reassess the nature of Chinese interests along
India’s northern border…” —Fareed Zakaria {Zak/148}
This is what Dr Ambedkar had to say in his resignation (from the
Nehru’s cabinet) speech of 27 September 1951:
“The third matter which has given me cause, not merely for
dissatisfaction but for actual anxiety and even worry, is the foreign
policy of the country. Any one, who has followed the course of our
foreign policy and along with it the attitude of other countries
towards India, could not fail to realize the sudden change that has
taken place in their attitude towards us. On 15th of August, 1947
when we began our life as an independent country, there was no
country which wished us ill. Every country in the world was our
friend. Today, after four years, all our friends have deserted us. We
have no friends left. We have alienated ourselves. We are pursuing a
lonely furrow with no one even to second our resolutions in the
U.N.O. When I think of our foreign policy, I am reminded of what
Bismarck and Bernard Shaw have said. Bismarck has said that
‘politics is not a game of realizing the ideal. Politics is the game of
the possible.’ Bernard Shaw not very long ago said that good ideals
are good but one must not forget that it is often dangerous to be too
good. Our foreign policy is in complete opposition to these words of
wisdom uttered by two of the world’s greatest men… This
[relatively] colossal expenditure [on defence] is the direct result of
our foreign policy. We have to foot the whole of our Bill for our
defence ourselves because we have no friends on which we can
depend for help in any emergency that may arise. I have been
wondering whether this is the right sort of foreign policy.”{Amb5}
Ambedkar criticised Nehru’s foreign policy saying: “The key note of
our foreign policy is to solve the problems of other countries and not to
solve the problems of our own country!”{DK/456}
Nehru himself had this to admit:
“We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and
we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our creation.”{Zak/149}
* * * * *
{ 6 }
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A Note on Citations
Citations are given as super-scripts in the text, such as {Azad/128}.
Citation Syntax & Examples
{Source-Abbreviation/Page-Number}
e.g. {Azad/128} = Azad, Page 128
{Source-Abbreviation/Volume-Number/Page-Number}
e.g. {CWMG/V-58/221} = CWMG, Volume-58, Page 221
{Source-Abbreviation} … for URLs (articles on the web), and for digital books
(including Kindle-Books), that are searchable, where location or page-number may not be
given.
e.g. {VPM2}, {URL15}
{Source-Abbreviation/Location-Number}… for Kindle Books
e.g. {VPM2}, {VPM2/L-2901}
Bibliography
Column Contains
A Abbreviations used in citations.
B B=Book, D=Digital Book/eBook on the Website other than Kindle, K=Kindle eBook, U=URL of
Document/Article on Web, W=Website, Y=YouTube
C Book/Document/Web URL Particulars
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